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The rhetorician and philosopher Richard Weaver has been an unfairly marginalized figure in 
rhetorical studies, consigned to the margins for his conservative political views and insistence 
upon the reality of Platonic transcendental forms. In this dissertation, I advance an argument that 
Weaver is not only a major figure who deserves reexamination, but also that a true understanding 
of Weaver must be based upon his education and training by the Southern Agrarian writers, 
critics, and poets. Analyzing Weaver’s writings through the framework of Agrarian thought, I 
use the categories of practice (practical and traditional knowledge), place (geographic identity), 
and solidarity (societal common purpose) to suggest new ways forward for rhetorical studies, 

















One of the goals of doctoral work in the humanities, more than a few faculty members 
remarked to me during the last half-decade, is to “enter the conversation”: to take one’s place at 
the table of scholarly debate and discussion. The subtext of this reminder is that there is no such 
thing as the mythical lone scholar, toiling away like Montaigne in a neo-Gothic castle tower. 
Indeed, no scholar gets through any level of work alone. Many people have helped me in 
manners beyond measure.  
 In the Department of Communication Studies, students and faculty alike are fortunate to 
count Suzanne Grachek and John Fackler as allies. Suzanne and John make the department run, 
and I am extremely grateful to them for all the help over the years. John and I talked literature 
and politics many times, and I doubt he knows how much those conversations meant to someone 
desperately needing a break from high theory.  
 My fellow students were a constant source of support, friendship, and amiable academic 
rivalry. I became good friends with many of them, and I hope our relationships endure as we 
spread out to other schools. I’d like to particularly thank Benjamin Garner, Chelsea Graham, 
Cooper Wakefield, Vince Meserko, Mike Anderson, and Eddie Glenn.  
 Dr. Brent Steele was a highly respected professor of political science here at KU when I 
first encountered him in a class on international relations and social theory. Aside from being 
incredibly intelligent, he is also an amazing and dynamic teacher. It was in that class that I first 
encountered the objections to Enlightenment thought that sent me down the road toward this 
dissertation. He is now at the University of Utah, and I doubt he could ever know just how much 
his lectures influenced my thinking.  
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 Dr. Charles Marsh served as my outside committee member, and I’m so grateful to him 
for the lessons in Isocratean thought and the helpful research suggestions. Dr. Marsh is a 
classical rhetoric scholar in the journalism school—no easy feat in the age of the algorithm. I 
have told every journalism major I’ve encountered at KU to seek him out, take his class, and 
simply listen. He is a true bright spot in the KU professoriate.  
 Dr. Beth Innocenti was my first teacher in my first class on my first day of the doctoral 
program, and on that day we read none other than Richard Weaver—excerpts from The Ethics of 
Rhetoric, to be exact. If you’d told me on that day that he would be the subject of my 
dissertation, I would likely have replied: “This boring curmudgeon?” Surely Dr. Innocenti’s 
enthusiasm for that text lodged somewhere in my subconscious, for when I came across an 
excerpt from Ideas Have Consequences two years later, purely by chance while looking for 
another work, something in my mind clicked. She is a remarkable scholar, a kind and supportive 
teacher, and owner of the greatest laugh in Lawrence. She also gave me two of the best pieces of 
advice in graduate school: “When in doubt, return to the text,” and “Make every sentence true.” 
Seems shallow, until you try to follow it exactly.  
 Anyone in rhetoric will know the name of Dr. Robert Rowland, but to know him by his 
(frighteningly prolific) publishing reputation alone is to miss what a truly amazing scholar and 
teacher he is. When I was doing my written comprehensive exams in an office across from his, I 
overhead an unhappy undergraduate complaining to Dr. Rowland about his grade in an 
inappropriately angry voice. Dr. Rowland replied, calmly but firmly, “Those are just opinions—
make arguments!” It was excellent advice, delivered in an almost Homerically intercessory way, 
and I’d like to think my answers from that point forward were a little better. He is a brilliant 
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debater, a helpful and supportive teacher, and he has one of sharpest minds I’ve ever 
encountered. His influence on my thinking was, and remains, profound.  
 I had one stroke of great fortune in the fall of 2013: despite his retirement, Dr. Donn 
Parson agreed to serve on my committee. What can one say about him? Yes, is a legendary 
figure in debate and argumentation. Yes, he has shaped the field in ways yet to be understood 
and has shepherded legions of students through the realm of rhetoric. But he is more than that. 
He is one of the wisest people I’ve ever known, and without question one of the broadest 
thinkers. He always encouraged us to think beyond narrow disciplinary confines and to ponder 
the deepest questions. He taught me more than I think he will ever realize, and his questions still 
guide my search for answers—at a time and in a place, of course.  
 My wife, Bridey, has been an unshakeable foundation of calm, patience, assistance, 
resolve, and general support. I would never have survived this past half-decade if it were not for 
her. We certainly didn’t make it easy on ourselves; we moved an incredible six times during the 
program—oh, and we had a child—but through it all she was positive, supportive, and endlessly 
patient with her husband, who grew more and more morose with each new chapter of social 
theory and cultural critique. Misanthropy, apparently, loves company—and I have the best 




 In June 2013, after completing a hellish season of comprehensive exams, I went through 
a bit of an emotional crisis. My work seemed of little tangible value; my scholarly 
accomplishments paled when held up to material problems; I wondered if academia was right for 
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me. I explained as much in a rambling and occasionally incoherent email to my adviser, Dr. Jay 
Childers. A couple of days later he wrote back, greeting my complaints head-on and addressing 
my qualms with personal stories of his own. It is clear to me now that it was one of the most 
important messages I’ve ever received in any medium. (He probably wishes there weren’t many 
such emails.) 
 It seems banal to say that Dr. Childers has been more than an adviser to me; surely every 
graduate student has felt the same way. But since the banal things usually end up being the truest 
things, I’ll go ahead and assert it. He has seen me through every question, every breakdown, and 
every achievement of the last five years. He praised, criticized, cajoled, rebuked, edited, coaxed, 
and lectured me into what I am today. It often took me far too long to accept his advice, which 
led me to say “You were right” to him more times than I could possibly count.  
 Every positive professional and scholarly attribute I have is due to him. Every negative 
trait I still possess endures in spite of his effort. He is at once a man of extraordinary intelligence, 
vast wisdom, and wide interests: as apt to quote poets as rhetoricians, quick to recommend 
novels and academic works alike, fearful of society’s path but optimistic about the capacity for 
change.  
I fear I can never hope to repay him for all he has done for me. Doubtless he has shaped 
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 Rhetoric is a form of human transcendence, a way 
we open ourselves to the influence of what is 
beyond ourselves and become receptive, a way we 
participate in a larger world and become open to the 
lives of others, a way we learn and change. 
  
  -- James Crosswhite 
  
 
We speak not only to tell other people what we 
think, but to tell ourselves what we think. Speech is 
a part of thought. 
 
 -- Oliver Sacks 
 
 
Communication that is not also communion is 
incomplete. 
    

























Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Give me a place to stand and I can move the world. 
-- Archimedes 
 
What is wanted is not to restore a vanished or to revive a vanishing culture under modern 
conditions which make it impossible, but to grow a contemporary culture from the old roots. 
--T. S. Eliot 
 
 
 Few would dispute the assertion that Kenneth Burke was a major figure in the history and 
theory of rhetoric. Imagine, however, that rhetorical scholars devoted classroom time, journal 
space, and conference agendas only to a tiny fraction of Burke’s work—a chapter from Counter-
Statement, say, or the first half of Permanence and Change, with no attention paid to anything 
beyond that. Surely the field would eventually question this very narrow application of Burke’s 
work, since to truly understand Burke requires broad immersion in the wide spectrum of his 
corpus. Focusing only on a limited slice does not do justice to the thinker, nor to his remarkable 
body of work. 
 This is exactly the case, however, with another major figure in the history and theory of 
rhetoric: Richard Weaver. Rhetorical scholars have focused almost exclusively on a very narrow 
portion of Weaver’s work—namely, small parts of ER and LS. But to attempt to understand 
Weaver based solely on these two works is to miss Weaver’s central, cosmological message: 
things can only be truly understood when ordered within a larger context and interpreted 
holistically. To focus on the rightness or wrongness of the tree, as scholars have done with 
Weaver, is to miss the significance and substance of the forest. 
 Further, our discipline has seen fit of late to reevaluate landmark thinkers and their 
application in rhetoric—and, crucially, to evaluate an author’s entire work and not simply the 
classic texts. Several examples have arrived in recent years: Christian Lundberg’s Lacan in 
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Public, Nathan Crick’s Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts of Becoming, Paul 
Stob’s William James and the Art of Popular Statement, and Scott Stroud’s John Dewey and the 
Artful Life. With the discipline trying to define its focus and its place in higher education, 
rhetorical scholars have turned to some of our original intellects and reevaluated their entire 
careers in order to better understand the role of rhetoric in academia and in culture. Weaver, 
however, has so far been omitted from this renaissance.  
 Thankfully, scholars are increasingly arguing that such a reevaluation of Weaver is fitting 
and overdue. Patricia Bizzell notes that “Weaver… is due for a revival” in the rhetorical 
tradition.1 Even more recently, Thomas B. Farrell argues that “the triumph of an information age, 
the disappearance of anything approaching a public ‘attention span,’ makes much of Weaver’s 
diagnostic still pertinent to our times.”2 Still more interestingly, James P. Beasley argues that 
“Weaver’s rhetorical positions have never been stronger,” and that “Weaver’s influence has 
grown in popular culture in spite of his ideas being out of favor with scholars.”3 A new and 
larger evaluation is necessary to both understand and correct this discrepancy.  
 To see how overlooked Weaver has been one need only look to the field’s most 
prominent journals. Contemporary rhetorical scholars rarely engage his work, and when they do 
the invocations are generally either references to parts of his well-known works or explorations 
of more philosophical subjects. He has been cited just a handful of times in the last decade in the 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, and only one essay explored his work in any depth.4 Weaver is 
similarly underrepresented in the pages of Rhetoric & Public Affairs, where he is deployed 
mainly in arguments about definitions and terminologies—all well and good, of course, but the 
scholarly work there often focuses only on his main works. Rhetoric Review contains a few 
larger discussions, including one particularly close examination, but for the most part only 
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Weaver’s central works are engaged and usually just in a passing mention of a concept like 
ultimate terms.5 As one might expect, given his perennial Platonic themes, Weaver makes a few 
more appearances in Philosophy & Rhetoric. Still, however, works about the South and about the 
uses of rhetoric in society are largely ignored, and substantive discussions of his work are still 
usually outliers.6 
 What is needed is a broader survey of Weaver’s work, not simply to do justice to the 
intellectual legacy of a major figure in our field but to truly understand Weaver’s work on 
rhetoric. Rhetoric, for Weaver, was more than simply various forms of arguments and appeals—
more, in other words, than is contained in his works specifically dealing with argumentation and 
language. According to Weaver, rhetoric was the means by which the individual makes core 
beliefs known, and the process by which communities arrived at moral truths. In other words, 
rhetoric was an ontological process of living more than it was a formal structure of the means of 
persuasion. It is how we join together in causes, how we understand our position in the universe, 
and how we become citizens of a place.  
 My goal in what follows is not only to recover Weaver’s broad body of work but also to 
suggest a new way to understand that work. I argue in this dissertation that Weaver’s writings 
and philosophy are best understood through the lens of agrarian rhetoric, and that Weaver can 
only truly be understood as a thinker firmly entrenched in the Agrarian tradition.7 Rhetorical 
scholars have not traditionally embraced agrarian studies, as Jeff Motter and Ross Singer argued 
in a recent review essay in Quarterly Journal of Speech.8 But agrarianism may offer a way to 
understand a fundamental goal of Weaver and of rhetoric at large: the location of “spacious” 
ideas around which we can all come together to advance noble ends and achieve social solidarity.  
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 Motter and Singer identify three guiding topoi for agrarian rhetoric, which I will use as 
entry points in analyzing Weaver’s writings: practice, or the “act of cultivation [which] take[s] 
on a normative dimension that suggests how one should or ought to act”; place, or how “people 
live and work together in practical simplicity”; and solidarity, which is “constructed by one’s 
place-based practices, not abstract interests.”9 Perhaps not surprisingly, given that Weaver’s 
intellectual forebears were the Southern Agrarians, these three topoi can be fairly called the three 
major themes of Weaver’s work—both in rhetoric and in social criticism. Rather than simply 
taking these topoi as a readymade analytical framework, I will use them as starting points: I will 
examine each in turn and find places in Weaver’s writings where one might explore the broader 
concepts that underlie each.  
 What is unique about these three modes of understanding life is that they offer a 
counterpoint to abstraction, that great flaw of modernity. Asking people to be loyal to a place, a 
practice, or a community is fundamentally different than asking them to be loyal to a concept—
freedom, for example, or American exceptionalism. By contrast, Weaver argued, as I do here, 
that our focus should be on what is local and tangible and immediate because we grasp those 
things better than we do mere ideas about a nation. Therefore, Weaver was foremost a regionalist 
because he felt a direct connection to a certain region, one of heritage and sympathy. Since 
rhetoric must be at least partially concerned with the formation of citizens, I suggest here that an 
agrarian understanding—of both Weaver’s work and its lessons for rhetorical ethics and 
citizenship—can offer a better way to build solidarity and social cohesion. Moreover, the three 
agrarian themes make up Weaver’s goal of “spaciousness”: an idea that can bond people together 
metaphysically and move us toward noble common ends. These ideas cannot be imparted as 
much as they must be lived: spacious ideas arise through daily experience and connection, not 
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through mere repetition. Thus a spacious idea like aiding a neighbor can only take metaphysical 
form when a person regularly sees it enacted by certain people of a certain place. It cannot take 
shape only when political leaders identify it as a key trait of Americans.  
 The agrarian framework that guides Weaver’s work is a counterpoint to the abstraction 
and fragmentation of modern life, while practice is a rebellion against modernity’s emphasis on 
technique. Agrarianism offers wholeness and tangibility against the abstraction of modernity. 
There may be no better statement of this stance than a collection of essays by the Southern 
Agrarian writers, who found the agrarian lifestyle to be the very embodiment of the counter-
Enlightenment. John Crowe Ransom, for example, thought agrarianism’s “self-sufficient, 
backward-looking, intensely parochial” way of life stood against modernity’s separation of the 
individual from the land, from tradition, and from a sense of place.10 For the Agrarians, 
connection to the land was a direct antidote to the rootlessness and vacuity so lamented by 
Weaver; if the individual is connected to the natural life cycle, to stewardship of the land, and to 
the solidarity of provincialism, she can resist the fragmentary forces of modernity. This 
provincialism is “man’s interest in his own center,” said Stark Young, and it allows the 
individual to feel anchored to a way of life, and to nature itself.11 
 The connection to nature is an essential component of the agrarian life, as its proponents 
see modernity as corrupting the premodern human dependence on nature—“the most ancient and 
the most humane of all the modes of human livelihood,” as Ransom puts it.12 Modernity has 
severed this connection and instead sought to use the instruments of progress to dominate nature, 
which inevitably leads to dehumanization.13 The key problem here is essentially one of time and 
control: agrarian thinkers say that humans should follow the cycles of nature and submit to its 
power, while modernity advances dominion over nature and mastery of its capacities. This 
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doctrine of progress makes us conceive of the world, and our own abilities, as continuously 
evolving; Hegel and Comte, among others, encouraged this view of reality as “world-process” 
whose historical and social phenomena evolve along with physical and biological phenomena.14 
Thus the cyclical permanence of nature is replaced by the transient upheaval of progress. 
 Most valuable in nature, agrarian rhetoric argues, is its inherent teleology. When we are 
stewards of the land, we clearly see things fulfilling their own ends—and this prods us to view 
ourselves as similarly telos-driven. But modern life, by encouraging instrumental thinking and 
domination of nature, made the individual, as Lyle Lanier put it, “concerned not so much with 
saving his soul as with making himself comfortable, and with improvement of the world through 
cooperative social effort.”15 As a response, agrarian writers like Wendell Berry offer a renewed 
connection to the land: “If we apply our minds directly and competently to the needs of the earth, 
then we will have begun to make fundamental and necessary changes in our minds. We will 
begin to understand and to mistrust and to change our wasteful economy, which markets not just 
the produce of the earth, but also the earth’s ability to produce.”16 Just as we use the doctrine of 
progress to escape unpleasant things, so too do we use domination over nature to escape “sweat 
and sorrow” only to also lose “love and excellence, health and joy.”17 If agrarianism had a motto, 
it might borrow that of the Benedictine monastic order: laborare est orare—to work is to pray. 
In agrarian rhetoric, wholeness for the person is achieved through tangible work in a specific 
place. 
 One can clearly see the applicability of the agrarian rhetorical framework to the works of 
Richard Weaver. Indeed, Weaver wrote to a friend that once he began his doctoral work he 
converted to the “Church of Agrarianism.”18 In true agrarian fashion, Weaver encouraged 
development of practice, or the cultivated form of being and doing that relies upon accumulated 
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knowledge and contains inherent norms and values; place, or a sense of belonging to a specific 
region with its own tradition, heritage, and values that help create social norms; and solidarity, or 
the feeling of common pursuit that comes with belonging to a specific and tangible set of 
experiences, and which helps bind one to other members of a group. Above all else the agrarian 
rhetorical framework seeks to move people away from abstraction—allegiance to a set of 
symbols binding us to people we never encounter and with whom we share little in common—
and toward tangibility and immediacy. When we devote a greater focus to the places we inhabit, 
the people we see, and the traditions we embody, Weaver and the agrarians argued, we create the 
conditions for development of virtue and ethics. This tradition argues that we need direct 
encounters with the consequences of our actions and direct experiences with the traditions of our 
forebears in order to truly understand what it means to be an ethical citizen.  
 This was the true message of the wide body of work by one of our field’s major figures, 
and yet that message has been lost in the field’s treatment of him. Instead of a holistic 
understanding of Weaver’s larger structure of thought—all of which, crucially, is vital to his 
theories of rhetoric—we have focused only on a small fraction of his work and marginalized or 
dismissed the remainder. Scholars in history have evaluated the broader Weaver, but our field 
has mostly overlooked it. I aim to correct that imbalance and to advance the relevance and 
application of agrarian rhetoric.  
 In this chapter I will first address how our discipline has treated Weaver and argue that 
said treatment has been both limited and unfairly narrow in scope. My conclusion is that a new 
examination of his work is both necessary and highly relevant to the field. I will then sketch a 
brief biographical portrait of Weaver, and finally offer more detail on the philosophy and 




The Treatment of Weaver in Rhetorical Studies 
 The vast majority of the scholarly attention paid to Weaver by our discipline has focused 
on his theory of argument. Perhaps this is understandable, given our concern for the mechanics 
of argumentation. But one should also find this narrow focus to be quite curious; after all, the 
basics of Weaver’s theory comprise just two chapters in one book. Broadly, the field’s treatment 
of Weaver breaks down into three approaches: technical analyses of his theory with a focus on 
argumentation; whole-cloth rejections based upon his politically conservative views; and 
admissions, sometimes begrudging, of the usefulness of his work. 
 Many scholars in the first category find methodological fault in Weaver’s theory. Lois J. 
Einhorn, for example, admired Weaver’s belief that “through the study of literature and rhetoric, 
[students] could learn the evocative power of words. Weaver viewed rhetoric, then, as a powerful 
means for restoring order to society.”19 She even sympathizes with his desire for rhetoric that 
“presupposed an antecedent dialectic” that focuses on the “essence or nature of something.20 
However, she faults the theory and is skeptical of its widespread application. She notes, in a 
rejection common in evaluations of Weaver, that acceptance of his hierarchy of argument—from 
circumstance, from cause and effect, from definition—requires acceptance of the spacious 
principles that underlie the theory. But according to Einhorn, Weaver “failed to provide a way 
for someone who does not accept his first premises from the start to step into his system.”21 
 What Einhorn and other critics miss is that Weaver’s goal was not to expand the premises 
to suit the rhetors—it was, rightly or wrongly, to expand the rhetors to suit the premises by 
attaching them to tangible things with transcendental foundations. This flaw is a result of 
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considering Weaver’s rhetorical theory outside the scope of his other work. His works beyond 
ER, IHC, and LS make clear that the role of rhetoric must be seen within the context of his 
cultural critiques. This is not so much a mistake as an incident of short-sightedness, but it is one 
that appears again and again in rhetorical studies. Most critics simply ignore the majority of 
Weaver’s work because they deem it irrelevant to his theory of argumentation. In fact, it is 
anything but. 
 Take, for example, Dennis R. Bormann’s study of Weaver’s analysis of Edmund Burke 
and the argument from circumstance. Bormann devotes his entire essay to this one element of 
one chapter of one book by Weaver, and then rejects Weaver’s judgment as “no longer 
applicable in Burke’s time and even less applicable today.”22 Throughout the essay, Bormann 
characterizes the hierarchy from argument as the only aspect of Weaver’s career relevant to 
rhetorical critics. But to do this is to miss what Weaver forcefully argued was the goal of 
rhetoric, including the hierarchy of argument: to move people toward noble goals. One simply 
cannot consider his theory of rhetoric without also considering the ultimate purpose of that 
theory, nor without considering the intellectual tradition that helped produce that theory.  
 Other scholars in this scholarly category reject Weaver’s theory because they indict him 
for not following his own advice. John R.E. Bliese, for example, deems Weaver’s theory 
unacceptable because Weaver did not take Edmund Burke’s entire substantive position into 
account when criticizing the latter’s style of argument. It is ironic, then, that Bliese himself does 
not fully examine Weaver’s entire substantive position when criticizing his hierarchy of 
argument. Instead, he surveys the relevant portions of ER, solely comprising work on argument, 
and then concludes that Weaver’s position on Burke is flawed because “one cannot use a process 
of arguing as the sole means of defining a political position.”23 Indeed one cannot; Bliese’s 
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failure to consider the rest of Weaver’s work is both unfortunate and highly representative of the 
work in the field.  
 An especially odd characteristic of the first category of responses—those who question 
Weaver while relying solely on his technical arguments about rhetoric—is that they often fault 
Weaver for his theory’s lack of universal application. In other words, they ask: how is the rhetor 
to proceed if she rejects the first premises? There are two possible responses to this. The first is 
that it ignores the broad swath of Weaver’s work that emphasized the importance of 
particularism and regional distinction, both essential elements of the agrarian framework. 
Weaver wanted a rhetor to be in line with the first premises and principles of her culture, and that 
does not necessarily mean universality. The second response is that Weaver’s philosophy aspires 
to universality because he saw the agrarian tradition as that most worthy of emulation.24 Those 
who reject his arguments without considering the full range of his work, including his goals for 
rhetoric, do a disservice to the field.25 
 The second category of rhetorical studies of Weaver’s corpus comprises those works 
even less helpful for a full understanding of Weaver: the articles that reject Weaver on the basis 
of his political principles. Foremost among these is an essay by Sharon Crowley, who believes 
that Weaver must be ejected from the rhetorical canon entirely because his views depart from the 
ruling orthodoxy of our time—specifically, because he criticized “freedom, equality, and 
democracy as well as liberalism, communism, and the women’s movement.”26 Her complaint is 
that rhetorical theorists whose views on rhetoric spring from “offensive” ideology cannot be held 
up as worthy either of emulation or study. Indeed, if she had her way with the rhetorical canon, 
Weaver’s work “would appear there no longer.”27 
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 Crowley’s objection is rooted in what she sees as a fundamental unintelligibility in 
Weaver’s premises of argument—in the very concept of a “spacious” rhetoric rooted in a 
“metaphysical dream” of a Platonic world of ideals. “It would be nice to know,” Crowley asks 
with near-derision, “how Weaver imagined that rhetors gain access to the ‘metaphysical 
dream’—is it done by virtue of long study and careful preparation, or must one simply keep her 
ears and eyes open?”28 But Weaver’s other works answer her question: the metaphysical dream 
emerges from a regional culture that preserves the “permanent things,” to use T.S. Eliot’s famous 
term, that help maintain that culture’s sense of cohesion and unity. Thus the South’s 
metaphysical dream consisted of chivalry, a sense of place, and the older religiousness, 
according to STB and SE. The metaphysical dream of the modern liberal academic, as Crowley 
would likely recognize, would include openness, tolerance, and free debate. A metaphysical 
dream emerges from the culture and its participants, and its codes are codified in the goods that 
culture considers noble. This is exactly in line with agrarian thinking. 
 Too much of our field’s work regarding Weaver—including other work by John Bliese, 
Donald Cushman and Gerard Hauser, Ross Winterowd, and Michael Sproule—is structured this 
way. To reject a theorist because his views do not comport wholeheartedly with what we 
consider to be our enlightened attitudes is both shallow and indicative of poor scholarship. 
Unfortunately, this is how most of the work regarding Weaver operates: his ideas are reduced to 
a fraction of his total output, his ideas are faulted for their lack of total applicability, and then his 
ideas are denied a hearing because he is a conservative who espoused many unpopular views.29 
Besides being a specious reading of his career, this dominant position is of dubious merit for the 
rhetorical academy. Very few people have focused on what ideas we might recover from 
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Weaver’s work, even if portions of those ideas strike us as dated or irrelevant. In this project I 
have addressed that gap in scholarship and criticism.  
 The third category of rhetorical studies of Weaver veers closer toward acceptance of his 
principles, though this category is a small minority indeed and is now decades old. Most of these 
essays sympathize with Weaver’s goal of using an agrarian rhetorical framework to foster virtue 
and ethics, arguing that at some point rhetoric as a field must decide on something that is worth 
aiming for—that the absence of an enshrined ethical stance reflects not openness but reluctance 
to offend any ethical standpoint. Such a position is taken by Ralph T. Eubanks, who argues that 
only when a rhetorical theory “is concerned with human purpose, enduring human values, and a 
sense of ‘oughtness’ will it be equipped to show the ‘new man’ a better version of himself.”30 At 
some point, in other words, rhetorical theory needs to be prescriptive: it must move people 
toward ends that we consider noble. Relying on a descriptive stance for rhetoric, in which the 
tools of persuasion are merely described to students without education in how they are to be 
used, is untenable—as is a position that nothing is noble, or, worse, that everything is.  
 What critics like Eubanks, Richard L. Johannesen, Walter H. Beale, and William C. 
Havard see in Weaver’s work is the possible foundation for an alignment between rhetoric and 
ethics: the realization of Weaver’s career-long goal.31 Eubanks and Baker, for example, write 
that liberal arts education has “forsaken its mission” as it has stopped educating students “in how 
man may best use his freedom,” and that universities have “abandoned their ancient and 
honorable task of training young people to live informed, intelligent, and integrated lives.”32 This 
is to be lamented, of course, but of particular concern to this line of criticism is the virtual 
absence of rhetoric from the conversation. As the field turned away from prescriptivist stances, it 
largely gave up its role in informing what ought to be the ethical stances of citizens. But rhetoric 
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according to Eubanks and Baker, “is a dynamic force in the nurture of human values; it must 
therefore find a central place in any plan which claims concern for man’s quest for values, and 
that looks toward the amelioration of man’s present state of anhedonia.”33 
 As Beale put it, since “Rhetorical education is an attempt to shape a certain kind of 
character capable of using language effectively to carry on the practical and moral business of a 
polity,” we must educate students in “the joining of eloquence and wisdom in the pursuit of the 
good society.”34 The two ideas, eloquence and wisdom, are not merely complementary but are in 
fact always already conjoined. To train a student in eloquence without offering directions for 
using it is as useless as training a student in wisdom without offering directions for expressing it. 
Both rhetoric and ethics, these critics argue, must be the twin forces of liberal education. 
Weaver’s rhetorical theories, when seen in light of his overarching cultural project, offer a 
potential way forward. They offer the rhetorician a means for advancing true and honest rhetoric 
toward noble ends while minding social solidarity. 
 From an analytical standpoint, this third category—which is really a sort of catch-all for 
all the works not mostly or wholly hostile to Weaver—is too dated to still be considered relevant. 
These essays represent an engagement with Weaver in the years after his death, when 
posthumous works were appearing and the field was trying to understand his ideas and their 
significance. It also represents a different time in our field, before the advent of the critical 
rhetoric project and its “permanent critique” stance. It was easier a few decades ago to discuss a 
set of ethical standards around which rhetoric might rally, and to explore ways for rhetorical 
education to be firmly steeped in the Western ethical tradition. Today, such claims might very 
likely be met with anything from surprise to anger. However, the critical approaches embodied in 
this third category still have potential value when placed within an agrarian framework, which 
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emphasizes specific place- and tradition-based understandings of ethical foundations. Thus 
despite its age, this category’s legacy is nonetheless essential to the project at hand.  
 An agrarian understanding of rhetoric and ethics, as suggested by the final approach to 
Weaver’s work, would stress the necessarily close proximity between the individual and the 
experience of practice, place, and solidarity. The “pursuit of a good society” can only occur 
when the individual citizen has close contact with both good and society. But extend the citizen 
too far, too broadly in the direction of ideals and away from tangible connection, and her 
experience becomes too abstract. If we apply the agrarian framework to Weaver’s work, as I do 
in what follows, then the immediate and the proximate becomes the basis for ethics. Weaver 
claimed that only when we are ensconced within a network of practice, place, and solidarity—
which can only arise at the local and the regional—can we fully form ideas of ethics and 
citizenship and culture.  
Weaver’s holistic view of rhetoric and society, in which ideals must be embedded in 
material practices, is a direct legacy of agrarianism, in which ideals can only flourish within a 
network of practice, place, and solidarity. Just as Weaver thought transcendental forms were at 
stake in our language use, so too does agrarian philosophy see forms disappearing when 
experience becomes too abstract. My sympathies generally lie with the final line of scholarly 
approaches to Weaver (although, as I will discuss in the conclusion, the Weaver program is not 
without its serious flaws). Unfortunately, this view is relatively unpopular and has not found a 
wide audience in our field because few critics, and almost none in recent years, have examined 
the work of Weaver beyond the few texts deemed immediately relevant to rhetorical theory—and 
those who do tend to reject his ideas for political reasons. This disciplinary affliction cries out for 
treatment. 
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A brief Weaver biography 
Weaver was born in 1910 in Asheville, NC, to Dick Weaver, a junior partner in a livery 
stable, and Carrye Embry, the owner of a millinery shop.35 After Dick died in 1915, Carrye 
moved the family to Lexington, KY, to be closer to her family. Weaver attended the Academy of 
Lincoln Memorial University, a preparatory school in Harrogate, TN, then enrolled at the 
University of Kentucky. While at Kentucky, Weaver was a well-known liberal and even worked 
for the American Socialist Party after graduation. In 1932 he was offered a scholarship to begin a 
master’s degree in English at Kentucky, but he left after a year when he was offered a better 
scholarship at Vanderbilt University, where he would encounter the Southern Agrarians.  
 “It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Weaver’s period of study with the 
Southern Agrarians at Vanderbilt,” Smith writes, and indeed these years turned out to be 
epiphanic for Weaver.36 He completed his thesis, “The Revolt Against Humanism: A Study of 
the New Critical Temper,” under the guidance of John Crowe Ransom—perhaps the chief 
intellectual star of the Agrarians, and the man around whom the entire movement rotated. 
Weaver received his degree in 1934 and began doctoral work; two years later he left to find a 
teaching position that might support him while he completed his dissertation on Milton. During 
this time, as he would later chronicle in his famous essay “Up From Liberalism,” he abandoned 
liberalism as philosophically incoherent and began his conversion to the “Church of 
Agrarianism.” 
 He taught for one year as an instructor at what is now Auburn University, then took a 
position as assistant professor of English and director of forensics at Texas A&M University, 
where he was “deeply disturbed by the mood of militant philistinism he encountered there.”37  
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He fled the campus whenever he could, spending weekends and breaks in Houston and Mexico, 
and summers in study programs at Harvard and the Sorbonne. One of the most formative 
experiences of his life came after the Harvard summer, on the drive back to College Station: “It 
came to me like a revelation that I did not have to go back to this job, which had become 
distasteful, and that I did not have to go on professing the clichés of liberalism, which were 
becoming meaningless to me.”38 
 Weaver set aside his Vanderbilt dissertation and applied to a new doctoral program at 
Louisiana State University, noting in his application that he considered himself “a Southern 
nationalist.”39 He spent 1940 to 1943 in the program, with summers at the University of Virginia 
and the University of North Carolina. Cleanth Brooks, the Southern Agrarian and literary critic, 
directed his dissertation entitled “The Confederate South, 1865-1910: A Study in the Survival of 
a Mind and a Culture.” After teaching one year at North Carolina State University, he was 
offered—after some lobbying by Brooks—a position as instructor of English in the College of 
the University of Chicago.40 
 It was here that Weaver truly bloomed as a teacher, a public intellectual, and an Agrarian. 
Though his teaching load was heavy—three courses per quarter—and his involvement in 
curriculum planning was also arduous, he arranged his schedule so that he could do several hours 
of dedicated scholarly work each day. He published academic essays on composition and 
rhetoric, earned plaudits as a highly admired teacher, and still published book reviews, cultural 
criticism, and other pieces in outlets like Modern Age, National Review, and Commonweal. 
Though he has posthumously acquired a reputation for hermetic and even monastic behavior, 
Weaver was a sociable colleague and frequent presence at University parties.41 
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 In 1947 Weaver finished a project he called “The Adverse Descent,” about the crisis in 
Western moral and intellectual life. It would soon be accepted by the University of Chicago 
Press and be published in 1948 as Ideas Have Consequences, a title Weaver disliked greatly but 
which has since become a frequent slogan of American cultural conservatism. A wide-ranging 
intellectual history and savage attack on modernity, the book met with many critical reviews in 
the liberal urban press but also received glowing endorsements from the theologians Paul Tillich 
and Reinhold Niebuhr, among others. The book helped him secure a promotion to assistant 
professor (he became associate professor in 1951, and full professor in 1957).42 
 The next few years were some of Weaver’s most productive. Satisfied with his cultural 
critique in IHC, he refocused his scholarly sights on the South and on Southern literature, 
publishing essays in Georgia Review, Sewanee Review, and Hopkins Review. He also completed 
the book our field knows best, 1953’s The Ethics of Rhetoric. A highly accomplished scholarly 
work, ER would secure him lasting fame in the fields of English and rhetoric and establish him 
as a major voice in matters of language. During summers in this period, Weaver traveled to a 
house he had purchased in Weaverville, NC, a city founded by his ancestors, and in which he 
placed his aging mother. His orations to his assembled family each summer, to be discussed 
below, contain some of his best thoughts on community and culture.  
 After the publication of these two books and his new friendship with Russell Kirk, whose 
landmark text The Conservative Mind was published in 1953, Weaver became an increasingly 
visible presence in a resurgent American conservatism. He gave many invited speeches in places 
like New York and New Haven, and wrote essays and reviews for various conservative 
publications—26 in National Review alone, in just two years.43 For someone who still taught a 
full load every semester, it was a staggeringly prolific output of writing and lecturing. In 1957 he 
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published a textbook, Composition: A Course in Writing and Rhetoric, and was invited to be a 
key speaker at a Vanderbilt Literary Symposium, which cemented both his connection to the 
Agrarians and his reputation as a serious intellectual of the South and of agrarianism.  
 In 1961 he finished the manuscript for Visions of Order, which he saw as a follow-up 
work to IHC. In the following, very successful two years the book was reviewed and accepted, 
Weaver received a special award at the national convention of the Young Americans for 
Freedom, and his invited lectures at major universities became highly praised publications and 
pamphlets. Most importantly and surely most gratifyingly for Weaver, he was invited to join the 
faculty at Vanderbilt—lodestar of the Agrarian movement and the site of his first agrarian 
explorations. He accepted, but on April 2, 1963, he was felled by a heart attack at just 53 years 
old.  His dedication to scholarship ensured that, in addition to his three published books, there 
was material for four posthumous collections.  
 How ought we assess the life of Weaver? It was a life of the mind, certainly; he qualifies, 
I believe, for an old-fashioned title that may yet retain some cultural currency: he was a man of 
letters. Had he lived, we might have received still more of his Southern writings, cultural 
critique, and theories of rhetoric. But even with a life cut tragically short, he managed to produce 
an impressive array of work, both scholarly and popular. This made him, according to the 
historian Eugene Genovese, one who ranked “among the most significant intellectuals of 
America in [the twentieth] century.”44  
 There was a sentiment among the Agrarians that there is value in exile—that is, that one 
must leave a place to see it most clearly. Many members of that esteemed group worked outside 
the South: at Kenyon, Yale, Minnesota, Middlebury, and elsewhere. So too may it have been 
with Weaver, who wrote that the Agrarian exile actually represented “a strategic withdrawal to 
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positions where the contest can be better carried on.”45 His best work came when he was trapped 
in what he considered the “megalopolis” of Chicago, far from his ideal agrarian setting. From 
that vantage point, he could see the benefits and the flaws of his native and beloved land. If he 
had remained only in the South, perhaps we would never have had his astute writings on the 
Southern mind.  
 Weaver also represented an intellectual type that has, to our great detriment, become 
something of an anachronism: he was a generalist. As I will explore in detail below, a central 
plank of agrarian thinking is that the human must be master of a wide range of skills, and that 
specialization is a pernicious outgrowth of modernity. Weaver can be classified as a thinker in 
rhetoric, history, intellectual history, political philosophy, English, and ethics—not to mention 
his works of literary and cultural criticism. It is increasingly rare to find such scholars today. 
This may be another reason to study the whole life and whole works of Weaver: perhaps we can 
recover something of how scholars might once again become wide-ranging thinkers.  
 Since I argue throughout this project that the only true way to understand Weaver’s 
rhetorical theories is through a holistic understanding of his work, and that Weaver was first and 
most importantly an Agrarian thinker, in the next section I survey the philosophy and history of 
American agrarianism, with special focus on the Southern Agrarian movement that so influenced 
Weaver. My hope is that a greater understanding of these lines of agrarian thinking helps 
illustrate Weaver’s goals in his writings on rhetoric, which have been so narrowly interpreted 
and analyzed by our field.  
The philosophy of Agrarianism in America 
 Russell Kirk is famous for asserting that conservatism is not an ideology, but rather a way 
of life. So too might we consider agrarianism: it is, according to Berry, “primarily a practice, a 
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set of attitudes, a loyalty, and a passion; it is an idea only secondarily and at a remove.”46 
Perhaps the reason it has never lent itself terribly neatly to a political program is because of this 
argumentative shortcoming; it is difficult to reduce a way of life to a catchy slogan or set of 
bullet points.  
 The agrarian tradition in the United States has obvious roots in the works of Thomas 
Jefferson, who trumpeted the virtues—for both person and nation—of the yeoman farmer. Early 
American history is often condensed, rather simplistically, into a battle of ideas between 
Jefferson (small farms, small government, decentralization) and Alexander Hamilton (industry, 
cities, finance, strong national government), with the usual conclusion being that Hamilton won 
both the battle and the war. This sort of Jeffersonian agrarianism, which has been covered well 
by scholars, is the antecedent of most back-to-the-land movements since that time. Emerging 
from this school of thought is the important idea that direct localism is better for citizens than 
abstract cosmopolitanism.  
 What I focus on here, however, is the influence of the Southern Agrarians, who penned 
the aforementioned ITMS in 1930. The thrust behind this version of Agrarianism, according to 
the literary scholar Louis D. Rubin, Jr.’s introduction, is not a vision for a nation but rather a 
counterattack from a threatened tradition against an encroaching, tyrannical industry-state 
monopoly. “The tradition out of which [the twelve Southerners] were writing was that of 
pastorale; they were invoking the humane virtues of a simpler, more elemental, nonacquisitive 
existence, as a needed rebuke to the acquisitive, essentially materialistic compulsions of a society 
that from the outset was very much engaged in seeking wealth, power, and plenty on a continent 
whose prolific natural resources and vast acres of usable land, forests, and rivers were there for 
the taking.”47 Or, as the Agrarian Herbert Agar put it a few years later, “There is the issue: Is 
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modern America, or is any united section of modern America, capable of desiring and defining a 
society based on principles rather than opportunism, on a moral image of what it wishes the life 
of man to be rather than on a more or less regulated scramble for possessions?”48 
 In other words, where Jeffersonian agrarianism laid out an idyllic vision of an ideal 
society, Southern Agrarianism was fighting back against a centralized economic system that 
transformed citizens into what Agar called “‘economic man,’ a sort of highest common 
denominator of human weaknesses,” and which formed a society “whose cupidity is abnormally 
intense.”49 This is the very vision laid out by Weaver in IHC: a society based purely on 
consumption and libertinism, where moral imagination is dead and any exploitation of resources 
or humans is justified as a necessary sacrifice to the almighty god of Progress: economic growth.  
 To counter this, Agrarianism proposed a nation of small property owners who would 
focus on their land and their region, making subsistence the first concern and wealth 
accumulation the second. The reasons for this were metaphysical as much as they were 
economic: according to Allen Tate, “A true property system will be composed of a large 
proportion of owners whose property is not to be expressed solely in terms of exchange-value, 
but retains, for the owner, the possibility of use-value.”50 The land means something to the small 
agrarian farmer, in other words—something beyond merely what it is worth. This in turn helps 
create more direct modes of living and more tangible connections to both earth and fellow 
citizen, according to Berry: “A man who is trying to live as a neighbor to his neighbors will have 
a lively and practical understanding of the work of peace and brotherhood, and let there be no 
mistake about it—he is doing that work… A good farmer who is dealing with the problem of soil 
erosion on an acre of ground has a sounder grasp of that problem and cares more about it and is 
probably doing more to solve it than any bureaucrat who is talking about it in general.”51 
 23 
 The Agrarian vision was not merely an alternative worth considering; it was an urgent 
and necessary corrective to an industrialized society based on consumption and destruction of 
difference. Part of the problem with that materialistic culture—and here is where Agrarianism 
breaks most sharply with Jeffersonian agrarianism—is its foundation in democracy. According to 
one scholar, the Agrarians embraced “a Jeffersonian rejection of industry but add[ed] a love of 
the Old South and a distinctly non-Jeffersonian suspicion of democracy.”52 Democracy, the 
Agrarians felt, too strongly emphasized the sovereignty of individual rights and too tepidly 
incorporated notions of community and solidarity. Democracy also lacked, in their view, a 
sufficient emphasis on virtue and any sort of teleological approach to ways of living. It too easily 
leads, they believed, to consideration of means over ends and to acceptance of a purely economic 
approach to society: if this action gets us more things or rights, then it is good. For Aldo 
Leopold, another intellectual heir of the Agrarians, there was no “more complete regimentation 
of the human mind than that accomplished by our self-imposed doctrine of ruthless 
utilitarianism.”53 Such utilitarianism, this argument went, emerges from the stark greatest-good-
for-the-greatest-number emphasis of democracy.54  
 Better, then, to accept that societies inevitably break down into social hierarchies and 
hence to accept republican government. This so-called “aristocratic agrarianism,” would strongly 
influence Weaver’s thought on social cosmology and order. The problem with this philosophy, 
however, is that it’s more than a little odd to champion the virtues of the common man and the 
small farmer while also advocating a hierarchical society and republican government. The 
Agrarians, it is worth remembering, were hardly yokels—most held advanced degrees and had 
studied at both Ivy League and top European schools.55 Thus the movement’s roots, as James 
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Montmarquet puts it in a nicely turned phrase, “were to be found more in the Great Books than 
on the Great Plains.”56 
But this potential incommensurability should not prompt rejection of the philosophy 
itself. The Agrarians saw inequality as a social inevitability, because they were “traditionalist[s] 
rooted in the history of accustomed forms and habits.”57 This is why Weaver would later take 
(rather uncomfortably, to our ears) the example of the plantation as a microcosm of cosmological 
order: because each person recognized a role in society; there was no doctrine of universal 
egalitarianism, and the world was better off for it. Weaver “maintained that aristocracy and 
patriarchy, which placed some men in the service and under the protection of others,” was 
healthy, and that egalitarianism “threatened to obliterate the sources of discrimination and 
therefore the standards of judgment that demarcated civilization from savagery,” as a historian of 
that era has said.58 This idea assumes that we should all see ourselves as subservient to 
something or someone, and the best choice is something natural.59 
 Just as the wealthy class in the United States was once known for a strong sense of 
noblesse oblige, so too did the Agrarians see themselves—despite their generally elite 
intellectual (and sometimes material) heritage—as stewards of respect for the land and the 
people who work it. Andrew Nelson Lytle, one of the contributors to ITMS, wrote that, when 
contesting the soulless materialism of finance-capitalism, “the answer lies in a return to a society 
where agriculture is practiced by most of the people. It is in fact impossible for any culture to be 
sound and healthy without a proper respect and proper regard for the soil.”60 Other Agrarians 
later relaxed this exacting standard a bit in favor of getting people closer to the land by 
decentralizing power, structuring communities around the places that produce their foods, and 
putting more people in touch with the sources of their food and the consequences of their actions. 
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One can only find self-actualization—that great quest of modern culture—by, as Berry put it, 
“recognizing physical landmarks, by connecting [oneself] to practical circumstances,” instead of 
the psychological self-indulgence of inward self-seeking.61 
 Stewardship of the land also benefits the modern citizen by providing a sense of 
wholeness to counteract the fragmentation of modern life. A central “pillar of agrarianism,” 
according to Frank Lawrence Owsley, is that “the agrarian population must dominate the social, 
cultural, economic, and political life of the state and give tone to it.”62 They should do so because 
they have a natural connection to the harmony and wholeness of nature, and thus can see things 
in wide scope rather than in narrow focus. In modern finance-capitalism, according to the scholar 
James Freyfogle, “Nature is typically fragmented into distinct parts—into parcels of land and 
discrete natural resources—its parts then valued piece by piece. Humans are fragmented, too, our 
lives divided into specific roles and our labor treated as another market commodity. It is hard to 
spot and appreciate the connections when all we see are the pieces. It is hard to uphold the long 
term when the market encourages consumption today.”63 
 Because how we view nature influences how we view ourselves, according to 
agrarianism, this fragmented outlook renders us equally fragmented. This specific critique has 
been leveled since the Enlightenment but has especial resonance in the modern United States. 
Roderick Nash saw both the legacy of Francis Bacon in westward expansion and the 
“conquering” of nature as a rejection of the drive to live in harmony with it.64 The post-bellum 
era in particular, with its emphasis on wealth and centralization of power, saw a “desperate 
retreat indoors, toward consumerism and specialization,” as Aaron Sachs put it.65 The problem 
with this, according to Southern Agrarian (and Weaver mentor) Donald Davidson, is that 
Americans had “become the image of what they contemplated”—if they look at the landscape 
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and see skyscrapers and specialization, then they will become specialized themselves.66 But if 
they look at the landscape and see harmony with nature—and, more importantly, live that 
harmony by being faithful stewards of the land—then such a landscape will help form more 
complete people.  
 Weaver, like his Agrarian forebears, was a strong critic of the applied tools of science—
not because he rejected science’s epistemology but because he disliked its ambition to explain all 
phenomena, divide realms of knowledge, and demystify all elements of life. This renders 
Agrarianism, with its emphasis on harmony and wholeness and stewardship, almost overtly 
theological. And it’s true that it can be difficult at times to separate critiques of modernity from 
advocacy of Christendom’s restoration. But modern agrarians tend to speak less about God and 
more about the power of nature. Thus while Ransom could write of his “defense of orthodoxy,” 
today we hear from public policy scholar Peter Brown: “Our primary orientation to the world 
should be ethical and mystical (characterized by a sense of awe and joy)—at once grounded in 
emotion and thought. Scientific knowledge, its related technologies, and economics should be in 
service to what Albert Schweitzer called an ethic of reverence for life.”67 The language may be 
more secular, but the message is the same: means must be subservient to noble ends, and those 
ends must be rooted in the knowledge that we cannot know all things. Humility, either before 
God or before the natural order of the world, is a central plank of Agrarian thought and of 
Weaver’s thought.68  
 For Weaver’s mentor Ransom, as for Friedrich Nietzsche, the demotion of the Judeo-
Christian God was a tragic event. Modernity had replaced God with purely physical phenomena, 
and science represented the effort to permanently eliminate the supernatural. But Ransom, and 
later Weaver, believed this diminished the importance of myths in cultures, which provide 
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guiding lessons on how to live and remind us of our own limitations. According to Ransom, 
“Myth resorts to the supernatural in order to represent the fullness of the natural… [Myth-
makers say] ‘Do not try to verify: not demonstrable, not historical: go and try them… The myth 
is not descriptive, it is prescriptive.”69 Weaver likewise believed in the power of myth, writing in 
STB that the Old South’s “reality had existed somehow in the willed belief, or the myth.”70 
Myths are necessary for people to live, and the powers of science—which, for Weaver, were 
most damningly revealed in the development of the atomic bomb—are always at war with 
nature. Worse, science destroys our sense of limits and lends itself too easily to economic reason 
and utilitarianism. 
 An obvious question arises, however: with all this emphasis on the mystical and the 
ineffable, is Agrarianism an ideology or a political project? I have argued above that the 
Southern Agrarians saw it as their task to offer an alternative to the materialist, consumerist, 
mass society. Some scholars have argued that the Agrarians are just the latest in a long line of 
“Romantic Agrarians,” a legacy originating with the pastorals of Virgil and extending through 
Rousseau, Frost, Blake, and Wordsworth, and that they simply construct an image of the past in 
their heads and pine for the loss of an ideal.71 And yes, perhaps the Agrarians’ praise for a long-
defunct system that availed itself of slave labor will strike us today as politically untenable, and 
thus limiting in its practical possibilities. 
 But to consign the Agrarians to the margins of history is to both judge them unfairly and 
fail to understand how they viewed their own project. For one thing, consider the world the 
Agrarians were facing. As Malcolm Cowley described the world contemporaneously greeting the 
Lost Generation, “Something oppressed them… it was Mass Production, Babbittry, Our Business 
Civilization; or perhaps it was the Machine, which had been developed to satisfy men’s needs, 
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but which was now controlling those needs and forcing its standardized products upon us by 
means of omnipresent advertising and omnipresent vulgarity—the Voice of the Machine, the 
Tyranny of the Mob.”72  
 More importantly, consider just how distinctly anti-capitalist the Southern Agrarians 
were—or at least anti-industrialism.73 Consider Owsley’s definition of Agrarianism’s enemy: 
“This enemy is a system which allows a relatively few men to control most of the nation’s 
wealth and to regiment virtually the whole population under their anonymous holding companies 
and corporations, and to control government by bribery or intimidation.”74 If this quote appeared 
out of context, it might easily be taken for some Occupy Wall Street platform. But this virulent 
anti-industrialism was a central theme of Agrarianism, and would resurface again and again in 
Weaver’s work. This, along with their determination to offer a viable alternative to this economic 
arrangement, moves them out of the Romantic Agrarian margins and squarely into the ranks of 
political and economic crusaders.  
 Here, for example, is Ransom in his introduction to ITMS: “The tempo of industrial life is 
fast, but that is not the worst of it; it is accelerating. The ideal is not merely some set form of 
industrialism, with so many stable industries, but industrial progress, or an incessant extension of 
industrialization. It never proposes a specific goal; it initiates the infinite series.”75 The emphasis 
in industrialism is on progress and nothing else, and the Agrarians offer a counterpoint in small, 
local organization. The aim of ITMS was not to offer some rosy view of the past, as 
Montmarquet suggests—it was to start a national movement against the “enslavement of human 
energies.”76 Indeed, the historian Paul Conkin asserted that ITMS was “a prelude to an organized 
agrarian movement.”77 And though ITMS does not “intend to be very specific in proposing any 
practical measures,” according to Ransom, it does make an explicit economic claim: “The theory 
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of agrarianism is that the culture of the soil is the best and most sensitive of vocations, and that 
therefore it should have the economic preference and enlist the maximum number of workers.”78  
 Specifics were to come later, in both the follow-up text to ITMS (the less cohesive and 
less successful Who Owns America? A New Declaration of Independence, published in 1936 and 
focused more tightly on criticism of business) and in essays published in outlets like the 
American Review. Ransom, for example, in his essay “Happy Farmers,” devoted an entire 
section to chronicling all the work involved in running a small subsistence farm and how they 
might “cancel out the farmer’s need of money.”79 He offered these specific visions to contrast the 
Agrarian emphasis on limited human wants with industrialism’s emphasis on endless desires 
supplied by the tools of applied science and promoted by advertising and media. It was better to 
own fewer material possessions and be one’s master than to own a surfeit of goods and toil in 
some anonymous job—a pursuit Ransom mocks with the modernity-summarizing phrase 
“screwing on bolt No. 47.”80 More specific proposals also came from Owsley, who put forth the 
five “pillars” of the agrarian economic project: “restoration of the people to the land and the land 
to the people”; “preservation and restoration of the soil”; making subsistence crops the first 
consideration; forming a “just political economy” where agriculture is on par with “industry, 
finance, and commerce”; and the “creation of regional governments” with more autonomy than 
today’s states.81 
 I should also note that as Agrarianism evolved, especially as it revealed itself in Who 
Owns America?, parts of it became decidedly influenced by and aligned with the Distributist 
movement of England. Advanced by such British thinkers as Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, 
this movement advocated “a property and land redistribution followed by government 
supervision of small business,” with the goal of returning the land to the people, ending the 
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power of centralized industrialism, and preserving the metaphysical and stewardship benefits of 
private property.82 The Distributists believed that the only chance at economic salvation was 
found within widespread distribution of property. Belloc, who contributed to Who Owns 
America?, nicely summarized the juxtaposition of property with the modern citizen’s status in 
industrialism: “Either we restore property, or we restore slavery, to which we have already gone 
more than half way in our industrialized societies.”83 Several of the Agrarians pursued this line 
of thinking, given its natural alignment with the vision of a small-farm society. Distribution of 
property had two great benefits: it weakened the power of centralized capitalism, and it returned 
the people to the land where they were more likely to produce their own goods and be in 
harmony with nature. 
 Of course, as Rubin put it, “It was one thing to be opposed to the tawdry slogans of 
boosterism and what Ransom termed the Gospel of Progress; it was another to tell a farmer to 
weave his own jeans rather than buy them at a store because it threatened his Agrarian values not 
to do so.”84 This raises a larger question for the Agrarians, who saw quotidian concerns and 
existential concerns as deeply connected: does the economic arrangement shape the philosophy, 
or does the philosophy shape the economic arrangement? Put differently: must we have an 
Agrarian system to be virtuous and complete? Is there any separating the ideology from the 
movement? 
 No, and this is what makes the Agrarians analytically problematic. They are at once, as 
Rubin put it, poets writing “a reasoned, intelligent, planned defense of religious values and 
humane community attitudes as a way of retarding (and in the doing, humanizing) the pell-mell 
rush of the modern South to adopt the ways, values, and practices of industrial America,” and a 
movement to create a society, as Ransom put it, “in which agriculture is the leading vocation, 
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whether for wealth, for pleasure, or for prestige—a form of labor that is pursued with 
intelligence and leisure, and that becomes the model to which the other forms approach as well 
as they may.”85 There is that crucial last clause: other forms, meaning governmental and social 
and ethical arrangements, will follow the agrarian example in their ideal vision. 
 This means that “in such modest joy in a modest holding [there] is the promise of a 
stable, democratic society, a promise not to be found in ‘mobility’: our forlorn modern progress 
toward something indefinitely, and often unrealizably, better,” says Berry.86 Indeed, “There is in 
fact no distinction between the fate of the land and the fate of the people.”87 Only with a lifestyle 
of wholeness and tangibility can we create the conditions for virtue and solidarity. This is 
because ethics must be lived and observed in order to become cultural practice, and they cannot 
be lived until the conditions are hospitable to them. An agrarian framework is needed for 
development of agrarian ethics.  
 I raise all of these issues about Agrarianism as ideology versus political project because 
these are the same questions that would be lobbed at Weaver two decades later. Many critics of 
IHC would ask, essentially: what would you have us do, return to the 13th century? Must we have 
your set of philosophical universals in order to have virtue? Must we all flee the cities and 
become farmers? Weaver, in his work on the South, would answer these questions: by looking 
back on these societies—which embodied Berry’s “cause of stable, restorative, locally adapted 
economies”—we can learn something of how we might live.88 And yes, there is a specific social 
and economic arrangement that best supports that. Our goal, Weaver said, should be to foster the 
conditions for virtue and ethics by remaking our society along smaller, more tangible lines. 
Donald Davidson offers this vision: “Ethics fuses with action and makes a social harmony only 
when it is already present at the base of society… it cannot be ‘poured in from the top.’”89 
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 This is what so many in our field have missed about Weaver in their narrow focus on his 
argumentative theories: Weaver was fundamentally an Agrarian, and must be evaluated on those 
terms if he is to be evaluated honestly and completely. Our field is virtually alone in missing this 
connection, but it must be recovered. Weaver was “the most prominent disciple of the Vanderbilt 
Agrarians”; he was their “best expositor”; he was “the most unreconstructed of them all.”90 
Indeed, the critic Fred Hobson even said Weaver was not saying anything “that Ransom, Tate, 
and Davidson had not said” in their landmark works.91 Weaver saw himself as an Agrarian heir, 
and other scholars confirmed that inheritance. To analyze and categorize Weaver outside the 
context of Agrarian thought is to misunderstand both the figure and the rhetorical theories.  
How this dissertation proceeds 
 In a study of the history of our discipline’s ethical and political development, Pat Gehrke 
argued that ethical issues in communication are fundamental to our understanding of and practice 
within the field. Indeed, a principal concern of our field used to be the “growth of the soul,” and 
speech education “did not bear so much the mark of science and health but an earlier ethos of 
morality and integrity… This was a tradition grounded more in the humanities, in the study of… 
paradigmatic examples from which one should draw moral lessons.”92 As recently as 1975, a 
rhetorician wrote in a major journal that “the most important function of the critic is to act as a 
moral guardian of civilization.”93 Weaver endorsed such a view. Given that he saw rhetoric as a 
tool for discerning moral truths and a force for advancing people toward noble goals, he would 
have considered it integral to include “growth of the soul” as a central task of rhetoric.  
 And yet this assertion invites immediate objections. In a pluralistic society, how is 
rhetoric to foster growth of the soul and development of virtue and ethics? Surely the American 
project is too large, too complex, too fragmented to foster such growth? For these purposes, the 
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surprising answer is: yes, it is. Asking citizens to structure their metaphysical lives around people 
they never see, ideas they never tangibly grasp, and places they never visit is mistaken. We can 
only fully develop senses of virtue and ethics if we understand the traditions and see the 
implementation in action. We need proximity, immediacy, and tangibility in order to become 
fully formed selves.  
 Weaver and the agrarian framework suggest a possible, if not exactly perfect, way 
forward for rhetoric. By structuring our symbol use around the three planks of agrarianism—
practice, place, and solidarity—people can more directly understand why we do, and why we 
should do, certain things in certain places with certain people. The advantage of the agrarian 
rhetorical structure is that it allows us to use the harmony of nature, fellow-feeling, and affection 
in order to educate more ethical citizens and encourage virtue in public life. When we see the 
roots of ideas, see the ideas put in action, and live with the consequences of those ideas, we are 
compelled to become more fully involved. 
 Aside from offering a more clearly defined metaphysical understanding, this dissertation 
advances the discipline by offering a new and more complete understanding of one of our major 
intellectual figures. Weaver’s work has been unfairly marginalized and misunderstood, dismissed 
and derogated, because of his unpopular political stances and a general unwillingness by the field 
to analyze his broader body of work. I correct this by approaching his corpus with the agrarian 
framework, which rhetorical scholars have identified as needing more study, to his entire body of 
writings. Since Weaver meant for his work to be understood as intricately interconnected—on 
topics ranging from Southern heritage to argumentation to the perils of mass media—it is only 
fitting that his work be subjected to such an analysis. The failure of the field thus far to conduct 
such an analysis is troubling.  
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 Further, this project offers a chance to advance not just a greater understanding of 
Weaver but of the agrarian rhetorical framework. “Rhetorical scholarship has been absent” from 
agrarianism, write Motter and Singer, and the field needs “more direct engagement with agrarian 
studies literature.”94 This is especially true given the rise in the last decade of decidedly agrarian 
lifestyle trends: backyard farming, organic gardening, local food sourcing, crafting, and renewed 
interest in local politics and governance. As new discourses arise to define and delimit these 
developments, rhetorical scholars need a greater understanding of how the themes of 
agrarianism—practice, place, and solidarity—allow individuals to feel closer to a tradition, a 
region, and a community. In particular, we need a greater understanding of how such ways of 
living contribute to the development of citizenship—a central concern of rhetorical education. 
 I offer three central chapters structured around the aforementioned three themes. These 
three themes are not quite a method or a technique of reading as much they are, as I identified 
them above, entry points for understanding Weaver’s work. Weaver was a broad and wide-
ranging thinker, tackling many subjects over the course of his short career. I believe the most 
justice can be done to his intellectual legacy by taking a similarly open approach to his work. In 
this project I rehabilitate Weaver’s reputation not just as a rhetorical theorist of some measure 
but as an inheritor of the Agrarian legacy. Indeed, I argue below that to not understand Weaver 
as an Agrarian is to not understand him at all.  
 Weaver is not easy to pin down as an intellectual, or even as a scholar. In our time of 
intensely narrow research programs and highly specialized graduate education, it is almost 
jarring to encounter a mind that roved so widely and capably over so many elements of language, 
history, and philosophy. Weaver’s onetime description of a cultural “outsider” could just as 
easily apply to himself:  
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There is another type of outsider, however, who may entertain hope of doing something 
about a culture that is weakening. He is a member of the culture who has to some degree 
estranged himself from it through study and reflection. He is like the savant in society; 
though in it, he is not wholly of it; he has acquired knowledge and developed habits of 
thought which enable him to see it in perspective and to gauge it. He has not lost the 
intuitive understanding which belongs to him as a member, but he has added something 
to that. A temporary alienation from his culture may be followed by an intense 
preoccupation with it, but on a more reflective level than that of the typical member. He 
has become sufficiently aware of what is outside it to see it as a system or an entity. This 
person may be a kind of doctor of culture…95 
 
“Doctor of culture”: words that Weaver would use in describing his mentor Ransom, and words 
we could easily apply to Weaver today. I aim to fully illustrate the extent of Weaver’s talent as 
such a figure. This is why, though I have the three central themes of agrarian rhetoric as my 
starting point, I will not limit myself to them. There are other ideas central to Weaver’s 
thinking—time, memory, and agency prominent among them—that all combine to make his 
rhetorical theories of interest to scholars today. Many of Weaver’s concerns are explored here, 
using the three main themes as entry points.  
 The theme of practice in the works and theories of Weaver are the focus of the second 
chapter. For this theme, I show how Weaver’s body of work provides a definition of knowledge 
as traditional, contextual, and embedded in social processes. In this sense, knowledge is 
cultivated over time and subsequently forms an ethical framework for both how people should 
act and how knowledge should be used. Especially useful in this chapter will be Weaver’s later 
works on society, especially VO and IDT, a collection of his short writings.  
 The third chapter examines how Weaver’s work uses the agrarian theme of place, or how 
attachment to a specific region and all its attendant traditions and customs help dictate how 
people live and work together to create a culture. For this theme, I show how Weaver’s works 
provide rhetorical scholars with a sense of how place—particularly the South, and especially as 
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revealed in STB and SE—can help create the conditions for a specific form of rhetoric and thus 
an ensuing form of rhetorical ethics. In other words, I believe Weaver provides a framework for 
a rhetorical ethics that requires tangibility in a specific place.  
 Solidarity is the theme of the fourth chapter, and there I examine how Weaver’s works, 
most notably IHC, ER, and LWP, form a blueprint for social solidarity based upon immediate 
and consequential exposure to actions and ethics. This kind of agrarian solidarity requires 
investment in a specific cause, people, or place—as well as a stake in the success or failure of a 
common enterprise. Weaver’s form of solidarity is structured around immediacy because he and 
the agrarians believe it better compels our participation than do abstract interests and principles. 
This is of course a challenge to the idea of social cohesion on a national scale, and this chapter in 
particular will grapple with Weaver’s continuing relevance and the enduring problems embedded 
in the process of creating social solidarity. 
 Finally, the conclusion not only presents an overview of this new, agrarian understanding 
of Weaver, but also addresses in greater depth the consequences of Weaver’s ideas and rhetorical 
theories for citizenship and solidarity. Rhetoric as a discipline has a great tradition and a great 
stake in this latter concern, and in the conclusion I will suggest why Weaver’s approach remains 
useful and instructive—particularly in an age of rootless cosmopolitanism and perpetual 
infotainment. If rhetoric is to remain an integral practice and subject of study, then we need to 
have a better understanding of citizenship based upon the agrarian understanding. In the final 
chapter I also discuss flaws of Weaver’s theories and explore ideas from other rhetorical scholars 
that might help us reconcile the competing goals of solidarity and individual difference. 
 This project’s purpose, then, is twofold. First, it offers a greater and more holistic 
interpretation of Weaver’s work. Second, it advances an understanding of an increasingly 
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relevant rhetorical framework. Both are useful for rhetorical studies, and with this project I hope 
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Chapter 2: Weaver and the Forms of Agrarian Knowledge 
 
Technique, however brilliant, is an employment of means. Perhaps our error is the ignoring of 
first and final causes, which cannot be studied without some conception of the whole man.  
-- Richard Weaver 
 
Time present and time past/Are both perhaps present in time future/And time future contained in 
time past. 
-- T. S. Eliot, “Four Quartets” 
 
 Imagine two sailboat captains stepping onto the pier, where their respective crews await. 
The first attended the finest schools, has read every book about sailing, and has watched training 
videos covering every possible sailing scenario. The second has a sixth-grade education, but has 
been sailing professionally for two decades and has logged thousands of hours on board while 
traversing every possible type of calm and rough seas. Under whom would you rather sail? 
 This scenario, while obviously reductive and simplistic, is a classic one when it comes to 
limning different types of knowledge. As thought experiment, it introduces the starting 
conceptual term for this chapter, practice, which Motter & Singer identify as one of the three 
guiding topoi of agrarian rhetoric. They call practice an “act of cultivation [which] take[s] on a 
normative dimension that suggests how one should or ought to act”; for this exploration, I will 
focus on how the concept of practice is an essential component of both the Southern Agrarians 
and of Weaver’s rhetorical theories and guides for living. In this chapter I will interpret this term 
broadly, discussing practice as it relates to Weaver’s theories of knowledge, nature of argument, 
and ideas of tradition, history, and memory. All of these are crucial for understanding his 
rhetorical theories, and virtually all have been overlooked by rhetorical critics.1  
Weaver’s view of rhetoric must be reincorporated into our field because, as I explained in 
the first chapter, rhetorical scholarship has lost its cosmological bearings. When ideological 
criticism is allowed to exercise intellectual hegemony over rhetorical scholarship, and when the 
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stance of scholars becomes one of “permanent critique,” then we have abandoned our faith in 
language as a vehicle of order. When our only task is to undermine, expose, interrogate, and 
“problematize,” then we are no longer using rhetoric or symbols to build communities—we are 
only myopically harming what rhetoric has created. Rhetorical power structures are not always 
evil things to be viewed with suspicion: they are often the very things that allow expansion of 
rights, democratic participation, and a flourishing arena of ideas. 
A proper understanding of Weaver’s view of the role of rhetoric absolutely requires an 
understanding of what he saw rhetoric combating. To Weaver, rhetoric was a moral force that 
could strike back against the dialectic- and techné-obsessed society and offer us a way to 
reintroduce the ought into a world of pure how. Given that Weaver dated the fundamental flaw of 
the Western world to the fourteenth century, it is astonishing how few rhetorical scholars have 
bothered to examine the historical background of Weaver’s ideas. His views on history, tradition, 
myth, and memory—all the elements that make up our notions of practice—each deserves more 
intellectual depth and nuance than they have been given.  
To be sure, rhetorical scholars have long cared about forms of knowledge and how they 
might affect judgment in a pluralistic culture. Robert Rowland and Deanna Womack wrote in 
1985 that Aristotle’s view of rhetoric, which “commands attention to both the emotional and 
rational faculties,” is the mode of rhetoric that is “well adapted to the needs of a democratic 
society.”2 Technical knowledge alone—or dialectic alone, in the case of persuasion—is 
insufficient for determining moral truths and forming political judgments. Rhetoric, in the sense 
of persuasion, is both an art and the object produced by the art. Rowland and Womack argue that 
“As an art, rhetoric is amoral; as a product, rhetoric is either moral or immoral.”3 This is because 
successful rhetoric, like practical knowledge, must draw on more than the means of persuasion 
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alone: it must incorporate the audience, unvoiced assumptions, and the community of mind that 
forms around the rhetorical situation.  
Lois Self likewise finds Aristotelian phronesis to be ideally suited for our own culture’s 
rhetoric, writing that, in persuasion, “The man of practical wisdom continuously balances the 
good and the expedient, the ideal and the possible.”4 The rhetorical scholar Steven Mailloux 
traces the idea of rhetoric as “practical wisdom” back to Aristotle and Pericles to show how “the 
best rhetors possess a practical wisdom that can discern the most effective means of persuasion 
in any specific situation,” which makes those rhetors, as Aristotle himself put it, those who 
“possess a faculty of discerning what things are good for themselves and for mankind.”5 
More recently, the political scientist Bryan Garsten has defended rhetoric rooted in 
practical knowledge as a key tool in political judgment. Aristotelian rhetoric-as-art “showed how 
public speech might draw private judgment into the activity of public deliberation and thereby 
take advantage of judgment’s insight without capitulating to its independence.”6 In other words, 
we use rhetoric to apprehend moral truths (to use Weaver’s proposal) by incorporating the 
knowledge and judgment of the ordinary citizen in a democratic society—hence, combining the 
wisdom of the community of mind to form larger public truths. In this scheme, rhetoric rooted in 
both the emotional and rational faculties becomes the crucial tool for transforming private 
practical knowledge into larger cultural guidelines, and for moving away from pure dialectic or 
technical knowledge as cultural foundations. 
As I have previously noted, too much scholarship in rhetorical criticism has attempted to 
isolate Weaver’s rhetorical theories—usually abstracted from the rest of ER and treated as 
standalone content—and consider them as forms of techné, mere argumentative strategies to be 
deployed rationally. But Weaver never intended his theories to be abstracted from their 
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surrounding content because he was an agrarian thinker: the forms of land-based practice that 
guided his writings insisted that ideas be considered cosmologically and holistically as part of a 
broader structure. Rhetorical scholarship on Weaver has been “aim[ing] at abstracting some 
arbitrary essence from the whole,” as Ransom wrote of science.7 We must understand the full 
context of Weaver’s ideas about and goals for rhetoric, including the Agrarian education that 
shaped him.  
The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how Weaver and the Agrarians viewed knowledge, 
time, memory, history, and myth—all components of the entry point term of practice. This 
concept is important because it dictates how we view the role of rhetoric and symbol structures 
in culture. If judgment is made to be scientific and logical and dialectical, then, argued Weaver, 
the role of rhetoric is diminished and culture suffers. But if rhetoric and myth and memory are 
incorporated into judgment and culture formation, then we can have a flourishing community. 
Before I survey the Agrarian roots of Weaver’s views of practice, I will briefly explain the types 
of knowledge that form the core of this ontological and epistemological conflict.  
Contrasting Types of Knowledge 
Broadly speaking, the sailing example above illustrates the two types of knowledge in the 
Aristotelian tradition. The example of the captain with plenty of book knowledge represents 
techné, or the kind of technical knowledge used in making crafts; in late modernity, techné 
translates to technical, rule-based, rational knowledge. The example of the captain with 
experience represents phronesis, or the kind of practical knowledge used in everyday social 
interactions and in judgment and deliberation. Though the second captain lacks the techné-
expertise of sailing, her steady accumulation of phronesis over the past two decades illustrates 
her depth of knowledge and would surely make most of us choose to join her crew.   
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The split between techné and phronesis dates back millennia. The crucial point for 
agrarianism is that cyclical and traditional work with the land relies upon the latter, and thus 
compels the individual to immerse himself in tangible pursuits rather than abstract ones. It is just 
this direct connection to tangibility that is sought by the idea of practice. Modern life has largely 
separated thinking from doing, turning collections of knowledge into specialized expertise that is 
separate from the physical work once devoted to land and craft.8 Where premodern work was 
largely based on accumulated knowledge, modern work usually relies upon rules, laws, and 
formulae—promoting technical reason and instrumentality over practical wisdom.9 This set of 
abstract rules keeps us from being connected to both our labor and its ensuing fruits; agrarianism 
advocates a return to tangible work instead of the abstract work of modernity. This tangible work 
is practice, or an activity whose internal goods fulfill a final purpose.10 The agrarian stance prizes 
this sort of work because it depends upon accumulated knowledge and accrued goods, rather 
than the reductionist and abstract rules of modern knowledge. 
But it is not just farming that has value and internal goods—agricultural work should 
subsequently become the basis for other pursuits. Recall from the first chapter the statement of 
principles from ITMS: “Technically, perhaps, an agrarian society is one in which agriculture is 
the leading vocation, whether for wealth, for pleasure, of for prestige—a form of labor that is 
pursued with intelligence and leisure, and that becomes the model to which the other forms 
approach as well as they may.”11 Agrarian pursuits, in other words, contain innate value because 
of their relation to land and reliance on practical knowledge, and thus become the form to which 
other human pursuits should aspire. Contrast this with contemporary bureaucracy, with its 
Weberian notions of rationality, or with contemporary industrial managerialism, with its total 
lack of teleology or internal goods. Weaver and the Agrarians began every philosophical and 
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rhetorical endeavor from this standpoint; questions of ends must always come before questions 
of means. Agrarianism, with its cyclical nature and accommodation to nature, always prioritizes 
the former.12 
When Weaver, following his Agrarian forebears, criticized industrialism and the “tools of 
applied science,” he meant exactly this split between realms of knowledge. The scientific 
mindset is overly dialectical, Weaver thought, attempting to reduce all knowledge to what can be 
gathered through empiricism and method. Other scholars have found this split to affect our very 
notions of public life. In governance, practical knowledge contains the accumulated wisdom of 
the ages, dependent upon pragmatic testing and acceptance by people over time. Compare this 
with technical knowledge, which attempts to “reformulate systems of knowledge in order to 
bracket out uncertainty and thereby permit the kind of logical deductive rigor possessed by 
Euclidean geometry.”13 Such an effort reserves no room for lessons learned, wisdom 
accumulated, or reasons refined; it only allows for scientific reasoning applied in all cases. 
“Techniques were devised to isolate and domesticate those aspects of key variables that might be 
expressed in numbers,” with the importance of other types of knowledge diminished.14 When we 
rely solely upon technical knowledge, as agrarianism condemns, we have no space for the 
“particular, situated, and contextual attributes” that help form a community and shape virtuous 
citizens.15 
This idea, of a split between the tangibility of practical knowledge and the abstraction of 
technical knowledge, is fundamental to understanding the Agrarians and thus to understanding 
Weaver’s intellectual lineage. “Techné,” writes Joseph Dunne, “provides the kind of knowledge 
possessed by an expert in one of the specialized crafts, a person who understands the principles 
(logoi, aitiai) underlying the production of an object or state of affairs… Phronesis, on the other 
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hand, characterizes a person who knows how to live well (eu zen). It is acquired not in the 
making of any product separate from oneself but rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows. It is 
personal knowledge in that, in the living of one’s life, it characterizes and expresses the kind of 
person that one is.”16 That is: the society rooted in phronesis is one at home in the realm of 
rhetoric, because it can deal comfortably in the symbolic and can grasp that notion that our 
discourse and modes of living are expressive of the sorts of people we are.17 
The political philosopher Hannah Arendt offered a similar distinction between “action” 
and “making,” also discussed by Dunne. Making “connotes activity which establishes a durable 
world of artifacts and utilities—and thereby rises out of the cycles of labor which are tied to the 
sheer necessity of biological survival. ‘Action,’ on the other hand, brings into being a higher 
freedom in which persons realize and reveal themselves as distinct, and indeed unique, 
persons.”18 When a society relies too much on making (the counterpart of techné), it results in “a 
society whose affairs are increasingly administered according to the standard of technocratic 
efficiency”—exactly the sort of economically ordered, progress-obsessed society condemned by 
Weaver and the Agrarians.19 By contrast, “It is through action”—the counterpart of phronesis—
“that a person discloses ‘who’—rather than ‘what’—she is.”20 
Recall that the Southern Agrarians, and subsequently Weaver, saw the fundamental 
conflict as industrialism versus agrarianism. The former is, according to ITMS, “the economic 
organization of the collective American society. It means the decision of society to invest its 
economic resources in the applied sciences… [it assumes] that labor is an evil, that only the end 
of labor or the material product is good.”21 Society is therefore defined according to material 
ends and the consumption of same. Hence, the technician who can maximize production is 
imbued with sacerdotal power.22 This has inevitable consequences for our view of the human. If 
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society is merely the maximization of material growth based upon techné, with little concern for 
the powers of phronesis that accumulate over time and exist in tradition, then the individual must 
be measured only in terms of economic output. This, according to Weaver, is at the heart of our 
broken Western culture: “Man created in the divine image, the protagonist of a great drama in 
which his soul was at stake, was replaced by man the wealth-seeking and -consuming animal.”23 
The key for Weaver, and for other devotees of practical knowledge throughout history, is 
that the two types of knowledge must be confined to their own realms so they might work 
together. When one strays beyond its borders to colonize another, neither individual nor 
community nor society can achieve practical philosophy—that which allows us to coexist with 
some degree of harmony and meaning. As Hans Georg Gadamer argued, “Practical philosophy is 
determined by the line drawn between the practical knowledge of the person who chooses freely 
and the acquired skill of the expert that Aristotle names techné. Practical philosophy, then, has to 
do not with the learnable crafts and skills, however essential this dimension of human ability too 
is for the communal life of humanity. Rather it has to do with what is each individual’s due as a 
citizen and what constitutes his arête or excellence.”24 Since, according to Weaver, man is 
created in the divine image, each life must have some kind of meaning—but techné brackets out 
all non-expert knowledge and defines the good only in terms of the material. This cannot be the 
basis for a functioning culture.  
The peril of the techné-dominated worldview is that it lacks any telos outside of 
materialistic growth. There is therefore nothing aimed at or aspired to—there is only relentless 
trampling of all things that stand in the way of growth. Expansion of technical knowledge and its 
offspring technology becomes society’s primary concern because it is deemed a salvific force, 
and technology thus becomes an end rather than a means: 
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“If we have no directing faculty outside of technology, then future technological 
advancement can only be guided by the expansion and refinement of the technical means 
to quantify and control the world and ourselves directed toward no end in particular, 
whether happiness or healthiness. In turn, the manipulation of the natural world and 
human nature may very well transform our minds, our bodies, and the planet into 
something unrecognizable.”25  
 
As I will discuss further below, this was precisely the fear of Weaver and the Agrarians: that the 
ascension of technical knowledge simply makes forward progress the indefinable and 
unreachable goal of human endeavors. “The [modern] ideal is not merely some set form of 
industrialism,” ITMS claims, “with so many stable industries, but industrial progress, or an 
incessant extension of industrialization. It never proposes a specific goal; it initiates the infinite 
series.”26 Gadamer puts it quite clearly: “One has to ask whether progress, as it is at home in the 
special field of scientific research, is at all consonant with the conditions of human existence in 
general.”27 Progress may work in the realm of techné, but it cannot tell us which way we should 
go. To the oldest question in philosophy—how should we live?—it only answers “More!”  
This is exactly the cultural malaise diagnosed by Weaver in IHC and expanded upon in 
his other works: an anti-humanistic culture that gleefully occludes anything that is not reducible 
to technical knowledge and material comfort. The Agrarian writer Ralph Borsodi skewered that 
culture in 1929: “This is an ugly civilization. It is a civilization of noise, smoke, smells, and 
crowds—of people content to live amongst the throbbing of its machines; the smoke and smells 
of its factories… For America is a respecter of things only, and time—why time is something to 
be killed, or butchered into things which can be bought and sold.”28 This is what happens when a 
society sanctions “the invasion of every department of intellectual activity by the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of technique,” as Michael Oakeshott put it.29 It becomes a society no longer focused 
on asking how we might live. Instead, it becomes a society that asks only how we might grow 
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the fastest and consume the most. It becomes, in other words, a society that has forgotten 
rhetoric. 
The Agrarian View of Knowledge 
In the agrarian mindset, knowledge extends beyond what we can be told by the tools of 
applied science and through dialectic reason. Knowledge is not a formal structure to be 
condensed into rules and formulae, but rather a malleable and evolving tradition to be cultivated 
and acquired instead of devised and taught. It relies upon tradition, history, and memory and 
readily calls upon all three in order to persuade and define. Most importantly, knowledge 
unashamedly relies upon myth in addition to science. John Crowe Ransom’s God Without 
Thunder, which was significant in shaping Weaver’s thinking, is the defining text for this 
section.  
The book’s subtitle—An Unorthodox Defense of Orthodoxy—reveals Ransom’s entire 
project. Ransom, the leading mind among the Southern Agrarians, had grown wary of the 
influence of scientific perception and reason and yearned for a way of expressing knowledge that 
was not constrained by them. Science is ascendant, Ransom wrote, and its forms have become 
the God of modern man. Modernity’s “recipe,” Ransom said, is “simply to ‘produce,’ to ‘get 
results,’ to apply science, and then more science.”30 But this process is incapable of producing 
positive knowledge, whose light “is directed only backwards,” and it must always be descriptive 
rather than prescriptive.31 Contrasting this kind of knowledge, which Ransom terms the “Second 
Moment” because it allows reflection on the experience of phenomena (the “First Moment”), is 
myth. Because it “resorts to the supernatural in order to represent the fullness of the natural,” 
myth provides more than just descriptions of events—it provides guides for living, which all 
people and societies need to function successfully.32 Ransom, in order to take advantage of the 
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utility of myth in society, looked for a “Third Moment”—“a way of recapturing the suppressed 
wholes of immediate experience,” which can underlie whole civilizations and faiths.33 
Since we as humans are always trying to recover the experience of the First Moment, the 
key point for Ransom is that “Logic, science, [and] ordinary philosophy are not sufficient to the 
task of the Third Moment. One can recover the First Moment only through contrived images, by 
use of the imagination and not by a logical act. Imagination, dipping into the storeroom, can 
bring up the lost aspects of the First Moment and allow an appropriate joy.”34 Science attempts 
to bracket out all things intangible and unquantifiable, but Ransom argues it is just those things 
that make life worth living. Just as importantly, those very unscientific ideas are how we learn 
about the true nature of the world—they therefore contain the highest forms of knowledge. 
Against the tide of the scientific “ascendancy,” as Ransom put it, the Agrarian view offers 
knowledge in the form of myth and tradition: nonscientific, nonrational, and deeply rooted in the 
stories we tell ourselves. The doctrines of faith and myth and the presentational creations of art 
allow us to connect the finite and the infinite just as the farmer connects a solitary plant to the 
larger cycles of nature.  
The crucial point here is not that agrarianism is inhospitable to scientific knowledge. If 
that were true, farmers would still be using horse-drawn plows. Instead, as Weaver brilliantly 
synthesized the two sides later, science must become more hospitable to forms of knowledge that 
lie beyond scientific understanding, just as dialectic must make room for rhetoric in public life.35 
Allen Tate believed this to be true as well. In “Humanism and Naturalism,” Tate wrote that “The 
religious unity of intellect and emotion, of reason and instinct, is the sole technique for the 
realization of values.”36 But until science and rationalism can clear some room for myth and the 
stories we tell ourselves to explain our history, its knowledge will always be circumscribed by 
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narrowness of sight: as Ransom wrote, “What [science] knows, it knows hard, but it cannot 
afford to know much. Its knowledge is ruthless and exclusive, while aesthetic knowledge, aiming 
at the fullness of the object, is inclusive.”37  
That phrase—the fullness of the object—is a good starting point for an exploration of 
Weaver’s theory of knowledge, which derives directly from his Southern Agrarian forebears. 
Weaver was a Platonist, and he was therefore committed to the notion of universal and 
transcendental ideals that underlie the perceivable objects of this world. For centuries, this 
dominant view provided a unifying mytho-poetic view of the world: each human and each object 
was part of a cosmological order. But according to Weaver, in the late fourteenth century 
William of Occam was responsible for Western man’s “evil decision, which has become the 
efficient and final cause of other evil decisions.”38 That decision was the embrace of “the fateful 
doctrine of nominalism, which denies that universals have a real existence… With the denial of 
objective truth there is no escape from the relativism of ‘man the measure of all things’… Thus 
began the ‘abomination of desolation’ appearing today as a feeling of alienation from all fixed 
truth.”39  
The essential part of Weaver’s argument here, and in Ransom’s argument above, is that 
there are very important elements of knowledge that we do not and cannot understand—and 
those are the more important parts. Science, for all its heat and light, can never tell people how 
they might live; its knowledge is limited to mere description and eventual speculation. 
Universals and transcendentals, even though they were part and parcel of a world of inequality, 
oppression, and a host of other ills, at the very least provided us with a teleological view of the 
world. And without any universal ideals, people have no idea where to turn for guidance; as 
Weaver says, once there is no objective truth, every man is “his own priest [and] his own 
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professor of ethics.”40 People lack any unifying foundations and have separated themselves from 
the most common foundation of all: nature.  
Nature is an essential component of this kind of knowledge because it demonstrates that 
there are things beyond human comprehension and, more importantly, human control. As 
Weaver wrote in IHC, “Whereas nature had formerly been regarded as imitating a transcendent 
model and as constituting an imperfect reality, it was henceforth looked upon as containing the 
principles of its own constitution and behavior.”41 In sharp contrast to the Enlightenment view, 
which treats nature as something to be dominated and regulated—part of the Cartesian separation 
of thinking from doing—the agrarian view of knowledge takes a myth-based position of 
harmony with an unintelligible natural world. “Nature is something which is given and which is 
finally inscrutable,” Weaver wrote in SE. “What man should seek in regard to nature is not a 
complete dominion but a modus vivendi—that is, a manner of living together, a coming together 
with something that was here before our time and will be here after it.”42 Indeed, true knowledge 
comes from that very unintelligibility and requires myth to tell us what science cannot: as 
Ransom said, it resorts to the supernatural to explain the fullness of the natural. And myth cannot 
exist without transcendental ideals, which subsequently bind us together through common 
foundations. 
The influence of this line of thinking on Weaver’s rhetorical theories is quite clear. We 
cannot use words and symbols to shape society unless we agree on the foundations of those 
words and symbols. Once we sever them from their foundations, around what points can we 
rally? “Here begins the assault upon definition,” Weaver wrote in IHC. “If words no longer 
correspond to objective realities, it seems no great wrong to take liberties with words. From this 
point on, faith in language as a means of arriving at truth weakens.”43 This is a theme to which 
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Weaver would return in ER, lamenting the decline of what he then called “the homogeneity of 
belief” in contemporary discourse.44 But as Richard L. Johannesen et al. argue, this required both 
dialectic and rhetoric: “Knowledge of universals comes through dialectic, the ability to 
differentiate existents into categories, and through intuition, the ability to grasp ‘essential 
correspondences.’”45 Thus spaciousness of rhetoric and “homogeneity of belief” require for 
existence both universals that underlie concepts and work on the part of the individual to 
understand how those concepts are differentiated.  
Can such forms of knowledge derive purely from the scientific view? Weaver and the 
Agrarians say no, and it is this stance that places them firmly in the phronesis camp and in 
opposition to that of techné. Myth, faith, art: these are the things that form our powers of 
judgment and cultivation of experience, rather than simply the ability to eventually internalize 
the lessons of rational knowledge. Recall that Oakeshott’s criticism of techné is that it allows 
little room for flexibility and adjustment and improvisation, but instead simply asks us to follow 
certain rules in certain situations. This form of knowledge is an ill fit for a philosophy that seeks 
to make land-based thinking the basis for all forms of human activity, because to work with the 
land—and thus to learn the lessons of stewardship, sustainability, and cyclicality—is to build 
upon knowledge over time and see the fruits of that knowledge perennially produced.  
For Weaver and the Agrarians, knowledge is at some irreducible level intuitive—that is, 
there are some things we simply know and can agree upon, and those things provide the basis for 
culture. While not quite a dogmatic Christian outlook, the view accepts the tenets of fallen man, 
the inscrutability of nature, and the permanence of human limits in a cosmological order. 
Ransom called this Agrarian outlook a “theological homebrew,” and his student Weaver gave it 
fuller description in his writings on the “older religiousness” of the South.46 The first element of 
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this “older religiousness” is piety: “Piety comes to us as a warning voice that we must think as 
mortals, that it is not for us either to know all or to control all. It is a recognition of our own 
limitations and a cheerful acceptance of the contingency of nature, which gives us the protective 
virtue of humility.”47 This attitude stands in contrast to the attitude of science, whose rules and 
formulae convinces us we can know all and master all.  
What the believer of the older religiousness “desired above all else in religion was a fine 
set of ideas to contemplate… [he] looked upon religion as a great conservative agent and a 
bulwark of those institutions which served him.”48 The “set of ideas” here can be read as 
Weaver’s Platonic assertion that universals underlie all things and provide unity; religion as a 
“conservative agent” echoes the advocates of phronesis who argue that practical knowledge 
conserves and forms the basis of functioning social institutions. Even more importantly, mytho-
religious knowledge—rooted in narrative, unifying in content, and more catholic than 
sectarian—allows us to stay on ontological terra firma via the ensuing sense of permanence. 
“Men cannot live under a settled dispensation if the postulates of his existence must be 
continually revised in accordance with knowledge furnished by a nature filled with 
contingencies… It is therefore imperative in the eyes of the older religionists that man have for 
guidance in this life a body of knowledge to which the ‘facts’ of natural discovery are either 
subordinate or irrelevant.”49 
We can see here the direct connection between the age-old knowledge debates and 
Weaver’s more contemporary thinking. He is arguing that if our worldview is only shaped by 
scientific knowledge (techné), then we lose any semblance of the permanence that arises from a 
“body of knowledge” (phronesis) functioning as a guide for living. This is why the South, as the 
central American repository of the older religiousness, “recognized in science a fascinating 
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technology [but] refused to become absorbed in it to the extent of making it either a philosophy 
of life or a religion.”50 Instead, the older religionists embraced “a natural piety, expressing itself 
in uncritical belief and in the experience of conversion, not in an ambition to perfect a system, or 
to tidy up a world doomed to remain forever deceptive, changeful, and evil.”51 Techné, then, is 
the tool of progress: its rational laws and steps are the mechanism for understanding the world 
and improving our condition in it. Phronesis, meanwhile, is the body of practical knowledge that 
helps provide a fixed foundation from which to work and compels us to see the world as 
ultimately unknowable. This is the agrarian, land-based ethic of knowledge: humble before 
nature, content with humankind’s limits, and secure in the feeling that good judgment requires a 
heartfelt embrace of myth and universals.  
History, Tradition, and Memory in Agrarian Thought 
The Southern Agrarians, as individuals, saw history in varied ways. Tate thought history 
might lead to a renewal of Christendom; Davidson believed submission to the past and to 
Southern tradition was self-validating for values; Ransom felt history offered superior examples 
of the power of religion and myth; others, like Andrew Lytle and Frank Owsley, thought the 
Southern history of small farming offered the best model for life.52 The Agrarians never had one 
capital-h History to fall back on in their critiques of modern life. Like all writing on history, 
theirs was contingent upon the world they faced. Some critics have even argued the Agrarian 
version of history was mythic in itself, embodying a mythologized and romanticized fusion of 
the values of integrity, family, and religious morality.53 ITMS recognized that “the preservation 
of the South’s cultural legacy might first of all require a battle for its economic soul,” and that 
soul was dependent on what form of knowledge society chose to utilize.54 And—forcefully, 
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indisputably—the Agrarians came down on the side of the evolving practical knowledge of 
history and tradition. 
So we have this body of evolving practical knowledge—whence does it come, and how 
do we use it? For Weaver as for the Agrarians, rhetoric was always a force informed and 
produced by memory. “The rhetorician always speaks out of historical consciousness,” Weaver 
wrote, “because his problems are existential ones.”55 If we are to move people toward noble 
goals, then the task of rhetoric must always take into account the full history and context of a 
given situation. This means that rhetoric, as a contextual and prescriptive force, must have 
behind it the weight that comes with a solid grounding in tradition and all that it implies. 
“‘Tradition’ is… an embodiment of ‘givens’ that must constantly be fought for, recovered in 
each generation, and adjusted to new conditions.”56 It cannot be simply asserted. 
Despite their critics’ claims, the Southern Agrarians who influenced Weaver were never 
content with vague invocations of “tradition” in order to justify their vision. Instead, tradition 
was a force that must be reckoned with and integrated. T.S. Eliot, whose views often overlapped 
with the Agrarians, argued this very thing: “[Tradition] involves a perception not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence… This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless 
as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together, is what makes a writer 
traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in 
time, of his own contemporaneity.”57 Similarly, Weaver believed that human actions must “seek 
transcendental help” in order to be “measured, pointed up, directed by some superior validating 
ideal.”58 We cannot understand the ideal without understanding the whole of tradition, and the 
“transcendental help” can only come from incorporation of the past. Eliot is talking about poetry 
and Weaver is talking about rhetoric in the face of scientific ascendance, but each point is the 
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same: if we are to aim toward something higher then we must understand the entire historical 
context which guides our sights. 
But if we want to incorporate tradition, we have to find a way to preserve it—no easy 
task when, as Weaver put it in VO, “The slogan today is to forget and live in the future. 
Wherever we look in the ‘progressive’ world we find encouragements not to remember. 
Increasingly the past is looked upon as a burden… for no man exists really except through that 
mysterious storehouse of his remembered acts and his formed personality. His very reality 
depends upon his carrying the past into the present through the power of memory.”59 When we 
successfully preserve memory, we can move beyond mere scientific knowledge and embrace the 
contemplative life: “Religion, morality, and art would again enable men to experience the drama 
of life and to feel the transformative power that accompanied the struggle between good and 
evil.”60 The world of science and industry has instead created a world in which problems are 
easy to leave behind and personalities are easy to invent anew. When people are free from the 
burden of memory, they need not reckon with the serious things. This, in turn, prevents them 
from living meaningful lives and moving toward noble goals. The stance of Weaver and the 
Agrarians with regard to memory set them apart from other American conservatives. Whereas 
other conservatives focused on economic issues and personal liberty, this group was, according 
to one scholar, “Interested in social and spiritual values [and] they followed the moral-cultural 
tradition of Coleridge, Goethe, and T.S. Eliot rather than that of Greek rationalism… [they were] 
traditionalist[s] rooted in the history of accustomed forms and habits. Continuity, order, and 
inequality were the earmarks of their good society.”61 
Ransom and the Southern Agrarians had “a passionate desire to restore myth to its proper 
place,” in both art and society.62 This desire greatly influenced Weaver, who thought myth could 
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and should be an expression of absolute truth just as much as scientific knowledge was. But what 
forces constituted this overarching myth that provided the basis for society? And what intrinsic 
goods in society does the power of myth create? And how, as Weaver wanted, could it help the 
world “regain order and stability [by returning] to the kind of poetic-religious vision of life 
which dominated the Middle Ages”?63 
The answers come from Weaver’s promotion of several concepts, all of which were 
deeply influenced by the Agrarians and by the tenets of agrarianism. The latter compels us to 
think in a land-based way, internalizing the cyclicality of an inscrutable nature and modeling our 
lives on the cultivation of an evolving body of knowledge. Once we separate ourselves 
philosophically from nature and its minimization of the human ego, we enter a dangerous realm 
of ontological hubris: convinced by our scientific prowess that technique can conquer all, we 
diminish the importance of the non-rational thinking displayed in art, aesthetics, myth, rhetoric, 
and literature. The Southern Agrarians built upon this fundamental agrarian concept by arguing 
that a society should follow the agrarian model in its social, cultural, and economic relations. 
According to one historian, Weaver’s accomplishment was to take the Agrarian model and 
reinterpret it as “a non-particularist conservatism fundamentally concerned with issues of 
value… [Weaver] defined Agrarianism in terms of philosophical positions and the defense of 
absolutes.”64 These absolutes constituted Weaver’s outline of this chapter’s heading: the practice 
of the good life and the good society.  
History, tradition, and memory were essential ingredients of the Southern Agrarians’ 
efforts. The three central figures—Ransom, Tate, and Davidson—all embraced a view of the 
South as a distinct and special kind of society within a society, heir to the aristocratic and 
enlightened tradition of Europe. This would later become Weaver’s view as well. The core of 
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this view is that the South had its claims to history snatched away at Appomattox, and had lost a 
sense of itself as a great civilization that carried on the traditions of Western culture and the 
unified ontological structure of Christendom. Tate’s famous poem “Ode to the Confederate 
Dead” illustrates what Tate saw as the modern citizen’s “spiritual exile from his or her own 
heritage.”65 Tate wrote: “What shall we say who have knowledge/Carried to the heart? Shall we 
take the act/To the grave? Shall we, more hopeful, set up the grave/In the house? The ravenous 
grave?”66 Here is a clear meditation on the legacy of those who fought at the landmark battles of 
the war, and even more importantly, a pondering of what the South ought do with that legacy. 
Should a society discard what was defeated? The North, via occupation and Reconstruction, had 
attempted just that: an extinguishing of the central tenets of Southern society.  
But the Agrarians shared Eliot’s view that history and tradition are not so easily cast 
aside. If a people are to truly know who they are, they must know who they were. This idea 
would resurface in Weaver’s writing on the “spaciousness” of the old rhetoric, when speakers 
would regularly draw upon not just the events of the past but the common assumptions that a 
population made about those events. Reconstruction proved that the North wanted a clean break 
between past and future, but Tate and the others knew there could be no future without a firm 
grasp of the past—for only a firm grasp could allow people to learn how they might live.  
Davidson made a similar point with his poem The Tall Men, where he wrote “The dead 
young men whose flesh will not reflower/But in this single bloom which now I pluck,/Weaving it 
into my spirit as victors weave/A chaplet, gathered from the mould, for honor’s sake?... The tall 
men, lie within the land they won./… Out of their death/Leaps now our life…”67 This is another 
example of how history weighs heavily upon us, makes us question our own search for meaning, 
and provides ontological guidance if we would only listen. The point in each poem is that the 
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narrator is struggling to understand the role of history in shaping our lives, and to what extent we 
should draw on tradition, and which is the best way to preserve the memory of what has taken 
place.  
This is not to say that the Agrarians simply violated Eliot’s dictum and embraced 
Southern history whole cloth.68 To do so would obviously mean supporting a system that relied, 
tragically, upon the forced labor of millions of slaves. But neither could Southerners ignore that 
history any more than, for example, Heidegger scholars could simply ignore his Nazi-era 
writings. To do either would be ethically spurious, because history does not allow us to 
whitewash our past. The lesson of the Agrarians was that the South should not throw out their 
entire history simply because of slavery. What is seen in the Tate and Davidson poems are 
honest attempts to reckon with, understand, and recover what good ideas are to be found in one 
region’s past despite the injustices it contains. Doing so requires a solid hold on the lessons that 
come from history, the customs that come from tradition, and the active preservation that comes 
with memory. 
All three forces help build the cultural myths that provide not just foundations for society, 
but a form of knowledge that is equal to that of scientific knowledge. This was Ransom’s point 
in God Without Thunder: that when it comes to the shaping of people’s lives, non-rational forces 
are far more important than the rule-based knowledge of industrialism’s scientists and 
technicians. Scientists and philosophers, he wrote, “elevate science into metaphysics; but they 
reduce religion into metaphysics.”69 In other words, a force like religion already occupies a 
higher plane than science ever could—but the forces of rationality continually try to displace the 
authority of all forms of phronesis. The two dominant forms of knowledge are not necessarily 
incommensurable, but each needs to retain its provenance; once the forces of techné start their 
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attack on the epistemological criteria of history, tradition, and memory then the good things in 
life begin to suffer and utilitarian industrialism reigns.  
Having established the basic philosophical elements of Weaver’s Agrarian teachers, I 
turn now to what the man himself said about history, tradition, and memory—the keys to a 
superior form of knowledge, he believed. Important to bear in mind in this discussion is that a 
common accusation made of Weaver and the Agrarians is that they simply want to turn the clock 
back to a time they have romanticized as somehow being better. Weaver addresses this in IHC, 
saying that such an accusation “reveals the philosophic position of modernism” and that “the 
things of highest value are not affected by the passage of time… In declaring that we wish to 
recover lost ideals and values, we are looking toward an ontological realm which is timeless… 
the return which the idealists propose is not a voyage backward through time but a return to 
center.”70 
Weaver on the Elements of Practice 
One scholar wrote that for Weaver, “the term ‘knowledge’ can only be applied to that 
which is essential, permanent, and unchanging”; indeed, “reality is ultimately noetic. Permanent 
reality, the realm of being, lies beyond the particulars of sensation and can be apprehended only 
through the intellect.”71 This is the entire thrust of IHC: that modern life is in decline because 
nominalism elevated sensation-knowledge over noetic knowledge—a direct link to Ransom’s 
ideas. Noetic knowledge—that based on the intellect and perception rather than scientific 
observation—is instilled through and kept alive in history and memory: the forces that must be 
cultivated to create the agrarian notion of practice 
“Between myth and status and memory there is a necessary connection,” Weaver wrote. 
“Every individual’s desire is that he will be seen for what he is, and what he is depends upon 
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some present knowledge of his past. The same principle holds for societies and nations. They are 
their history… Cultural life depends upon the remembrance of acknowledged values.”72 This is 
especially true with regard to rhetoric, because to move people with language depends upon 
shared associations of words and symbols. Writes a Weaver scholar, “The link between 
knowledge and language is memory… Language is the record of memory, a result of the 
collective process of recognition.”73 Indeed, Weaver argued that language “appears as a great 
storehouse of universal memory… aiding us to get at a meaning beyond present meaning through 
the very fact that it embodies’ others’ experiences.”74 
The emphasis in both quotes is necessarily on the collective rather than the individual. 
This is because agrarian practice insists on knowledge and meaning that lie below—or perhaps 
beyond—the sensation-perception knowledge of scientific rationality, which can only be verified 
by the autonomous individual. If people are to truly have a foundation for social knowledge, it 
must consist of the things they somehow know but cannot enumerate. Words like universal, 
collective, storehouse: these indicate that Weaver and those who have accurately understood him 
recognize the need for something beyond the mere individual. If all people have is an 
agglomeration of individual sensations that they call knowledge because they are rationally 
verified, then they are inevitably left with not just cultural but linguistic relativism. By contrast, 
if they correctly order our collective knowledge of myth, memory, and the like, then, as he put it 
in IHC, “Finding the meaning of the definiendum is finding what emerges naturally if our present 
concepts are put together in the right relation.”75 
Like his Agrarian teachers, Weaver believed that scientific industrialism and its tools 
were waging a war on memory by tolerating only that knowledge that can be abstracted from the 
whole and ordered rationally. (Think again of their assertion that Reconstruction attempted to 
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systematically eradicate all traces of the antebellum South in order to create something anew, 
while ignoring any virtue that old world contained.) But for Weaver, memory also “supplies 
material for the faculty of reason and it provides the necessary condition of conscience… [it is 
thus] essential to intelligence and to soul.”76 Hence Weaver’s argument that rhetoric (based on 
phronesis) and dialectic (based on techné) must be counterparts, not opponents. Dialectic offers 
us the means, but only rhetoric can help us understand and aim toward the ideal. And without 
knowledge of the ideal, rhetoric cannot recommend one thing over another—linguistic relativism 
therefore breeds cultural relativism.  
Part of the problem, according to Weaver, is that the modern world encourages a sense of 
“presentism,” or “the belief that only existence in the present can give significance to a thing. 
The passage of time not only retires things from temporal existence but also deprives them of 
value and meaning.”77 We tend to devalue, in other words, elements of life that have faded 
away—assuming that they faded away for good reason. In his Southern writings, Weaver often 
lamented the disappearance of the gentleman and the code of chivalry. Modern citizens tend to 
assume that the “gentleman” faded because it was antiquated or was no longer relevant to life. 
But Weaver’s point is that losing the memory of the gentleman’s code also means losing the 
good that it produced. Building up the value of present things tends to degrade the value of past 
things.  
The threat to memory, according to Weaver and the Agrarians, is that in an age of 
scientific knowledge the value of other forms of past knowledge is lost. Scientific knowledge 
gives us clear tools that, we are told, enrich our lives. But forms of practice and non-rational 
knowledge are foundational forces, running beneath the surface of institutions, social relations, 
and indeed the whole of civilization. Since they do not offer benefits that can be quantified or 
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explained in a soundbite, and since they are easy to dismiss as relics of a distant and deservedly 
forgotten past, people tend to discount both their importance and their role in their lives. 
Presentism is therefore not just a threat to forms of knowledge, but to an entire ontological 
orientation. Without memory people are rootless, cast adrift without a philosophical anchor.   
Scientific knowledge, which is prized by industrialism and finance-capitalism for its 
benefit to acquisitiveness and profit, cannot give people an accurate sense of history. Science, 
according to Weaver, is the study “of what is presently true because uniformly true, of what is 
abstractly true because generally true. History on the other hand is the memory of all the past 
with its uniquenesses… scientific judgments are rational whereas historical judgments are 
intuitive.”78 Here again we see Weaver’s firm belief in things that are simply known, because 
they can be grasped through collective memory and the lessons of history. This echoes the views 
above of thinkers like Oakeshott, who argued that practical knowledge must be acquired and 
imparted rather than simply taught and learned. This has direct implications for rhetoric. When 
President Obama, for example, speaks of America’s “long season of war,” the words will ring 
truer with adults who have wearily lived through the last decade and a half of war.  Their 
knowledge comes from history and collective memory. Consider by contrast how a group of 
schoolchildren, who have only been taught that there have been wars, will react to the words. 
One reaction will simply be recognition, but the other will be felt. That is the power of memory 
in Weaver’s rhetorical schema: it allows people to feel rhetoric rather than simply hear it. People 
are moved by it if they share a common metaphysical foundation created through collective 
experiences and stored in the vault of language. 
Weaver thought this attack on memory was a bourgeois mentality and that it represented 
a philosophy of escape, a “habit of judging all things by their departure from the things of 
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yesterday.”79 This mindset departed sharply from his heritage and his training. A political 
philosopher wrote that “As a Southerner, and particularly as an heir to the Agrarian tradition, 
Weaver was well-equipped to resort to the collective and individual memories of his own 
culture… The agrarian knows about the contingencies of life, because he must experience them 
day by day, through all the fickleness of weather and the seasons.”80 In other words, the agrarian 
view embraces history and tradition because they are how we learn in spite of the unpleasant 
parts of life, while the scientific view strives to escape those unpleasant parts by ignoring history 
and tradition. This view is decidedly Thomistic, as Weaver argued: “The necessity of having 
some form of knowledge which will stand above the welter of earthly change and bear witness 
that God is superior to accident led Thomas Aquinas to establish his famous dichotomy… that 
whereas some things may be learned through investigation and the exercise of the reasoning 
powers, others must be given or ‘revealed’ by God.”81 Practice is superior to technique in the 
agrarian view because it traffics in the revealed things, the things that emerge over time and 
prove themselves true through the seasons—the things that are more felt than discovered. “It is 
therefore imperative,” Weaver wrote in SE, “that man have for guidance in this life a body of 
knowledge to which the ‘facts’ of natural discovery are either subordinate or irrelevant. This 
body is the ‘rock of ages,’ firm in the vast sea of human passion and error. Moral truth is not 
something which can be altered every time science widens its field of induction.”82 
The reason the Southern Agrarians, and thus Weaver, believed that the agrarian form can 
be a model for all forms of life is because rooting oneself in practical knowledge and felt moral 
truths provides a more direct link to virtue than scientific knowledge alone. It is not simply an 
“ism,” Weaver argued: agrarianism “presents a complete regime… [because it] began, as all 
philosophies should begin, by considering man in relation to the creation.”83 This stands in 
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contrast to scientific worldviews like Marxism and technocracy, according to Weaver, because 
those views all see the human as ahistorical, fundamentally good, and free from the burdens of 
history thanks to scientific knowledge and the progress of industrialism. Weaver argued that this 
is why people from Aristotle to Horace to Xenophon have argued that “there is a relationship 
between the life of rural husbandry and political and civic virtue.”—because it is better to 
grapple with the contingencies of life than to flee them with sensation-knowledge alone.84 
   Historical Tradition in Weaverian and Agrarian Thought 
Scientific knowledge, I have argued throughout this section, aims to be decontextualized: 
divorced from history and setting, its rules and formulae can work in all settings at all times if 
applied correctly. But to Weaver, this form of knowledge is in the broader consideration rarely 
useful by itself because it cannot tell people what we should value, what is worth aiming for, or 
what a noble end can offer them. This is why rhetoric is so necessary, he wrote in LWP, and why 
it is “the most humanistic of the humanities”; it is a “means of making convictions compelling to 
others by showing them in contexts of reality and of human values.”85 For without such context, 
there can be no true civilization. Therefore the agrarian tradition, which grounds all human 
activity in the perennial virtues of an inscrutable nature, should be society’s guiding structure. 
Agrarianism embraces the permanence of tradition and does not immediately bend to the whims 
of technical discoveries. “The real question,” Weaver wrote, “is the relation of different kinds of 
things to this flow of time. The idea that everything has only a temporal status and therefore must 
change with the passage of time is the idea to be examined… To believe in basic verities is to 
believes that some values are not grounded in time; they move neither against nor with the 
clock.”86 
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These basic verities not grounded in time come to us from our own history and tradition, 
just as agrarian knowledge is refined and acquired over succeeding generations. This kind of 
historical knowledge is what must be the wellspring of rhetoric, as he wrote in LS:  
Rhetoric is intended for historical man, or for man as conditioned by history. It is part of 
the conditio humana that we live at particular times and in particular places… Hence, just 
as man from the point of view of rhetoric is not purely a thinking machine, or a mere seat 
of rationality, so he is not a creature abstracted from time and place. If science deals with 
the abstract and the universal, rhetoric is near the other end, dealing in significant part 
with the particular and the concrete.”87 
 
But what is this tradition that opposes the abstract, and how might we find it in our time? 
It is a “recognizable pattern of belief and behavior transmitted from one generation to the next,” 
he wrote in STB.88 Like phronesis above, tradition is difficult to teach in a classroom alone: it 
can only be fully acquired when accompanied by some immersion within it. Weaver himself 
provides a fine example of this. He made himself a Southern intellectual and the heir to the 
Agrarian legacy by fully immersing himself in the region’s art, literature, and social thought. 
That tradition shaped his rhetorical theories, and so his intellectual legacy and his rhetorical 
theory must be considered together. Weaver was “always, first and foremost, a conscious 
participant in the Southern heritage,” according to Nierman, and his work must be viewed in that 
light.89 As Weaver himself said, the Southern Agrarian tradition presents a complete regime; to 
consider work from that regime in a vacuum is misguided.  
The elements of that regime focus heavily on history and tradition. Importantly, total 
agreement on everything is not needed for a civilization. Weaver stressed that people need 
“community of mind,” which will at least provide a basis for common ground on the truly 
important parts of life.90 However, this can only be found through a study of the first and final 
things—the things that lead people to some understanding of the whole human.91 This 
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community of mind—which Weaver also sometimes called a culture’s “metaphysical dream,” to 
express the underlying unity of a coherent culture—is a fundamental concept of Weaver’s, for it 
allows people to gain some consensus on cultural, social, and political matters while still 
providing sufficient freedom for each person. Without it, rhetoric cannot accomplish what 
Weaver labeled its central task: “to move men’s feelings in the direction of a goal,” or at least to 
move feelings “into closer line with the truth that dialectic pursues.”92  
The threat to community of mind, which is based on a particular culture’s history and 
tradition, comes from an undue reliance upon dialectic and its partners, logic and social science 
discourse. This “patter of modern shibboleths,” as Weaver called it, “emphasizes logic and fact 
and engages in sensationalism, without stimulating the imagination of the audience or orienting it 
toward an ethical good.”93 Worse, social scientists claim to avoid value judgments while 
frequently and implicitly making such judgments, and strive for an unattainable objectivity: this 
makes them, according to Weaver, “tendentious dialectician[s].”94 The community of mind can 
be neither created nor maintained by such figures. Instead, rhetoric—which by definition 
expresses the subjectivity of the speaker, just as ethics expresses the goal of an action—is needed 
to provide foundations. This is why Weaver believed, according to two scholars, that the 
“authority to interpret social life” should have remained with “theologians, philosophers, 
ethicists, and orators” instead of shifting to specialists “whose factual prose pales in comparison 
to the unctuous eloquence of such nineteenth-century luminaries as Emerson, Thoreau, or 
Webster.”95 
The larger critique that Weaver and the Agrarians leveled at the modern Western world 
echoes this smaller one. As the Industrial Revolution and its ensuing products—the railroad, the 
factory, the regimented life of the office—made the world resemble mechanical processes, 
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humans shifted more toward scientific metaphors of phenomena because those explanations 
reflected the world we now knew. If the cell and the brain are just machines, for example, then 
surely the universe can be understood on those terms rather than by the mysteries of Biblical 
creation stories. Weaver and the Agrarians, in this case, professed arguments similar to the 
philosopher and historian Lewis Mumford, whose influential 1934 book Technics and 
Civilization argued that it was the moral choices we make about technology, not the technology 
itself, that dictates our experience and our preferred form of knowledge.96 Too often, all parties 
to this argument agreed, society rejects history and tradition in the name of some ostensibly 
emancipatory new technology that promises to leave old conflicts behind. Thus the tools of 
progress and applied science, which spring from scientific explanations, ignore the power of 
memory and insist upon the irrelevance of history by promising a brighter and more materially 
abundant future.  
Instead of attempting to leave history behind, Weaver and the Agrarians wanted to create 
a community of mind around shared belief, which requires spacious and ethical rhetoric. The 
rhetorician is the agent of history, according to Goodnight, because the rhetorician “recognizes 
that only when a people agree that a common problem exists can there be an impetus towards its 
solution… and, that only when a people agree upon the definition of a problem can there be a 
satisfactory solution for all. The rhetorician relies upon the experience of history to establish 
consensus on a temporal problem.”97 Here one sees Weaver’s two key elements of historical, 
practical knowledge: it must help people form a community of mind, and it is dependent upon 
the definition of the word.  Since speech is the vehicle of order and definition must depend on 
some kind of analogical relationship of a thing with other things, people can only form a 
community of mind and therefore a functioning society if they agree on the relationship between 
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words and the concepts for which they stand. And to achieve such agreement, first, the 
dialectician must know where the boundaries of logic lie; and second, the rhetorician must draw 
upon memory, tradition, and the historical consciousness of shared experiences to move people 
toward noble goals.  
Perhaps this sounds merely idealistic or aspirational—the way Marxian theories routinely 
describe a workers’ paradise that is always right around the corner. But for Weaver and the 
Agrarians, this was no mere theory. “The Power of the Word,” perhaps the strongest and most 
philosophically sophisticated chapter in IHC, warns quite specifically what happens when 
rhetoric declines. Weaver believed that when faith in language as a vehicle of order is lost, and 
when trust in language as the bearer of absolute meaning between word and concept is lost, then 
cultural forms and thus human civilizations disintegrate. The question of language use is one of 
survival, not just one of abstruse academic debate. Corrupt words betray corrupt thoughts, 
Weaver believed. If there is no strong rhetoric that avails itself of memory in order to direct 
people toward noble goals, then people have lost their way in the cosmological order. When the 
community of mind is lost—as, for example, the Agrarians thought it had been in the postwar 
South—then a civilization is destroyed. The postmodern view of language as slippery, 
subjective, contingent, constructed—this, to Weaver and the Agrarians, is nihilism.  
But it is not just postmodernism that threatens the foundations of language. Any culture 
that prizes the technological over the contemplative, the material over the transcendental, and the 
logical over the rhetorical is doomed, Weaver believed, because it has moved away from the 
practical knowledge of agrarianism. Goodnight, in a key insight, even suggests that the two 
forms of public life in Weaver’s thought could be only technocracy or agrarianism: in other 
words, either a society that relies upon technical knowledge or a society that relies upon practical 
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knowledge.98 This is why it is so essential to understand the view of knowledge held by the 
Agrarians and by Weaver. They saw such debates as key to the formation and perpetuation of a 
civilization; the sort of knowledge people prioritize ends up dictating what sort of world they 
create. If people want an agrarian society—one based upon stewardship, tradition, and limits on 
human endeavors by the inscrutability of nature—then they cannot emphasize only instrumental 
knowledge. They must instead value the intangibles, the myths, and the historical memories.  
Myth-knowledge, just as Weaver’s teacher Ransom argued, holds great innate value for 
society. Myths, Weaver wrote in VO, “are great symbolic structures which hold together the 
imaginations of a people and provide bases for harmonious thought and action. They posit a 
supersensible world of meaning and value from which the least member of a culture can borrow 
something to dignify and give coherence to his life.”99 The use of “supersensible” tells us that 
Weaver is here elevating knowledge from myth to a plane higher than that of knowledge from 
science, which can only tell us what can be learned from sensations. And again, Weaver in VO 
critiques scientific knowledge as never being capable of enumerating goals: myth “cannot be 
dealt with or destroyed by the method of analysis” because it “expresses some idea of value” and 
“expresses a reality which is subjective but which is nevertheless part of the totality.”100 
The notion of totality is a central one for the Agrarian school. The propensity to 
specialize—to focus intensely on one thing at the expense of mastering a broad range of 
knowledge—is evident in both our work lives and our forms of knowledge, and reflects the 
ascendance of scientific knowledge that abstracts parts from the whole. Weaver’s ideal person, 
the philosophic doctor who is a sort of hybrid of gentleman-farmer and philosopher-king figures, 
should instead pursue knowledge of a wide range of things. “Science is therefore not a pursuit 
for [the philosophic doctor],” he wrote in IHC. “Because it demands an ever more minute 
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inspection of the physical world, it makes an ideal of specialism… The position of the 
philosophic doctor and his heir, the gentleman, was thus correct. For them the highest knowledge 
concerned, respectively, the relation of men to God and the relation of men to men.”101 
Perhaps no concept in Weaver’s entire corpus shows more direct influence of the agrarian 
form of life and his Agrarian teachers. The small farmer, that admittedly romanticized icon of 
Agrarian thought, must be master of all kinds of knowledge. He must be able to, in short order, 
plant a crop, milk a cow, slaughter a pig, preserve a harvest, repair a machine, and complete a 
sale—not to mention the ability and willingness to contemplate his relation to God and to other 
men. Nothing in this scheme allows for specialization, which often avails itself only of techné; 
the small farmer’s ontological orientation must rely upon phronesis in order to ensure the 
survival of his clan.  
Now expand this one farmer out to an entire society of such figures, each of whom is 
reliant upon the practical knowledge inherited through memory and tradition, and we will see 
how the Agrarian theory of knowledge forms the foundation for a society. Each farm family will 
contribute not just to preservation of history and tradition but will inculcate virtue in the society, 
because they are connected to a holistic view of the world—a view they live each day on their 
land. The ideal figure of this society, Weaver wrote, is “an agrarian, living on the soil; a primary 
producer creating things, not trafficking in the things that other men made.”102 A whole society 
of such figures would show “wholesomeness, its rhythms in unison with nature, and its rooted 
strength.”103 That society would be better for continuation and distillation of virtue, because its 
figures use practical knowledge that connects them to the permanent foundations of life—the 
stuff of myth and tradition, not technique and rationality.  
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This society would be made up of those who know there is a community of mind 
underlying the physical community itself, unified by certain beliefs about culture and the nature 
of things. It would grasp intuitively the deeper sources of its existence and coherence, which 
always run beneath the surface. Only a barbarian, Weaver wrote, insists upon seeing a thing as it 
is.104 But a culture will form itself when each person possesses three aligned levels of reflection, 
according to IHC. First “are the thoughts he employs in the activity of daily living,” which 
“constitute his worldliness.” Above this is “his body of beliefs,” which “he will have acquired in 
the ordinary course of his reflection.” Third and “surmounting all is an intuitive feeling about the 
immanent nature of reality, and this is the sanction to which both ideas and beliefs are ultimately 
referred for verification.”105 These three levels are necessary and can only flourish within a 
society based upon agrarian forms of knowledge and life. Without the metaphysical dream these 
levels form, said Weaver, “it is impossible to think of men living together harmoniously over an 
extent of time. The dream carries with it an evaluation, which is the bond of spiritual 
community.”106  
The final conclusion for Weaver is that “sentiment is anterior to reason,” a perfect echo 
of his biggest influence, Ransom’s GWT.107 “We do not undertake to reason about anything until 
we have been drawn to it by an affective interest,” he wrote in IHC. “It appears, then, that culture 
is originally a matter of yea-saying.”108 One could hardly find a better encapsulation of Weaver’s 
thought: a culture forms when people communally say yes not just to underlying myths and 
sentiments, but to the history and tradition that provide their upkeep. A culture cannot form from 
reason alone, nor can it thrive when knowledge based purely on reason is the dominant mode of 
public life. According to Weaver, people need the myth because the myth forms and sustains 
them. Just as dialectic cannot offer a full picture of ends, reason could never provide full 
 78 
explanation of the world nor full guidance for living in it. For that people need myth and 
rhetoric, both of which contain and are based upon practical knowledge.  
Final Thoughts 
I have argued in this chapter that Weaver and the Agrarians possessed a distinctive view 
of knowledge. Under the broad term of practice, or a philosophical “cultivation” that is 
inherently normative, I have drawn a line from the ancient Greek concepts of phronesis and 
techné through the Agrarians, who believed modern life had corrupted knowledge by 
emphasizing the rational and scientific kind, to Weaver, who argued that rhetoric can only 
succeed when the history and tradition that underlies practice can form a community of mind. 
Philosophers have long debated the divide between phronesis and techné, but one of Weaver’s 
key insights was to see that both were needed for a fully functioning society, in the form of 
dialectic and rhetoric. His quarrel was with a society that had severed the link between a word 
and its concepts, and thus between rhetoric and its metaphysical foundations and functional 
spaciousness. By viewing all language as subjective and all scientific facts as pure truth, the 
modern world has come close to destroying any community of mind based on noble ends. 
Scientific knowledge, Weaver and the Agrarians argued, certainly has an important place 
in culture. But too often it stresses only means and rules out ends as beyond its purview. This 
poses a grave danger, argued Goodnight: “It is a dangerous thing to develop means without 
reference to rational ends, because if you do, the means may condition the ends. A great 
flowering of means may even be a cover-up for a failure of purpose.”109 Consider the atomic 
bomb, the event that so shocked Weaver and other thinkers like Kenneth Burke: Weaver 
considered this development the ultimate expression of scientific knowledge rooted in 
technique—how do we do this?—and without any expression or consideration of ends. To lose 
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purpose, Weaver suggests, is to veer wildly off the course that a culture’s metaphysical dream 
has set us on; this is why rhetoric must avail itself of history, memory, and tradition in order to 
move people toward noble ends.  
The Agrarians, like their heir Weaver, were not academics as we now know the term, and 
the homiletic tone of their writing can often obscure its philosophical power. They were 
intellectuals, essayists, polemicists—and, frequently, farmers. This is because they believed they 
were arguing for a superior form of knowledge and superior mode of living, and the best way to 
understand it was to live it. One could even argue that Weaver, ensconced though he was in his 
Chicago rooms, maintained an agrarian outlook. He pondered history and tradition; he drew 
upon memory to defend noble rhetoric for noble ends; he journeyed back to the land of his 
people each summer and thus maintained his connection to the Southern metaphysical dream; 
and he always valued practical, tangible knowledge over technical, abstract knowledge. He was 
not a farmer, but he found his community of mind and he remained a part of it throughout his 
life. This was exactly what the Agrarians thought best for society: to stay connected to the 
underlying myths that provide more knowledge and power than scientific reasoning based on 
sensations. The agrarian form of knowledge is a felt one—people grasp things intuitively and test 
ideas perennially because they share the same broad outlook as those with whom they share a 
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Chapter 3: Rhetoric, Culture, and Place 
 
 
We are provincials. We have our name on the land.  
-- Richard Weaver 
 
Each blade of grass has its spot on earth whence it draws its life, its strength; and so is man 
rooted to the land from which he draws his faith together with his life. 
-- Joseph Conrad 
 
 A fairly significant amount of scholarship in rhetorical studies in the last decade has 
focused on rhetoric of place: how spaces, areas, and regions constitute and enact symbols. A 
special 2012 issue of Rhetoric Society Quarterly, for example, focused on “regional rhetorics”: 
the “rhetorical processes by which particular spaces accrue particular meanings,” as Dave Tell 
put it in an article in that issue.1 But less attention has been paid to how a place immanently 
creates meaning—how and why rhetoric as a cohesive cultural force must emerge from a 
specific place and is often limited to that specific place’s culture. This was the opinion of 
Weaver, who thought rhetoric, as a form of knowledge that draws upon the past and on 
community of mind, must be connected to a specific culture in a specific place. His status as a 
Southerner, his insistence on the importance of memory, and, most importantly, his Southern 
Agrarian training all provided the foundation for his belief that the agrarian concept of place—
that sense of belonging and coherence in a specific location—must precede spacious rhetoric.  
 This view insists that place must precede symbol: that meanings and symbols do not 
accrue, as Tell put it, but rather that place is always already invested with symbols that 
subsequently bind citizens to that place. Further, place qua place shapes and reflects the 
community of mind that arises there. Personal and cultural memory is inextricably bound up with 
place, and the place is likewise inseparable from symbolic structures. For Weaver, place offers 
permanence and cultural coherence, and eventually becomes indistinguishable from philosophy.  
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 This was a common attitude among the Agrarians, and indeed perhaps throughout the 
South more than in any other part of the country. The Agrarians were regionalists, believing that 
a true community could only develop where people felt a sense of permanence. Weaver took the 
next step by arguing that spacious rhetoric, which must draw upon collective memory in order to 
move people toward noble goals, can only truly exist where physical permanence underlies and 
maintains metaphysical permanence. T.S. Eliot, who was extraordinarily influential to the 
Agrarians, wrote that “It is important that a man should feel himself to be, not merely a citizen of 
a particular nation, but a citizen of a particular part of his country, with local loyalties.”2 
 To the Agrarians, a person was not truly of a place unless she could see and live the 
traditions, customs, and habits enacted on a daily basis.3 There must be a physical presence for 
belonging; allegiance to abstract propositions is not enough. Donald Davidson believed that 
thanks to the country’s legendary mobility and Westward expansion, most Americans lived only 
as citizens of an “Americanized nowhere,” and that particular social memory of a place was 
reliant upon a “folk-chain” that tells people “who we are, where we are, where we belong, what 
we live by, what we live for.”4 Asking people to merely support vague ideas of “liberty” or 
“equality” was useless; a person must have some deep sense of belonging that can only come 
with long exposure in a place full of people with similar tenure.  
 One motivation for this chapter is to join other scholars in reclaiming placed rhetoric as a 
key concept in the discipline, and what it means for a culture and for a people when a kind of 
symbol emerges from a specific place. If we take Weaver seriously and understand spacious 
rhetoric as a kind of metaphysically shared symbol-creation, then we must also take seriously his 
ideas on what might help create the conditions for that creation and where the metaphysical 
boundaries lie. Weaver believed that such boundaries matter deeply, both for preservation of 
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culture and for the conditions that allow creation of spacious symbols and ideas. My goal in this 
chapter is to elucidate exactly what Weaver thought about place, and how we might use that to 
renew a focus on place in rhetorical studies.  
 Weaver would no doubt have been intrigued by the work of philosopher Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, who has written extensively on identity and culture. For Appiah, collective identities 
(e.g., “black” or “female”) “provide what we might call scripts: narratives that people can use in 
shaping their projects and in telling their life stories.”5 Appiah’s stance is a refreshing one, since 
he acknowledges that agency is not a force of limitless power—as the American gospel of self-
creation and our long-treasured bootstrap myth would have it—but is shaped and limited by 
social forces. Appiah also dislikes the idea of “global citizens” who are without allegiance to a 
particular place. And perhaps his notion of “scripts” can be reconciled with Weaver’s notion of 
“spacious” ideas that bind us together in some kind of shared pursuit.  
 But where Appiah and Weaver would diverge is in the notion of Appiah’s “rooted 
cosmopolitanism”: the idea that we should stay connected to our roots but aspire toward a greater 
global order of philosophical liberalism. Weaver would say the opposite: that truly spacious 
ideas can only emerge when we retrench, dig down, and go deeper. Only by getting closer and 
closer to the sources and consequences of our own place, he believed, do we truly understand the 
shared symbols of a culture. Weaver saw great value in geographic and cultural distinction: by 
preserving what makes a culture distinct and cohesive, a place serves a crucial function. Better to 
flourish in a narrow and cohesive script, Weaver might reply to Appiah, than to lose yourself in a 
perpetually expanding one. And such a narrow script can only thrive when a sense of place is 
maintained.  
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 Place is an essential component of culture, according to the Agrarians, and Weaver wrote 
that rhetoric can only emerge from and function in a particular culture. This chapter, therefore, 
will focus on the guiding concept of place: how a physical setting helps form culture, and how 
rhetoric must draw from and contribute to the spirit of that place-based culture. This chapter 
more than any other will focus on the American South, since it was the formative home of the 
Agrarians and of Weaver, and since Weaver used the South as his example in nearly every 
argument. Scholars have not paid much attention to Weaver’s discussions of the South, but its 
status as a region and as a collective memory must play a role in any examination of his ideas. 
Weaver’s rhetorical theories emerge directly from his Southern cultural experience; his rhetorical 
ideas are inseparable from his ideas of Southern history and culture. In this chapter I shall begin 
by examining how the South was treated by the Agrarians and subsequently by Weaver, and how 
Weaver’s ideas expanded on the Agrarian notion of the South. I shall then show how the agrarian 
idea of place, particularly the South, played a key role in Weaver’s rhetorical theories.  
The Concept of Place in Agrarianism 
 It is surely not surprising that a belief system devoted to the land would place great 
ontological emphasis on place and its relation to the human community that can flourish in a 
particular place. The contemporary writer Wendell Berry, whom I will quote extensively here 
because he has taken up the Agrarian mantle of place, argues that “If the word community is to 
mean or amount to anything, it must refer to a place (in its natural integrity) and its people. It 
must refer to a placed people… ‘community’ must mean a people locally placed and a people, 
moreover, not too numerous to have a common knowledge of themselves and of their place.”6  
 In such a place and such a community, a distinctive culture arises: one whose store of 
collective knowledge can be created and maintained by its members. Echoing chapter two’s 
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topic, scholars believe that the “placed people” concept reflects a faith in culture versus a faith in 
tools. In other words, when a community is geographically coherent, it is to some extent isolated 
from cultures that exist beyond its borders. This means a particular face-to-face community, 
rooted in its place, is not merely at the whims of experts and their tools. Only after “we have 
good culture in place,” to use one scholar’s phrase, can a community draw on its store of 
knowledge to maintain itself.7 
 This agrarian framework argues that a land and its people are irrevocably connected, and 
that a culture can only flourish when there is a tangible connection. In other words, we must 
interact with the elements of the place as frequently as possible, know and feel its past through 
our culture, and imagine its future with us as stewards. According to Berry, “To have a place, to 
live and belong in a place, to live from a place without destroying it, we must imagine it. By 
imagination we see it illuminated by its own unique character and by our love for it. By 
imagination we recognize with sympathy the fellow members, human and nonhuman, with 
whom we share our place.”8 A true community, then, in the old-fashioned sense of the word, can 
only succeed when people work and plan together, gain sympathy for each other, and recognize 
their common mission. If these elements sound familiar, it is because they align with Weaver’s 
requirements for spacious rhetoric and the “community of mind” that enables movement as a 
group toward noble goals. If rhetoric can only thrive in a cohesive culture sharing the same 
values, and that culture can only thrive with geographic limitations and devotion to a place-based 
enterprise, then successful and noble rhetoric is dependent upon place. For Weaver, the fate of 
the people is dependent upon the place’s community of mind and the power of the word; in 
agrarianism, “there is in fact no distinction between the fate of the land and the fate of the 
people,” as Berry put it.9 
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 The idea of land and place is also deeply intertwined with the Agrarian skepticism of and 
opposition to ideas of progress. Whereas the industrial doctrines of progress compel us to 
envision ever upward, to always dream of more and bigger and better, the smaller scale of the 
place-based view can “force us to remember things, cause us to hope for second chances, and 
provide an incentive to keep the scale small,” as Bill Vitek and Wes Jackson put it.10 This is 
because “placed people” are inevitably bound up in the history of their place; one cannot simply 
remove the past when the storehouse of cultural memory envelops all. Recall the Agrarians’ 
complaint that Reconstruction attempted to simply erase the memories of the Old South—it was 
misguided and unsuccessful, because the past lives in the memories of the very distinctive 
Southern culture.  
 The doctrine of progress prizes “mobility,” which puts into verb form the idea of 
forgetting the past and pushing ever forward through barriers and across frontiers. But the 
Agrarians thought that “mobility” also severs us from our ontological sources, reshaping us as 
cogs in an economic machine that only knows how to expand insatiably. We are told that 
progress and mobility have given us improved quality of life and a sophisticated 
cosmopolitanism based on global culture, but we actually have, according to Berry, “an ever-
worsening unsettlement of our people, and the extinction or near-extinction of traditional and 
necessary communal structures.”11 When the next generation can no longer reach back to the 
past for any knowledge due to communal failure, or when its only knowledge of the world comes 
from homogenized consumer culture, the community of mind is harmed—perhaps extinguished. 
This, according to Weaver, will always prevent rhetoric from succeeding. If there is no common 
past there can be no common goals, and there is no common past if there are no longer any 
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common people. This echoes Davidson’s assertion that social harmony must emerge from strong 
foundations, and cannot be “poured in from the top.”12 
The Southern Agrarians and the Place of the South 
 Donald Davidson wrote that “The good life is not to be found at too great a distance from 
the land, or apart from the intimate fellowship of kinfolks and friends, the mutual graciousness of 
family life, the solace of a steadfast religious faith, and above all, the sense of belonging 
somewhere in a world which at best is changeable and insecure.”13 This is a perfect 
encapsulation of how the Agrarians viewed the South and the importance of place. For that 
group, a place was more than just an accumulation of resources in the manner viewed by modern 
industrialism. A place is imbued with a spirit that arises from the people it contains and the ways 
those people interact with it. A place creates culture just as surely as people do.  
 The belief that place has metaphysical value emerges from a dedicated opposition to 
attachment based on abstraction—that, according to the intellectual historian Wilfred McClay, 
“human beings have a profound need for ‘thereness,’ for visible and tangible things that persist 
and endure, and thereby serve to anchor our memories in something more substantial than our 
thoughts and emotions.”14 For the Agrarians, there was no better place of “thereness” than the 
South, and particularly the idea of the Old South. Tate believed that the idea of place in the South 
created its distinctive mode of imagination, because the myth of the place itself had such 
power.15 The Agrarians did not see this idea as merely romantic or nostalgic, however (though 
there is no denying the occasional moonlight-and-magnolia gloss in their depictions); for them, 
the idea of the place itself embodied attachment to a common governing idea and the balance 
between individual freedom and social hierarchy.16   
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When Southerners saw their way of life—rooted in honor, chivalry, and tradition, 
according to Weaver—enacted all around them on a daily basis, it fostered the sense that such 
codes can only exist in such a place. This echoes Edmund Burke’s argument that “public 
affections” can only arise through daily repetition, and that a place must thus feature “daily small 
acts of loyalty and reciprocity, in order to prepare us to love well and moderately something too 
large to experience directly,” as another historian put it.17 The Agrarians believed these small 
acts were the currency of social life in the South, where customs and manners (whose 
disappearance, we might recall, was lamented by Ransom in ITMS) helped preserve tradition. 
This in turn helped create rooted Southern citizens, since, according to Simone Weil, a person 
has roots “by virtue of his real, active, and natural participation in the life of a community which 
preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular 
expectations for the future.”18 By participating in the small customs and habits of the South, even 
in a geographically limited social world, the Southerner was participating in the life of the South.  
 The Agrarians and Weaver saw the South as heir to the European legacy of civilized life. 
Indeed, Davidson wrote “The cause of the South was and is the cause of Western civilization,” 
while Weaver called the Old South the “last non-materialist civilization in the Western World.”19 
These men believed that the South was the true heir to the aristocracies of Old Europe, and that it 
was the North, with its slavish devotion to materialism and industrialism, that represented the 
historical aberration.20 The rootless cosmopolitanism of the North particularly irked the 
Agrarians, for they did not see cosmopolitanism as suited to actual human scale or capable of 
inculcating long-term commitments to others around you.  
 But was the Agrarian idea of the South as a land of customs and traditions a real entity, or 
merely an elaborate metaphor? Scholars have disagreed on this question. There is no disputing 
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the Southern Agrarian literary achievement of making the South “a symbolic marker of both 
traditional society and Western civilization,” or that they persuaded other Southerners to see the 
South as a “conservative cultural center,” as a historian phrased it.21 But an obvious problem 
arises: elsewhere, such as Ransom’s essay “Happy Farmers” or Troy Cauley’s Agrarianism: A 
Program for Farmers—or, for that matter, in several of the ITMS essays—the Agrarians go to 
great lengths to make agrarianism an economic program with specific agricultural tenets. Could 
they have it both ways—an economic program that was rooted in a place and an idealized 
metaphor, like Jefferson’s yeoman farmer, rooted less in place than in concept? 
 Answers varied among the Agrarians and their intellectual heirs. For Tate, the South was 
the bastion of Christian humanism; for Davidson, it was the sole remaining repository of the 
good life; for Ransom, it was the place where myth still reigned; for Warren, it was the “potential 
source of spiritual revitalization”; for Weaver, it was less “a concrete way of life” and more “a 
set of values.”22 The unifying element in each view is still the South as a particular place. 
Rhetorical critics of all people should recognize and appreciate the power of a symbol—or, 
perhaps, of the South as a Burkean representative anecdote. If a symbol has the power to compel 
certain behavior and instill certain beliefs, then its origin in pure fact or pure myth is secondary. 
The Agrarian Stark Young believed the aristocratic ideal of the South was “superficial in some 
ways… but it was founded on a profound sense of self and deep social commitments.”23 It 
doesn’t matter, in other words, whether the perceived aristocratic ideal was total malarkey—it 
only matters that it was a powerful symbol that shaped Southern behavior. And there is no 
disputing just how powerful a symbol the place of the South came to be: when General Lee said 
he could not draw his sword against his beloved Virginia, he was making an astonishing 
statement of devotion to place.  
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 For Lee as for the Agrarians and Weaver, what the place represented was more important 
than what the place was, because a community of mind (and thus successful rhetoric) could only 
thrive in a place that had “association on some non-material level and common attachment to 
some non-material ends.”24 Virginia represented that for Lee; the Union did not. The Agrarians 
were provincials in the way Weaver defined it: “Provincialism is one of the chief supports of 
character. To be of a place, to reflect it in your speech and action and general bearing, to offer it 
as a kind of warranty that you will remain true to yourself—this is what it means to have 
character and personality.”25 Even if his choice was misguided, Lee remained true to himself as a 
Virginian because of his provincialism; the Agrarians remained true to themselves as 
conscientious objectors to modern life because of theirs.  
 I dwell on this point because I believe the historians’ debates are beside the point. It 
matters not if the Agrarian idea of the South was imperfect. What matters is that there exists an 
idea of the South that embodies certain ideals because it is of a place, just as there is an idea of 
the Midwest that embodies hard work and stoicism, of the West as the land of freedom and 
wildness, and of the Northeast as puritanical and harried. There have been ideas of regions since 
virtually the founding of the republic, and those ideas matter because they function as symbols 
acted upon by real people in real places. Regional boundaries are famously nebulous, but there is 
no denying people feel them and act on them: thus “Southern hospitality” and “Midwestern 
kindness” emerge as part of regional cultures. The ideas of the South help form Southern culture, 
and that culture can only exist in the place itself. These writers believed that without exposure to 
tradition and the small acts of Southern-ness that make up a particular culture, a community of 
mind cannot form. Common culture needs a rooted place, and noble rhetoric needs common 
culture.  
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 The Agrarians, like Weaver after them, were social and cultural critics—both in form and 
in attitude. This means it is sometimes easier to see the ideas they deemed praiseworthy by 
examining what they criticize most fiercely. The reason they yearned for and perhaps 
romanticized an antebellum vision of the South was because they believed the Civil War 
represented an imperial aggression by the North, whose values were and are anathema to the 
agrarian, contemplative life. This is why the central mission of his poetry, according to 
Davidson, should be to defend “spiritual values against the fiery gnawing of industrialism.”26 
 The “Statement of Principles” in ITMS, which was written by Ransom and approved by 
the group, gets to the very heart of the Agrarians’ complaints about the North and its imperial 
vision of a homogenized industrial culture. The culture of the North, Ransom writes, expects 
“the evils to disappear when we have bigger and better machines, and more of them.”27 But “this 
is to assume that labor is an evil, that only the end of labor or the material product is good,” and 
“on this assumption labor becomes mercenary and servile, and it is no wonder if many forms of 
modern labor are accepted without resentment though they are evidently brutalizing. The act of 
labor as one of the happy functions of human life has been in effect abandoned, and is practiced 
solely for its rewards.”28  
The North, in other words, had chosen exchange value over use value by embracing only 
a good produced, and now that idea was infecting the South—which had always, thanks to its 
agrarian roots, seen the process of labor as equally rewarding as the output. The modern society 
of the North, according to Ransom, had “called upon its members to becomes always more 
professional, more abstract, in their functions,” and now “they have persuaded the farmers 
too.”29 The danger is that with greater abstraction in labor comes greater abstraction from place. 
When we are attached to work in a specific place, and especially specific property, it allows, 
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according to the Agrarian Herbert Agar, “for enterprise, for family responsibility, and in general 
for institutions that fit man’s nature and that give a chance for a desirable life.”30 This idea would 
resurface in Weaver’s contention, discussed below, that property was the last metaphysical right 
of humans.  
 Elsewhere, Ransom wrote—in a sentiment later directly repeated by Weaver in IHC—
that attachment to a place helps create piety. This “piety is directed first towards the physical 
region, the nature who has always given [the community] sustenance… It is also directed 
towards the historic community which has dwelt in this region all these generations and 
developed these patterns.”31 But the industrial North corrupted this idea by instead insisting on 
attachment to abstract ideas like profit and progress—notably, ideas that have no outer 
boundaries and place no limits on human behavior. After the War, Reconstruction forced these 
latter ideas on the South and divorced the Southerner’s devotion to a specific place that created a 
specific attitude toward work and civic life. Being rooted in place, said the Agrarians, forged a 
metaphysical connection between self and environment. The farmer and conservationist Aldo 
Leopold wrote in 1939 that “The landscape of any farm is the owner’s portrait of himself.”32 The 
Southerner looked at the fields and saw that the place supported his community, and he in turn 
became supportive of that place. The Northerner looked at the frenzied cities that supported 
profit and progress, and in turn became dedicated to those abstract propositions. The Agrarians’ 
arguments generalize and reduce, no question about it—but they also reveal the fierce devotion 
to the place they loved that animated their writing and social criticism, and how forcefully they 
loathed what they saw as corruption of that place by the imperial forces of the North.  
 History may have written the history of the War as emancipators versus slave owners, but 
this is not how the Agrarians—or indeed much of the South—saw the matter. For them, 
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according to one historian, the War “reflected primarily a competition between two economic 
systems and ideals—on the one hand an independent yeomanry of farmers and small 
shopkeepers, on the other a commercial, financial, large manufacturing oligarchy which already 
dominated the Northeast.”33 The key element in this broad if simplistic rendering (clearly and 
shamefully overlooked is the role of slavery, both social and economic) is that the world of the 
South is depicted as people who are by necessity rooted to place. Farming is rooted and tangible, 
not abstract; small shopkeepers are limited in commerce to their communities (at least at the 
time). But in the Agrarian view the cultural forces of the North were rootless and unattached to 
either place or history: they paid no heed to the history or tradition that come with devotion to 
place. What the Agrarians lamented and the South feared was the loss of their place, which 
helped dictate their way of life. 
 Davidson, whose attachment to the place and culture of the old South was most in line 
with Weaver’s eventual views, led the Agrarians in resurrecting antebellum theories of regions—
that “the United States was not really a nation, but a congeries of very distinct regions, each with 
a holistic and, short of outside intervention, a healthy culture”; distinct regions were “threatened 
by an imposed, uniform national culture. Large, centralized firms had tried to push such a culture 
upon the vulnerable, exploited, outlying regions” like the South. 34 Since Weaver’s rhetorical 
“community of mind” arises from particular cultures in particular places, homogenized culture 
forced on a placed people from the outside corrupts both community spirit and the ends of a 
people. For the Agrarians, what started with Reconstruction culminated in the New Deal and its 
economic experts reshaping Southern people who were not given the chance to dictate the future 
of their own places and thus of their own communities.35 The solution was not cultural 
homogenization but instead a return “not only toward more subsistence farming, but to stronger, 
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less dependent, more regional marketing systems, to the type of rural economy that prevailed in 
the late nineteenth century” as the scholar of the Agrarians Louis Rubin put it.36 A return, in 
other words, to regionalism: attachment to the people and products of a particular place.  
 This is, perhaps, a large amount of space to devote to the Agrarians’ views of the South 
as a place. But I dwell on this for two reasons. First, one of my goals in this project is to examine 
how Weaver’s ideas are direct descendants of, and in fact personified, the Southern Agrarians’ 
ideas. The connection will become clear in the following section. Second, Weaver repeatedly 
contended that rhetoric as an art, a discipline, and the “most humanistic of the humanities” could 
only thrive when based upon a cohesive ontological foundation—the “community of mind” and 
“metaphysical dream” to which he returned again and again. If we are to appreciate Weaver as a 
scholar then we must have a firm understanding of those notions’ origins—and their origins lie 
directly in the formative writings of the Southern Agrarians. We cannot have rhetoric without 
community, Weaver believed, and we cannot have community without place.  
 It is place, for the Agrarians, that forms individuals who are free to take up their social 
obligations, rather than the individuals “torn loose from family, community, and civic 
responsibility—an individualism that has metamorphosed into egocentrism, personal 
irresponsibility, and a loss of civic discipline,” as one historian of the South put it.37 It is no 
surprise that Weaver based his theories upon the idea of community since that “was the a priori 
ideal” of the Agrarians, according to the neo-Agrarian M.E. Bradford: a world of “families, pre- 
or non-capitalist because familial, located, pious, and ‘brotherly’; agrarian in order not to 
produce the alienated, atomistic individual.”38 Place creates communities, and thus provides 
fertile ground for production of noble rhetoric for noble ends. Ransom, in his ITMS essay, 
provides the classic statement of why place is so essential in the Agrarian framework: 
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“[The farmer] identifies himself with a spot of ground, and this ground carries a good 
deal of meaning; it defines itself for him as nature. He would till it not too hurriedly and 
not too mechanically to observe in it the contingency and the infinitude of nature; and so 
his life acquires its philosophical and even its cosmic consciousness. A man can 
contemplate and explore, respect and love, an object as substantial as a farm or a native 
province. But he cannot contemplate nor explore, respect nor love, a mere turnover, such 
as an assemblage of ‘natural resources,’ a pile of money, a volume of produce, a market, 
or a credit system. It is into precisely these intangibles that industrialism would translate 
the farmer’s farm. It means the dehumanization of his life.”39 
 
This is the attitude that so influenced Weaver’s rhetorical theories. Now that I have established 
how forcefully his Agrarian mentors embraced the idea of place, I turn to how Weaver himself 
explored the concept.  
The South in the Thought and Rhetoric of Weaver 
 “The South is the region that history happened to,” wrote Weaver, and I begin with his 
thoughts on the South because no region—and no regional idea of place—is more integral to 
understanding his rhetorical theories.40 Weaver grew up in the South, was educated in the South, 
and returned to the South every chance he got even while living, if not in the Northeast, at least 
above the Mason-Dixon line in Chicago.  
 “The government of the United States was founded on abstract propositions,” Weaver 
bluntly declared in STB, whereas the South was based upon “something I shall insist is higher—
an ethical claim which can be described only in terms of the mandate of civilization.”41 The 
South, in other words, was an early example of Weaver’s argument from definition. Whether this 
argument’s “nature of the thing” is “already recognized convention, or whether it is defined at 
the moment by the orator, or whether it is left to be inferred from the aggregate of its 
specificities, the argument has a single postulate”: “that there exist classes which are determinate 
and therefore predicable.”42 Weaver argued in STB that the South was based on such classes 
(which we must acknowledge are frustratingly broad generalizations): chivalry, the older 
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religiousness, the code of the gentleman, and the feudal theory of society. Without these classes, 
he thought, a culture cannot arise—just as a coherent and noble argument can arise only from 
definition. And, crucially, these classes are specific to the place of the South. Indeed, Weaver 
wrote that the North’s denial of the existence of such defined order “shocked Southern political 
thinkers.”43 
 The community of mind emerges from a coherent culture that shares the same ontological 
and metaphysical foundations. The Southern plantation, wrote Weaver with a disturbingly 
selective memory, was a “little cosmos” in this regard, “in which things were arranged by a well 
understood principle giving coherence to the whole.”44 This means a plantation owner or local 
leader could speak with the conviction that his audience shared his basic assumptions about their 
social world. He could do this because the beliefs were specific to a place—they were connected 
to a piece of land as surely as his name was. He and his audience could share a community of 
mind because they exemplified Southern provincialism, which according to Stark Young in 
ITMS is “a fine trait. It is akin to a man’s interest in his own center, which is the most deeply 
rooted consideration that he has, the source of his direction, health, and soul.”45  
 Weaver argued that the little cosmos existed on that plantation because the Southerner 
had a “desire for a lasting identification of the family name with a piece of land. He had a 
profound conviction that a family is not established until it belongs to a place, that a local 
habitation and a name go together.”46 Since the family unit could also be considered a little 
cosmos—structured as it is on hierarchy, order, and a shared culture—this reveals how integral 
place is to rhetoric in Weaver’s formulation. Recall that Weaver saw rhetoric as the vehicle of 
order, and believed that a foundational culture was required prior to any successful rhetoric. If 
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one of the best ways to achieve a foundational culture in a little cosmos is to attach it to a place 
over successive generations, then surely place becomes a key ingredient in the realm of rhetoric.  
 When Weaver praised ITMS, he did so because he believed it captured the spirit of the 
place of the South—meaning that it embodied the characteristics that comprised the Southern 
community of mind. The Agrarians, he wrote, stood for “a way of life that exalts leisure and 
contemplation over money-making and success; for a culture of manners and distinction. 
Everything that materialism and philistinism appeared to have routed from the scene is [in ITMS] 
reaffirmed in a reasoned case, and without a trace of that mawkish apology which often attends 
the presenting of an unpopular view.”47 Weaver appreciated that the Agrarians were unwilling to 
apologize for the place that made the Southern community of mind possible, and this 
subsequently informed his view that realists need not apologize for their opposition to the 
doctrine of nominalism—provided the realist tenets informed a particular community’s 
metaphysical dream.  
 The goal of the South and the goal of rhetoric were, for Weaver, one in the same: the 
quest was for wholeness, for a view that did not create discrete elements but instead formed a 
cohesive unit. He wrote that the South was “a world of place and time, but it is also a world 
which includes the mystery of the timeless. It is a place in which the transcendental is 
apprehended in the actual, and the actual is never without some link to the transcendental. The 
real and the ideal, the act and the idea, man as he is and man as he ought to be, nature and super-
nature are presented in their inextricable involvement.”48 While the phrases themselves may 
strike us as a flight of literary fancy, these lines contain the core of Weaver’s rhetorical theories. 
We can read “the real” and “the actual” as dialectic—trafficking in facts and logic, charged with 
presenting the world-as-it-is. “The ideal” and “the transcendental,” meanwhile, make up rhetoric: 
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the world-as-it-could-be that connects us to history and tradition and links us to those who share 
our cultural assumptions and foundations. Perhaps the South, then, appeals to Weaver as a 
civilization because in it he sees the requirements of his “power of the word”; the South, to him, 
is proof that his vision of a rhetoric-dialectic alignment is the best chance we have for moving a 
culture toward noble goals.  
 As I suggested above, it is here that Weaver breaks most forcefully with Platonism. 
Though he is a dedicated Platonist in philosophy—believing that real forms underlie ideas, and 
that those forms are unvarying and transcendental—he does not agree with Plato’s dismissal of 
rhetoric as a set of tools for manipulation. Rhetoric for Weaver is not a set of tools: it is a way of 
seeing and a way of moving other people, and must be used and considered in light of history, 
tradition, and the customs of a particular community.49  
 The ideas of the Old South are ideas we can recover for our own time, Weaver believed. 
Indeed, this was the stated purpose of his doctoral dissertation: “There cannot be a return to the 
Middle Ages or the Old South under slogans identified with them. The principles must be studied 
and used, but in such presentation that mankind will feel the march is forward… The Old South 
may indeed be a hall hung with splendid tapestries in which no one would care to live; but from 
them we can learn something of how to live.”50 We can learn something about the place-culture 
of the South because the Old South, for Weaver, was a “regime”: a “complex of law, custom, 
and idiomatic social behavior [which] fills all the interstices of life… a system of sustaining 
forms, and everyone who has been in contact with a regime recognizes its capacity to give every 
man, the high and the low, some sense of being at home.”51 The Old South was a place in the 
sense that it offered its inhabitants a complete ontological system and a sense of belonging to a 
common mission: two necessary ingredients for successful and spacious rhetoric. “The very fact 
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that we speak of ‘place,’” wrote Weaver, “means that we envision a social whole, in reference to 
which there are locations and directions.”52 
 The example Weaver uses is the household: “The principle of the ordering may be more 
intuited than reasoned out. Yet this sense of inclusive ordering makes the individual feel that his 
presence is acknowledged in more than a perfunctory way. A regime is thus a powerful check 
against the sense of lostness, the restlessness, and the aimless competition which plague the 
modern masses and provoke the fantastic social eruptions of our era.”53 Place, therefore, is not 
just a certain region that can help foster a community of mind. It is in fact an ontological 
touchstone and philosophical bulwark against all the modern forces that would tear us loose from 
our foundations. Recall that Weaver labeled agrarianism a “complete regime”: he meant that 
connection to the land forms a place that serves as a metaphysical center, one that fills “all the 
interstices of life” and guarantees a corrective to the rootlessness of non-placed events. It is both 
land and the feeling created on that land. It is, to borrow a famous line from Robert Frost, the 
place that has to take you in. 
 And, by extension, it is the place that must keep some out—and this is part of the 
exclusionary nature of Agrarian theory that irks some rhetorical critics. Weaver argued that a 
regime must also function on “a principle of exclusion. It is a way of rejecting what is inimical or 
foreign to the group’s nature and of retaining what can be assimilated. Social and cultural 
groups, like organisms, must be able to fend off what they cannot accept without ceasing to live. 
To say that this is a law of life is almost superficial; it is rather a law of existence. Intolerance of 
what would be fatal is a necessity for survival.”54 In our age of tolerance for seemingly all things 
save slights against democracy, this position can seem very odd—if not even a tad fascistic. 
After all, doesn’t this attitude squash dissent and compel conformity?  
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 Perhaps. But it is hard to believe those are Weaver’s true intentions. Recall the “older 
religiousness” of the South that Weaver and the Agrarians examined in their writings. One of the 
tenets of this quasi-faith for Weaver was that “a certain portion of life must remain inscrutable, 
and that religion offers the only means of meeting it, since reason cannot here be a standard of 
interpretation.”55 If, then, a citizen of the Old South were to suddenly announce to her 
community that she was now convinced of the explanatory power of science and would 
subsequently reject any idea requiring mere faith, surely her fellow citizens would consider her 
no longer part of its community of mind. The point is not to ostracize or exile someone—
Weaver’s claim is that that person can no longer share the same spacious rhetoric, because she 
no longer subscribes to the same metaphysical foundation.  
 Consider the current case of same-sex marriage and mainline Protestant religions. The 
Methodist Church is facing a near-schism as of this writing because some of its parishes have 
sanctioned such unions. The Methodist hierarchy is now asking: are those parishes still 
Methodist? Can they coexist with parishes that reject these unions? Can they all share the same 
symbolic structure if they do not agree on the foundations? This is what Weaver was after: not a 
pretext for ejecting nonbelievers, but a claim that a true metaphysical foundation can only be 
shared by people who truly believe in aligned dogma. Rhetoric cannot move us toward noble 
goals if our community of mind is torn on what those goals are.  
 The Methodist Church is not a place, of course, but I mention this example because, in a 
fragmented world in which most people do not live in small towns, sites of faith are often the 
closest many will come to a metaphysical community of mind. Such institutions’ understandings 
of dogma and uniformity, then, are of clear interest to scholars. It’s also notable that the split in 
the Methodist Church often breaks down along geographic lines: the churches of the northeast 
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have been faster to embrace evolving social norms than their regional Protestant counterparts. 
Perhaps even an otherwise unified religious dogma can be harmed by regional differences and 
the power of place.  
 We should consider dissent from the community of mind not as an immediate cause for 
dismissal but as something closer to a process of mediation. Social norms change; cultural 
attitudes evolve; previously unacceptable ideas sometimes become palatable. If the history of 
democracy is in part the history of mediating the lines between individual rights and collective 
sacrifice, then in a similar way the history of culture is in part the history of negotiating mutually 
agreed upon social goods. Ideally, a well-argued dissent from the community of mind does not 
result in expulsion. Instead, it is a process for determining whether something shall remain prized 
by the group or whether the dissenter’s point shall spark a change.  
 The ideal regime for Weaver was the South, and it is to his treatment of the South that 
rhetorical critics should look if they wish to understand his vision of a world steeped in rhetoric. 
His “Southern way of life” was a distinct attitude and set of assumptions because it was localized 
in a region; it was nonsense, to Weaver, to speak of an “American way of life”—the nation was 
too diverse, too abstract, and insufficiently committed to the same ideas. But the South “has a 
society more unified by imponderables, more conscious of self-definition, more homogeneous in 
outlook than any other region,” as he argued in IDOT, thanks to its tripartite philosophy of 
societal structure, devotion to transcendence, and preservation of history.56 In contrast to the 
utilitarian North, where scientific reasoning reigned and each day made anew, the South was to 
Weaver “a cohesive social ordering… an independent, self-directing social order, with a set of 
values proper to itself.”57 
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Place, Rhetoric, and the Good Life 
 For Weaver, a community of mind must be localized in a geographic location to facilitate 
ease of contact between members; the geographic location itself, however, is not enough to 
comprise a “place.” When Davidson spoke of regionalism and sectionalism, he did not mean that 
everyone in, say, the Upper Midwest shared the philosophical foundation required to form a 
community of mind and a distinct people in a distinct place. Rather, he and Weaver knew that 
“people existing together in one geographical spot do not necessarily comprise a community.”58 
 Weaver lived for many years in the thick of what he called “the Megalopolis,” a few 
blocks from the campus of the University of Chicago, but for him such urban density precluded 
any possibility of a true community of mind from forming. For that, we need the open spaces and 
contemplative living of the rural life. “The spoiling of man always seems to begin when urban 
living predominates over rural,” he wrote in IHC. “After man has left the countryside to shut 
himself up in vast piles of stone… he becomes forgetful of the overriding mystery of creation.”59 
Because life in the city allows us to be abstracted from sources and consequences—not just of 
food, as agrarianism would emphasize, but also in social relations and history—it makes our 
lives too easy and prevents us from grappling with the inscrutable forces of nature.  
 The connection to rhetoric stems from Weaver’s devotion to place. Since rhetoric deals 
with the world-as-it-could-be, it is dependent on our exposure to and knowledge of the 
“inscrutable forces of nature” that the city-dweller is missing. If we are not faced with the 
“overriding mysteries of creation” and forced to grapple with our own mortality as revealed by 
the cyclicality of nature, then we lose our capacity for envisioning things larger than ourselves—
the realm of rhetoric, in other words. The city to Weaver represents dialectic, dealing in brute 
facts and the logic of progress. The rural life, in his conception, offers space for imagination. 
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Recall Davidson’s claim that we become what we contemplate; for Weaver, when we 
contemplate the “vast piles of stone” in the city we start to reflect their fragmentation. The city-
dweller has “abandon[ed] the concept of the fixed cycle,” he wrote in STB, and thinks himself 
above and insulated from the forces larger than himself.60 This is no doubt simplistic and overly 
neat analysis of social attitudes stemming from geography, but it is a key element in 
understanding Weaver’s theory of rhetoric-in-place. 
 Weaver’s mentor Ransom emphasized above all other things the generalized existence of 
the agrarian. His realm of expertise must occupy parts of many different issues; he cannot live a 
life solely devoted to specialization, and cannot dedicate himself solely to one pursuit. This 
argument influenced Weaver, who wrote that urban life leads to such fragmentation amid 
industrialism’s cult of “specialization” in all things. “Specialization develops only part of a man; 
a man partially developed is deformed; and one deformed is the last person to be thought of as a 
ruler.”61 The city-dweller loses contact with the varied pursuits of life and is regimented, both 
practically and philosophically, by the grids and corners and buildings of the city—he thus loses 
the capacity to think beyond immediate needs and to envision the world as it could be based on 
his community of mind. To explore rhetoric, for Weaver, is to require the space of rural life. 
 One can raise several objections here, not least among them the fact that rhetoric first 
flourished in the city-state of Athens. One could also point out that exploration and imagination 
have long been present and healthy in many of the world’s great cities, from Amsterdam to 
Venice to New York—cities that are often composed of proud neighborhood regionalism. Surely 
those cities represent the capacity to imagine a world of noble ends. But I don’t believe Weaver’s 
critique is wholly without merit: urban life for many is often anonymous, lonely, and indeed 
highly fragmented, and anyone who has ever stood on a crowded sidewalk in a large city can 
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testify to that. Weaver might argue that there is no opportunity to put one’s name on the land 
when the land is but a tiny slice of a vast concrete metropolis.  
 Where we can take heart in Weaver’s argument, I think, is in neo-agrarian movements 
like urban farming and local food consumption. While not fully rural, such pursuits do indeed 
move us closer to sources and consequences of food, at least—which the Agrarians said should 
be the form for our other modes of life. Perhaps as city-dwellers embrace these movements, it 
will put even them in the rhythm of the “inscrutable forces” they are missing. Once we see that 
only the stunning reach of the applied tools of science allows us to get a fresh tomato in New 
York in January, we can begin to imagine the world as it might yet be: smaller in scale, closer 
together, moving in unison toward noble ends. We can start, in other words, with the noble end 
of consuming food closer to our place; from that, per the Agrarian claim of extrapolation, we 
might reshape our social relations to reflect that form of life.  
 Perhaps, then, it is not geography that matters so much for a rhetorical community of 
mind as much as attitude. Weaver looked around Chicago and did not see contemplation of the 
good life: he saw frenzied people driven by the profit motive above all else. It’s difficult to 
envision—let alone act upon—noble ends when we live such fragmented lives. But if a different 
attitude can pervade the city and lead people to form a community of mind based on, say, the 
localism of neighborhood affiliation, then perhaps an ounce of rural contemplation and 
connection to the frailty of life can infiltrate the harried urban attitude. In that scenario, rhetoric 
could flourish as a full partner with dialectic.62 
 One last factor relating to geography must be examined in any exploration of Weaver, 
agrarianism, and place. If a place must be in part defined by a geographic area, then why, the 
cynic might ask, did so many of the Agrarians—and Weaver, for that matter—leave their 
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beloved South? Many of the original twelve went to Northern universities; only a few, like 
Davidson and Andrew Nelson Lytle, truly committed to the rural, Southern, agrarian life. 
Weaver spent most of his career in Chicago, though he returned to the family plot near 
Weaverville, NC, each summer. Is it not the least bit hypocritical that a group that largely fled 
the South should lecture everyone else on committing to a place?  
 Weaver addresses this issue head-on in his essay “Agrarianism in Exile,” where he 
contends that since agrarianism is a way of living, trouble arises when we make it a solid 
doctrine with boundaries and dogma. Because the Agrarians attempted such a thing, their 
withdrawal to the North only “completed an alienation long in progress.”63 He wrote in SE that 
as soon as the agrarian “anywhere adds, or allows to be added, the ism, he is preparing the way 
for his own exile… Every ism is an intellectual manufacture; it has, in all its sobriety, little 
relation to the people who till the soil for a living. These do not understand the language of such 
abstraction. Whatever it is they have, they arrive at by a different route.”64 
 This is an interesting claim, and seems to raise a fairly serious objection to the claims of 
Ransom, Cauley, and others who argued that agrarianism could be both an economic program 
and a cohesive philosophy. Weaver embraced such views in other works, which makes his 
elegiac tone in this essay all the more strange. What’s happening here, I believe, is that Weaver 
is making an essentially Heideggerian argument: he is saying that since agrarianism is rooted in 
being-in-the-world and bound up in history, tradition, memory, myth, and place, it loses its 
power once it enters the realm of intellectual artifice. Jefferson’s yeoman farmer did not choose 
that path from many because it offered the best connection to an inscrutable nature; he inherited 
it in a place and a community. If we attempt to professionalize and intellectualize that, Weaver 
appears to be saying, then agrarianism as mode-of-living loses some of its power. “The Agrarian 
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intellectualized himself enough to make a case for agrarian living. In doing so, he was ceasing to 
be native.”65 It’s almost as if they had tried to take practical, contextual knowledge and transform 
it into a rule-based system: by extending agrarianism beyond its quotidian confines, they had 
weakened their own power and become something different.66  
 But this, paradoxically, did not weaken the power of the argument. As discussed above, 
the “flight of the Agrarians” was actually “a strategic withdrawal to positions where the contest 
can be better carried on”; after all, argued Weaver, “In the battle against anti-humanist forces one 
does not desert by changing his locale for the plain reason that the battle is worldwide.”67 Trying 
to formulate a coherent philosophy may have cost the Agrarians their status as being-in-the-
world agrarians, but it extended the contemplation of such issues and took the battle to the front 
lines of industrialism.  Through it all, the Agrarians were attempting to defend their place against 
the incursions of modern life because only in such a place could rhetoric and memory flourish. 
The place of the South meant something to the Agrarians, even after they left it. Their goal was 
to defend the place-based structure that made the good life possible. Weaver wrote that they 
celebrated “a free and unmeasured sort of life, rich in social intercourse, with its attendant 
manners and irrepressible conversation; it revolves around little poles of distinction (none great 
enough to excite those lusting after abstract power); it recognizes the fireside, the old custom, the 
traditional pieties.”68 However—and here is the crucial point I believe Weaver is making about 
exile—it is a life that is fundamentally rooted in experience: “The most important thing to say of 
it is that this kind of life must be appreciated in its physiognomic character or not at all. It is 
completely foreign to the statistical, bureaucratic, reformistic temperament which has come to 
dominate metropolitan America. The census taker can never get at this form of life.”69 
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 For Weaver, what really matters about the agrarian life of tradition, place, and practical 
knowledge cannot be captured in a book or a census. It can only be felt and experienced whole 
cloth; it cannot be reduced to rules or systems. Further, its capacity to inspire spacious rhetoric 
cannot be applied discretely in non-contextual settings. It requires wholeness, not fragmentation. 
The Agrarians, because they believed it should be the dominant form of life, attempted to capture 
it in a programmatic way—and this, Weaver says, cost some of them their sense of permanence 
in the place of the South. Explaining what makes a Mozart opera great is not the same as 
listening to it; knowing the full anatomy of the peregrine falcon does not substitute for seeing 
one in flight; following a program for farmers is not an exact path to the good life. For that we 
need a history, a tradition, and a place—and then noble ends will follow.  
Property, Metaphysics, and Rhetoric 
 “That there is a world of ought, that the apparent does not exhaust the real—these are so 
essential to the very conception of improvement that it should be superfluous to mention them,” 
Weaver wrote.70 This statement could be the nucleus of Weaver’s thought; small wonder, then, 
that he followed this with “Upon this rock of metaphysical right we shall build our house”—an 
unintentionally direct way of equating the normative world with the concept of place.71 
 Place, in the form of private property, offers for Weaver a firm encampment for “those 
made seasick by the truth-denying doctrines of the relativists,” for “When we survey the scene to 
find something which the rancorous leveling wind of utilitarianism has not brought down, we 
discover one institution, shaken somewhat, but still strong and perfectly clear in its implications. 
This is the right of private property, which is, in fact, the last metaphysical right remaining to 
us.”72 According to Weaver, all the other metaphysical rights—religion, vocation, roles of men 
and women—have been swept away by the forces of modernity, which with perpetually 
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increasing force transform us into purely economic and utilitarian creatures. But property offers 
us a chance to once again live as permanent beings steeped in history and memory. 
 Property is metaphysical “because it does not depend on any test of social usefulness,” 
writes Weaver: “Property rests upon the idea of the hisness of his… In the hisness of property we 
have dogma; there discussion ends.”73 By equating a place with a person—and all the history, 
tradition, customs, and foundations that accompany a person—the concept of property provides a 
sense of permanence in a transient world. “The property which we defend as an anchorage keeps 
its identity with the individual… By some mystery of imprint and assimilation man becomes 
identified with his things, so that a forcible separation of the two seems like a breach of 
nature.”74 
 This idea comes directly from the Southern Agrarians, and the fact that Weaver makes it 
the subject of an entire chapter in IHC demonstrates just how influenced he was by his teachers. 
Tate believed that property ownership was the fundamental concept of liberty, and that the two 
could not exist without each other: “The effective ownership of property entails personal 
responsibility for the action of a given portion of the means of production. A true property 
system will be composed of a large proportion of owners whose property is not to be expressed 
solely in terms of exchange-value, but retains, for the owner, the possibility of use-value.”75 The 
Marxian terms reflect the idea that some parts of life, like labor in Marx’s scheme, contain value 
beyond what can be measured in economic terms. For Tate, property meant something more than 
the resources contained therein—it was the foundation of liberty and the source of agriculture, 
which is “the most stable basis of society because it is relatively less dependent upon the market 
than any other kind of production.”76 This form of life then becomes the basis for those beyond 
it. Ransom echoed this sentiment when he wrote that “The religion of a people is that 
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background of metaphysical doctrine which dictates its political economy.”77 In the South, for 
example, the doctrine of property is the metaphysical basis—thus agrarianism becomes the 
political economy. This is precisely the example Weaver went on to use in his work on property 
and place. 
 Further, Weaver claims property is deeply intertwined with virtue: “[Property] also 
provides an indispensable opportunity for training in virtue. Because virtue is a state of character 
concerned with choice, it flourishes only in the area of volition”—in other words, in the area 
where each person has the liberty to flourish.78 Specifically, property instills in us a sense of 
providence, according to Weaver: 
“Providence requires just that awareness of past and future that our provincial in time, 
eager to limit everything to present sensory experience, is seeking to destroy. It is 
precisely because providence takes into account the nonpresent that it calls for the 
exercise of reason and imagination. That I reap now the reward of my past industry or 
sloth, that what I do today will be felt in that future now potential—these require a play 
of mind… The ability to cultivate providence, which I would interpret literally as 
foresight, is an opportunity to develop personal worth.”79 
  
If this sounds familiar, it is because Weaver is also defining the criteria for noble and 
spacious rhetoric in a community of mind. Weaver’s theory of property is therefore dramatically 
similar to his theory of rhetoric, which is another legacy of his influence by Agrarian thought. 
Both require the preservation of the past; both are inextricable from virtue and nobility of ends; 
both fight against the mode of knowledge that prizes only the present and the sensory; and both 
foster a development of the person. Most importantly, both are ineluctably combined with the 
idea of place. Property provides a place for the individual person: it forces reckoning with past 
and future, and roots a person to something permanent. Rhetoric, by being based upon a 
community of mind, also provides a place: it helps community values cohere and helps form a 
metaphysical regime built upon shared foundations of a placed people.  
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 Permanence, the product of property, is at the heart of Weaver’s argument from 
definition, that there is a world of oughts. Transience, on the other hand, is at the heart of the 
argument from circumstance—sharply criticized by Weaver in ER for its perpetually adapting 
foundations. In fact, Weaver thought his pursuits in rhetoric were in direct line with his pursuits 
in Southern history and philosophy; the South contained the people of the word, who were rooted 
to place and to definition. This devotion in the South made “Private property [a] substance; in 
fact, it is something very much like the philosophic concept of substance.”80 The place of 
property is at the core of our being, said Weaver, irreducible and ontologically normative, 
offering us a usable past and a foundation for a community of mind.  
 This devotion to place and property helps explain Weaver’s promotion of the 
feudal theory of society, which he cites as one of the major advantages of Southern culture. 
When most of us hear “feudal” today, we think of a medieval system of landowners and serfs—
an inherently unjust system, in other words. But for Weaver the feudal system represented 
something more: connection to the land across generations.81 The feudal system in the South, he 
wrote in STB, “possessed stability, an indispensable condition for positive values: it maintained 
society in the only true sense of the term, for it had structure and articulation, and it made 
possible a personal world in which people were known by their names and their histories. It was 
a rooted culture which viewed with dismay the anonymity and the social indifference of urban 
man.”82 Property-as-place is permanent, and thus required for true rhetoric.  
 Dialectic only offers logical facts, according to the Agrarians, and cannot tell us by itself 
which path we ought choose. For that we need rhetoric, which draws upon history and tradition 
to offer a community of mind a set of noble ends. Similarly, he wrote in IHC, “private property 
is essential in any scheme which assumes that man has a choice between better and worse… 
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Unless something exists from which we can start with moral certitude, we cannot depend on 
those deductions which are the framework of coherent behavior.”83 History provides the 
foundation for spacious rhetoric, just as property provides a foundation for the human life and 
training in virtue. Rhetoric cannot operate outside of place, and both draw upon the continuity of 
permanence in order to promote noble ends.  
 Further, since one becomes a complete person only by participating in the rhetorical 
realm of the world as it could be, attachment to property thus becomes a prerequisite for 
successful rhetoric. Without attachment to—and, ideally, ownership of and control over—a place 
that enables piety and development of the person, rhetoric cannot flourish. Notably, property 
must be tangible in this scheme: stocks, bonds, and other tools of finance do not move us closer 
to sources and consequences. Weaver wrote that “the last metaphysical right offers nothing in 
defense of that kind of property brought into being by finance capitalism. Such property is, on 
the contrary, a violation of the very notion of proprietas… For the abstract property of stocks 
and bonds, the legal ownership of enterprises never seen, actually destroy the connection 
between man and his substance without the metaphysical right becomes meaningless.”84 His 
point is that if the property does not offer something tangible—work with the land, interaction 
with a fellow community member, exposure to sources and consequences—then it is not real 
property and is not a step on the road to noble rhetoric. Only with placed property, something 
that anchors us to place and to people and to permanence, can we fully develop ourselves and our 
community of mind. The noble ends of rhetoric require such a place.  
Final Thoughts 
 In the last chapter I spent a great deal of time examining the Agrarian emphasis on myth, 
and Weaver’s subsequent arguments for the primacy of myth and myth’s role as a sort of 
 116 
cohesive agent in society. Myth is, to Ransom and to Weaver and all those who stress the value 
of the intangibilities of social life, intertwined with the history and tradition of a people. 
Rhetoric, therefore, is highly dependent on a given culture’s relative embrace of myth. Religious 
communities, for example, place high value on myth; scientific communities in academia may 
place very low emphasis on myth due to its lack of empirical foundation. The scientific emphasis 
in modern forms of knowledge meant, in the Agrarian framework, a consequent loss of myth.  
 For Weaver, the twin declines of rhetoric and myth were deeply related. “The decline of 
myth in modern societies and the ensuing decay of status are related also to the disappearance of 
‘place’… There is something protective about ‘place’; it means isolation, privacy, and finally 
identity. We cannot rationally wish to be nowhere or everywhere at once. To be somewhere is 
necessary to our standing—to our status.”85 The same forces were responsible for the decline in 
the status of myth. “For essentially the same reason, this terrible mobility is fatal to mythical 
constructs. Myths have always developed among a people occupying one region for a long 
period of time and developing a strong provincial consciousness… To take away place is to take 
away the locus of myth.”86 
 This is Weaver’s clearest statement on the innate connection between myth and place, 
and I mean “innate” here in its etymologically original sense: emerging from the mind rather 
than from sensory experience. The connection is felt more than it can be known: it emerges from 
one’s experience in a place and its history, rather than from a lesson taught or knowledge 
consumed. Rhetoric is to Weaver a mythical force—it is bound up and inextricable from a 
culture’s beliefs about itself, and can only function if there is a comparatively uniform 
metaphysical structure underpinning that society. And, as he explains above, such a metaphysic 
can only arise within a place. Weaver the anti-logician would not like this, but if we were to 
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formulate it syllogistically, we might say that rhetoric depends upon myth, and myth depends 
upon place, and thus rhetoric depends upon place.  
 Modern life has given us plenty of “empirical communities,” according to Weaver, but 
fewer examples of the “metaphysical community, suffused with a common feeling about the 
world which enables all vocations to meet without embarrassment to enjoy the strength that 
comes of common tendency.”87 The best metaphysical communities in our time were to be found 
in the antebellum South, according to Weaver. Rhetorical critics have tended to ignore Weaver’s 
writings on the South, perhaps because they are made uncomfortable by his failure to condemn 
the peculiar institution. But it is in his Southern writings that we find the most fully developed 
theories of the myth-based place, which is his starting point for thriving rhetoric.  
 The advantage of the Southern myth-based places was that they had unity of belief, a 
force whose disappearance Weaver laments. “Men cannot live in harmony unless there is an 
overriding sense of unity. In the absence of a unity of belief, attempts are made to impose a unity 
by force through politics.”88 The South had communities made up, as Weaver wrote, of “the 
local neighborhood, the village or perhaps the county, in which men have relationships other 
than that of cash exchange… We have long memories, and it is against our instinct to build for a 
day.”89 This is a deeply revealing quote. Weaver describes and praises the sense of place in the 
South, demonstrates just how local that sense was, stresses the deeper meaning of relations 
between citizens, and indicates just how important history and memory are to people who thrive 
in a placed community. His requirements for place are strikingly similar to his requirements for 
rhetoric, because both thrive on the community of mind and strive toward noble ends. Place is at 
the very heart of Weaver’s rhetorical theories.  
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 Critics may have no use for Weaver’s ideas, nor for his emphasis on communal good 
over individual good. Where Weaver saw the bonds of community, others may see fascistic 
tendencies. But Weaver, like the scholar Danielle Allen in more recent years, sees sacrifice for 
the common good not just as good but as worth the tradeoff: in order for a community to thrive 
in a place, or in order to have a functioning democratic republic, we must abandon the hope of 
getting everything we want all the time. Unlimited personal autonomy is incompatible with 
social, political, and communal life. 
Allen writes that “[Citizens’] sacrifice makes collective democratic action possible… The 
hard truth of democracy is that some citizens are always giving things up for others. Only 
vigorous forms of citizenship can give a polity the resources to deal with the inevitable problem 
of sacrifice.”90 Weaver would add that only a vigorous form of place can equip a people to deal 
with sacrifice for the common good, because only a vigorous form of place can provide culture 
and shared metaphysical spaciousness.  
 “All of the world’s cultures have been regional,” Weaver wrote, because “Culture always 
develops in a region… It expresses the feelings of the people in that place and time, and it is 
always conscious of itself; that is to say, it can quickly recognize what is foreign to it. A culture, 
to use a word which has unfortunate connotations today, operates on a principle of exclusiveness 
and can operate on no other.”91 This echoes Weaver’s sentiment that a place, in order to form a 
foundation for the metaphysical dream, must be defined in some limiting way. Recall the 
example earlier of the dispute within the Methodist Church. Not only can the Church as a 
universal body have some degree of metaphysical coherence, but the place itself—the individual 
parish on a Sunday morning—must also, for the faith celebration loses at least some of its 
meaning if the attendees do not buy into the myth underpinning the proceedings. Weaver uses 
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the example of the ancient Greeks, whose word barbaroi gave us our modern term barbarians. 
The word in Greek means “those speaking a different language”—literally, those from outside 
this place. This is how a culture preserves the community of mind within a place, which is the 
first step toward a thriving rhetoric.  
 Place, as a guiding term in this chapter, can cover a lot of ground. It encompasses a 
physical location, yes, but also the attitude that can only thrive within a physical location and the 
rhetoric that emerges from a people who possess philosophical coherence and unity of belief 
within a specific location. Think of Weaver’s central lament in ER: rhetoric is no longer 
spacious—the term itself suggests location-based concerns. He argued that in order to have 
spacious rhetoric, we must have unity of belief in a place: “[The orator] was comfortably 
circumstanced with reference to things he could ‘know’ and presume everyone else to know in 
the same way… Disagreements over the most fundamental subjects leave us puzzled as to ‘where 
we are’ if not as to ‘what we are.’”92 Place, in other words, helps determine philosophy—and 
disputes over that philosophy, according to Weaver, can disorient our very sense of “where we 
are.” Our physical and philosophical surroundings are a key ingredient in noble rhetoric; indeed, 
“Man is free in proportion as his surroundings have a determinate nature, and he can plan his 
course with perfect reliance upon that determinateness.”93 
 These geographic terms are not mere metaphors for Weaver. Place, as a concept 
spanning geographic location and the community of mind that springs from unity of belief in that 
location, must precede noble rhetoric. If rhetoric’s goal is to draw upon history and tradition in 
order to accompany dialectic in moving us to a world of oughts, then it must be connected to a 
place. We must be close to sources and consequences, close to the land, and close to those who 
join us in a community of mind. The place of rhetoric, for Weaver, is very similar to the place for 
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rhetoric. We depend upon metaphysical anchors in our rhetoric, and those can only come from 
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State University Press, 1978), 103. 
37 Genovese (1994), 14. 
38 M.E. Bradford, “The Agrarian Tradition: An Affirmation,” in M.E. Bradford, Remembering 
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Press, 1985), 86, emphasis in original.  
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40 Genovese (1994), ix. 
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42 ER, 86. 
43 STB, 38.  
44 STB, 50. Obviously, this “little cosmos” of the Old South often included slaves. Many 
contemporary rhetorical scholars have rejected Weaver outright for his praise of a system that 
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sanctioned and perpetuated slavery. And yes, his candor can easily make us uncomfortable. But 
as I wrote above, it is foolish to completely dismiss him simply because of that view.  
 As I write this, same-sex marriage is becoming increasingly accepted across the United 
States. Many supporters of President Obama praise his support for same-sex marriage. But those 
same supporters do not simply reject everything Obama said before his recent (and politically 
beneficial) change of opinion in 2012. Instead, they view his pre-2012 views as flawed in one 
key area. 
 So it should be with critics’ treatment of Weaver. We should follow the advice of the 
philosopher Bernard Williams, who argued that applying our current conception of ethics to past 
eras is foolish because people in those eras often could not even have understood the ontological 
foundation of our views. The two sets of ethics are incommensurable, and it is therefore a 
colossal waste of time to denounce, say, St. Thomas Aquinas for tacitly supporting a medieval 
system that denied property rights to the hoi polloi. As much as we like to think ourselves 
enlightened, there are no doubt many things we consider unassailably true that future generations 
will denounce as unfair or atavistic (our brutal factory farm system comes to mind). Trying to 
reconcile the ethical worldview of the modern liberal academic with all other worldviews, as so 
many critics have tried to do, is a fool’s errand. Better to accept that different people at different 
times support different ideas, and attempt to recover any and all good things from the past while 
staying true to our own values.  
45 ITMS, 343-344. Weaver cites this quote approvingly in SE.  
46 STB, 57, emphasis added.  
47 SE, 18.  
48 SE, 57. 
49 This makes Weaver’s views of rhetoric fall somewhere between those of Aristotle and 
Isocrates.  
50 STB, 395-396. 
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62 What Weaver probably wouldn’t like is that this attitude in today’s cities is best exemplified 
by the wealthy bourgeoisie, whose members have the time and money to devote to such pursuits. 
As a dedicated opponent of bourgeois elitism, Weaver likely wouldn’t find much to like in 
today’s urban obsession with all things artisanal—though, once he got past the aspect of 
bourgeois affectation, he might like the consequences.  
63 SE, 40.  
64 SE, 40. 
65 SE, 40, emphasis added. 
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66 For comparison, imagine the principle of decentralization—or, better still, the Catholic 
principle of subsidiarity: that all things should be done on as local a level as possible. (For 
example, a poor family in Lawrence, KS, should be helped first not by a local or state 
government, but by the parishioners of the family’s church.) It’s a decentralized philosophy, in 
other words. To have a centralized authority overseeing the system of subsidiarity would, at least 
in part, be contrary to the principle’s goals. Weaver is making a similar claim about Agrarianism 
here: since it’s a felt system based on inherited knowledge and the customs of place, to make it a 
unified system would be, again at least in part, to defeat the goals.  
 I believe Weaver is being a bit too hard on his mentors in this case, and it’s worth noting 
that this almost dismissive attitude toward their work appears nowhere besides this essay. We 
might also bear in mind that at the time this essay was written (1950), two decades had passed 
since the publication of ITMS and many of the original twelve had moved on to different 
pursuits: Tate and Davidson to poetry, Warren to fiction, Ransom to literary criticism. It’s a tad 
unseemly for Weaver to criticize the Agrarians like this when their setbacks came at the hands of 
the very industrialism and “New Dealism” that Weaver himself decried. 
 Weaver’s complaints about the Agrarians and exile also affirm the view of many 
historians that Weaver saw “Agrarianism” less as a social and economic program, as most of the 
original twelve did, and more as a sort of broad Southern philosophy. In this he followed the 
Christian humanism emphasis of Tate and Davidson more than anyone else, and less so Ransom 
and Lytle and Owsley, who tended to focus more on the practical side of the ledger. There is 
little doubt, however—as I hope I am proving here—that most of Weaver’s ideas can still be 
traced to the thought of the Agrarians.  
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69 SE, 47, emphasis in original. 
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73 IHC, 132, emphasis in original. 
74 IHC, 133, 134, emphasis added.  
75 Allen Tate, “Notes on Liberty and Property,” in Herbert Agar & Allen Tate (eds.), Who Owns 
America? A New Declaration of Independence (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1999), 113-114. 
This book, originally published in 1936, was billed as the follow-up to ITMS but was much 
broader in scope and focused on opposition to the fusion of state and corporate power. Only a 
few of the original ITMS contributors participated in the volume.  
76 Tate (1999), 115. Clearly Tate is talking about subsistence agriculture plus local markets—not 
the globalized agriculture market we know today. 
77 GWT 118. 
78 IHC, 137. “Liberty” has become a slightly corrupted term, thanks to rights absolutists who 
insist a right to do something is always pristine, unassailable, and wholly decontextualized from 
any other concern. (See the so-called Tea Party for a disturbing example of this.) But Weaver 
and the Agrarians used the term in a different way. For them, liberty was the foundation of each 
community and culture. It was the freedom to begin building something, not a void into which 
social obligations disappear. Weaver once dismissed the idea of freedom as an end in itself as 
“vacuous,” and wrote near the end of IHC, “Do you see the necessity of accepting duties before 
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you begin to talk of freedom?” (186-187) Perhaps this example is just further evidence of how 
bastardized the very term “conservative” has become in our time, and how Weaver and the 
Agrarians would feel quite left out in a gathering of today’s alleged conservatives. Nothing about 
the modern Republican Party, for example, is conservative—for what exactly are they trying to 
conserve? Not nature, nor institutions, nor civil society, nor public goods like education and art; 
today’s so-called conservatives are participants in an incoherent philosophy, they should be 
ashamed to cloak themselves in the mantle of Edmund Burke.  
79 IHC, 138, emphasis added. 
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81 Obviously this does not eliminate the continued serfdom. We should remember that Weaver’s 
goal in virtually all writings was to recover what good ideas he could from older times. No, 
feudalism was not perfect—but perhaps there is still something we can salvage from it, and in 
this case Weaver argues that is rootedness.  
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and the synthetic collateralized debt obligation.  
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Chapter 4: Solidarity and Rhetoric 
 
Freedom as an end in itself is simply vacuous. 
-- Richard Weaver 
 
I am with you, you men and women of a generation, or ever so many generations hence;/ I 
project myself—also I return—I am with you, and know how it is—Walt Whitman 
 
 In chapters two and three, I examined two key concepts of Weaver’s: what sort of 
knowledge is required for a culture to have successful and spacious rhetoric, and what kind of 
place is required for that culture and its rhetoric to thrive. The subject of this chapter is the 
logical conclusion of that exploration. Now that I have explored the metaphysical and tangible 
foundations of a culture, one must ask: how exactly does this culture arise, and how does it 
maintain the cohesive community of mind required for rhetoric?  
 The broad term I will use in this chapter is solidarity, which refers to the sense of shared 
purpose and mission a culture’s members share and which will overlie such concepts as 
community, common pursuit, common valuation of symbols, and shared experiences.1 While the 
second chapter focused on Weaver’s writings on forms of knowledge for rhetoric and the third 
chapter focused on his Southern place-based writings, this chapter will largely focus on perhaps 
Weaver’s central concept: order. Weaver has been called the “philosopher of order,” and his 
ideas on how a culture is and stays formed are essential to any understanding of his rhetorical 
theories.2 The creation of “solidarity,” and its use as a critical term here, might be considered 
akin to Kenneth Burke’s dictum that we identify with each other in order to overcome division. 
Similarly, Weaver wanted cultures to find spacious metaphysical ideas that would allow us to 
move forward together toward noble ends. Finding ways to do that is essential to the task of 
rhetoric.  
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 This chapter is perhaps the most important in this project in terms of offering an 
alternative to the ideological approach that has a strong presence in our discipline. In it and 
especially in the conclusion that follows, I hope to sketch a different path for rhetorical studies—
one based not on critique but on construction. In his landmark 1989 article, rhetorical scholar 
Raymie McKerrow argued that the chief function of the rhetorical critic is to “unmask or 
demystify the discourse of power. The aim is to understand the integration of power/knowledge 
in society—what possibilities for change the integration invites or inhibits and what intervention 
strategies might be considered appropriate to effect social change.”3 In this scheme of critical 
rhetoric, power—and thus those institutions and persons possessing power—is always something 
to be viewed with suspicion, as if power were always a way station on the path to oppression and 
agency-deprivation. Perhaps in theory, this stance is only slightly objectionable; however, it is 
difficult to see how, when played out over years and instilled as a default stance of rhetorical 
studies, it is a road to anything but the kind of relativism that makes solidarity difficult.  
 If a central stance of academic rhetorical criticism and rhetorical education is critique of 
power in the name of personal agency, then rhetoric can quickly become a field without a core. If 
there can be no power then there can be no order, and surely without order there can be no real 
social or communal possibilities.4 One potential consequence of ideological criticism and critical 
rhetoric could be social atomization: by perpetually separating us into discrete, autonomous units 
compelled to oppose discourses of power, critical rhetoric can harm social solidarity. If society is 
to be more than a collection of individuals, then surely such an amalgamation would constitute a 
discourse of power—and thus would need to be opposed. Weaverian rhetoric is inherently 
incompatible with such a stance, since Weaver’s goal was to use rhetoric to build ethical 
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societies, develop good citizens, and pursue noble ends—all of which eventually require some 
semblance of power.  
 One useful way to think about a connection between Weaver’s ideas and contemporary 
rhetorical criticism is through the theory of constitutive rhetoric. This theory, most clearly 
expounded by Michael McGee and Maurice Charland, holds that a symbol or text creates an 
audience, or a people, through an interpellation or Althusserian “hailing.” In other words, 
according to Charland, a symbol or text first constitutes a collective subject by transforming a 
group of individuals into a people. It then posits the existence of a transhistorical subject: it tells 
the audience that they, this people, have always and will always exist in relation to that particular 
symbol in that particular way. Finally, the symbol must offer the illusion of freedom by telling 
the audience it has embraced the symbol willingly.5 
 There are obvious connections here to Weaver’s work, even if the two do not quite align 
perfectly. Like Charland and McGee, Weaver argued that a symbol or text or narrative could call 
people into being and form them into a culture. The idea of an audience always existing in 
relation to a particular symbol in a particular way has echoes of Weaver’s subject-object unity, in 
which a term always has a transcendent form underlying it—though Charland’s formulation 
focuses on audience effect and Weaver’s on the symbol itself.  
Most relevant for this discussion is what McGee says is the crucial step in constitutive 
rhetoric’s formation of an audience: the people must be prepared by the symbol for social action 
in the material world.6 In other words, it is not enough for us to say, in effect, “Look, we are a 
rhetorically constituted audience.” Rather, what matters is what the audience—Weaver would 
call it a community of mind—does from that point forward, and how the symbol in question 
exerts influence in its members’ lives. Once the community of mind is constituted through 
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rhetoric, a culture can begin to take shape. Since solidarity should be a central feature of 
democratic life, rhetorical critics should be extraordinarily interested in the symbols and texts 
that have the capacity to unite, to shape, and to cohere. What should concern our field is not just 
what symbols constitute a people, but what the people do after that constitution.  
This chapter is aimed at outlining exactly how the notion of cultural and rhetorical 
solidarity contributes to those goals. In this chapter I will first survey the Agrarian ideas on 
social cohesion, which, like most of the Agrarians’ ideas, strongly influenced Weaver. I will then 
turn to Weaver’s writings themselves in order to see how we might recover old ideas of cultural 
solidarity in order to advance a thriving, spacious rhetoric in our own time. 
Cultural Solidarity in Agrarianism 
 The idea of agrarianism has long been intertwined with ideas of wholesomeness and 
simplicity in the culture and the people. For this reason, generations of writers and philosophers 
from ancient Greece to the present have deemed farmers to be the most virtuous people and 
hence a model for culture. “Cultivators of the earth,” Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Jay, “are 
the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, 
and they are tied to their country, and wedded to its liberty and its interests by the most lasting 
bonds.”7 Jefferson’s famous vision was a yeoman republic, or a culture of rural citizens 
possessed of the same solidity and cultural integrity that the individual farmer so routinely 
exhibited.  
 It is clear to all that there is more than a little romance and nostalgia in this idea.8 But 
what has made people cling to this idea that the rural and agricultural population is the font of all 
that is good in society? One frequent theme in cultural depictions is the inherent appeal of the 
close-knit culture and cohesive community. The classic small farming town in the typical 
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American depiction is filled with simple people who do simple work together—people who 
know that there is more to life than the frenzied rush of big cities.9 There is at the heart of this 
depiction an order to the agrarian life, a reassuring sameness and sense of permanence, which 
counteracts the other key American impulse: restless expansion and westward movement.   
 The agrarian life of order and stability is also routinely invoked as the center of American 
community, with all the sense of shared purpose and mission that term connotes. Where urban 
life is frequently seen as the sphere of the lone striver, agrarian life is one of working together—a 
feeling created by “consideration for the nature of a place; by consideration for the needs and 
feelings of neighbors; by kindness to strangers; by respect for the privacy, dignity, and propriety 
of individual lives; by affection for a place, its people, and its nonhuman creatures; and by the 
duty to teach the young,” as Wendell Berry put it.10 In other words, agrarians see their life as 
whole: in its embrace of the life cycle and deep connection to the earth, it represents a holistic 
life that opposes modern fragmentation. This gives it the aforementioned sense of order that 
many find ontologically and practically satisfying.  
 It is this characteristic of order that the Southern Agrarians found so valuable in 
traditional and rural life, and it is also what spurred Weaver to extend his ideas on rhetoric to his 
ideas on culture. The Agrarian view of an ordered culture was premised on the cosmological idea 
that a society has distinct roles and hierarchies, and that this structure is right and just because it 
is based on the myths shared by a community and its metaphysical dream. Indeed, one scholar 
argues that the Agrarians embraced myth not because they believed in it but because they 
recognized its value in providing a foundation for “order and objective standards.”11 This order 
and structure subsequently provided the basis for community and social relations, which are best 
developed, according to the Agrarians, when each member of a society knows his or her role and 
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accepts the roles of others.12 Myth, then, provides the basis for order and that order provides the 
basis for social relations. The latter-day Agrarian M.E. Bradford wrote that “All our social myths 
presupposed some version of the corporate life—that man is a social being, fulfilled only in the 
natural associations built upon common experience, upon the ties of blood and friendship, 
common enterprises, resistance to common enemies, and a common faith.”13 
 The Agrarians saw their project as a defense of this order—derived from the long 
tradition of Western civilization and inherited from aristocratic Europe—against, as Davidson 
put it, “the new barbarism of science and technology controlled and directed by the modern 
power state.”14 These latter forces they believed to be corrosive to community, because they 
imported—or compelled, in the Agrarian view—homogenization and monoculture into 
philosophically distinct regions. Community was the “a priori ideal” of the Southern Agrarians, 
wrote Bradford, calling it “an informally hierarchical social organism in which all Southerners… 
had a sense of investment and participation.”15 There was inequality in this informal hierarchy, 
no question—but inequality was a natural outcome in diverse societies, they argued. What they 
disputed was the modern “cult” of equality, or an insistence upon the total equality of all people 
and the abolition of distinctions between persons. “Equality as a moral or political imperative, 
pursued as an end in itself—Equality, with the capital ‘E’—is the antonym of every legitimate 
conservative principle,” wrote Bradford.16 True order based upon myth contains inequality, they 
believed, because it is honest about the various social roles people occupy. 
 The Agrarians saw modern life’s dis-ordered reality in a harshly negative light, as an 
“international economy of morally indifferent affluence for many and misery for those who 
cannot compete,” according to one historian.17 Against this they proposed order based on myth, 
rooted in the land. This structure of society was an essential part of agrarian life, and it is hard to 
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separate the social arrangement from the agrarian economy. This is because in the agrarian 
society, wrote Bradford, “the measure of any economic or political system was its human 
product. Goods, services, and income are, to this way of thinking, subsidiary to the basic cultural 
consideration, the overall form of life produced.”18 Modern secular gods like gross domestic 
product play no role in the evaluation of the agrarian economy, and market factors therefore do 
not determine social relations. The problem, as the Agrarians saw it, is that ever since 
Appomattox the United States has been trying to “sustain traditional values without having the 
social relations necessary for their sustenance.”19 In other words, they believed we once had a 
republic of order and hierarchy that was generally accepted by most people in local economies 
and small-scale social relations. Now, in our globalized, utilitarian, “flattened” world, we find we 
cannot preserve the benefits of that society without the underlying order that allowed them.20 
 That order helped foster cultural solidarity because the Southern Agrarian mode of 
imagination, according to Tate, was fundamentally rhetorical rather than dialectical.21 It was 
based on shared imagination drawn from history and tradition and contextual knowledge rather 
than discrete principles adopted for purposes of efficiency or logic. You cannot divorce the 
Southern mode of imagination from the South; you could not simply plunk it down in the middle 
of New England and expect it to help form a cohesive culture. For that, you would need the 
entire context of the Southern experience and the entire meaning of the Southern place. Cultural 
solidarity, the Agrarians believed, emerges from something intangible and rhetorical: myth, 
shared by community, revealed in social relations. All are necessary for the creation of order, but 
as one historian put it, the Agrarians believed such things had been replaced by the forces of “the 
modern, false religions of production, consumption, and progress.”22 
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 These forces, in fact, formed what the Southern Agrarians thought was an entirely 
different kind of cultural “solidarity”: one rooted purely in the solipsistic, acquisitive, 
individualism of mass consumer society.23 Their critique was that these values inevitably formed 
within industrialism, which encompassed both “a mode of economic organization and the 
cultural values that supported it,” as the Southern historian Paul Conkin described it.24 This is a 
distinctly Marxian or even Gramscian argument; virtually all that’s missing from this diagnosis 
are the labels “superstructure” and “hegemony.” In fact, Weaver and the Agrarians were unique 
among conservative critics who adopted the basic Marxist complaints about modern 
industrialism and finance-capitalism, which they saw as uprooting tradition and eroding 
community solidarity. Their focus on property as a corrective to modern capitalism was also 
unique; Conkin calls them “the last original group of critics in America, with anything close to a 
national audience, who took property and property rights seriously.”25 This focus on property 
and opposition to the culture of material consumption helps explain both their devotion to the 
rhetorical mode of imagination and their focus on solidarity. Since an ordered culture can really 
only emerge in a tangible place, and since it must have the wellspring of imaginative rhetoric to 
draw from, it is natural that their focus on solidarity would involve property and the modern 
culture that separates us from attachment to it.  
 A key element of an ordered culture is a certain definition of individualism. Indeed, 
Bradford labeled the Southern Agrarians agrarian because they opposed “the alienated, atomistic 
individual to whom abstractly familial totalitarianism can appeal.”26 As I will discuss below, 
Weaver devoted a sizable portion of his later writing to competing notions of individualism. The 
key to understanding the Agrarian view of individualism is an anti-Thoreauvian point: they 
believed that people can only define themselves in relation to their communities rather than in 
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opposition to them.27 This is surely a legacy of the doctrine of Southern provincialism, in which 
people were attached to a piece of land by a sense of continuity and permanence. When such a 
society exists, we become ontologically whole when we can understand and explain how we fit 
into a communal structure based on continuity, not how we can be rebellious individuals 
breaking out of it. When we see ourselves within the context and culture of a community, we 
often see qualities in others that we aspire to possess. These qualities help determine how we 
evaluate actions, and in turn drive us to improve ourselves.28 Individualism in the Agrarian 
scheme is not a fragmenting activity but a unifying one. It moves us upward toward the good that 
our community of mind defines.   
 When a culture is formed around only discrete, consuming individuals who maximize 
their utility—as the Agrarians saw the modern United States—then the very structure of the 
culture shifts to accommodate new visions of the good life, and contemplation and leisure are not 
among them. Instead, a culture begins to measure the good life based upon economic measures 
and utilitarian calculations—and upon this foundation there can be no cultural solidarity, because 
all that matters is ceaseless growth. Allen Tate lamented the fact that “We have been mere 
economists,” concerned only with “the study of wealth”; he argued we must now be “political 
economists as well [and] study human welfare.”29 Without concern for the health of a culture 
based purely on materialism, in other words, we will never know noble ends. The latter-day 
agrarian and conservationist Aldo Leopold wrote that a healthy and cohesive culture will see the 
non-utility aspects of the natural world and of human relations, not merely that which can be 
exploited.30  
 The point is not that the agrarian mindset is against growth in formation of a culture, or 
that it demands submission by humans in the face of, as A.E. Housman famously put it, “nature, 
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heartless, witless nature.” It asks, rather, that we measure our culture not in terms of GDP but in 
terms of lives well lived, because only when we focus on the health of connections between 
people can we form any kind of cultural solidarity. This point is essential to understanding the 
Agrarians view of solidarity, which was deeply influential to Weaver. If a society is simply the 
sum of individuals pursuing their interests—and this is standard macroeconomic doctrine today, 
to the point that economists often use “the economy” and “society” interchangeably—then there 
is no shared purpose, and thus no community of mind, and thus no noble ends: all of which are 
necessary for rhetoric to thrive, or even to exist. If we have a purely economic society, argued 
the Agrarians, then how becomes the guiding force in public life; why, meanwhile, is completely 
ignored. To take a more recent American cultural assumption: the World War II generation 
didn’t mobilize to fight Nazism by simply asking how we were to build a bomber, we tell 
ourselves—they did it by asking why the bomber was worth building. The myth holds that shared 
purpose pervaded the work, which created cultural solidarity if only for the duration of the war. 
Technical questions alone cannot tell us how to act: this was Weaver’s key point for rhetoric. For 
guidance, we must draw upon our shared histories and social connections in order to find a way 
toward noble ends.  
 This is what Ransom meant when he criticized modern society for calling “upon its 
members to become always more professional, more abstract, in their functions.”31 He and the 
other Agrarians believed that when we become more abstract from sources, consequences, and 
each other, then it becomes more difficult to find cultural rallying points. The Agrarian Herbert 
Agar wondered if modern life was “capable of desiring and defining a society based on 
principles rather than on opportunism, on a moral image of what it wishes the life of man to be 
rather than on a more or less regulated scramble for possessions?”32 Agar argued that when we 
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break culture into nothing more than competing economic units, then the citizen turns into “an 
‘economic man,’ a sort of highest common denominator of human weaknesses; and a society 
composed chiefly of such units will have the minimum of moral will, of true freedom of choice. 
It will tend to obey ‘economic law.’”33 That term, “moral will,” would be a direct inspiration to 
Weaver: he set for rhetoric the task of elucidating and illuminating the noble path that our true 
selves sought, and moving us toward it within a cohesive culture.  
 Almost needless to say is the fact that the Agrarians considered the South to possess far 
greater cultural solidarity than the North because the South was based upon transcendent 
principles and the idea of community. They saw the North as sickened by the pursuit of material 
greed and by purely economic measures of individual lives. The Agrarians were more committed 
to the South as a region, while Weaver saw it more as an idea, and, as Murphy put it,  “talked 
less of the South as a concrete way of life than as a set of values, or ‘mind.’”34 This was a 
premodern faith in values, which could provide cultural solidarity because they stood beneath all 
social relations. As early as STB, his first work, Weaver was praising the cultural solidarity of the 
Southerners who grew up with “one order, familiar with its assumptions and customs, and 
feeling that the rules of its collective life somehow emanate from themselves.”35 The myths 
provide cultural solidarity and an agreeable way of life based in community of mind. Myths, in 
other words, provide social structure: this is a direct argumentative homage to Ransom’s GWT. 
When the myths are purely economic, however, or when they encourage us to always place faith 
in material gain—what we see from the doctrine of perpetual progress, for example—they cannot 
form cultural solidarity at all. They can only encourage us to view ourselves as discrete 
individuals participating in commerce, with the ignoble end of creating more of the same, ad 
infinitum.  
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 The Agrarian view that so influenced Weaver, then, was rooted in the idea that a culture 
can only become cohesive when it is formed around a set of common values, is based in a 
commonly experienced place, and aspires toward a set of commonly held noble ends. It is a 
rhetorical mode of imagination, as Tate argued, because it draws upon history in order to 
envision a shared purpose for a people, not just a group of individuals. Cultural solidarity is 
based on values, preferably transcendent ones, that encourage us to see ourselves as part of a 
larger project that began before us and continues after us, and which has discernible and 
definable ends. Finally, it insists that why must share equal billing with how in matters of social 
and cultural activities. All of these forces combine to create order, which is the goal of societies 
based on enduring principles. In the next section, I will explore Weaver’s ideas on solidarity, 
individualism, order, and the rhetoric required to achieve both.  
Weaver, Rhetoric, and Individualism vs. Community 
 Exploring Weaver’s ideas on culture and solidarity first requires establishing why 
rhetoric is so important. Rhetoric is a tool for building cultures, Weaver believed; indeed, he saw 
the decline of Western culture as aided by, if not even a partial consequence of, the decline of 
rhetoric. So what is culture, and how is it formed? For Weaver, “Culture is a delicate 
reconciliation of opposites”: a harmony that can arise in spite of the sometimes conflicting 
impulses of the individual and the group.36 The task of the rhetorician, one of Weaver’s 
“prescriptionists of culture,” “is to discern what changes are necessary to get [cultural] principles 
back into a proper relation.”37 
 A culture is characterized by movement toward goals, Weaver argued, and all cultures 
are moving toward something; stasis is impossible for a culture, though movement toward 
ignoble goals is certainly possible. Rhetoric is the power that shapes that movement since it “is 
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designed to move men’s feelings in the direction of a goal,” and as such is concerned “with men 
in being” rather than in the abstract.38 Rhetoric is hence a key tool, if not the key tool, for 
constructing cultural solidarity—the force that arises when all members of a culture are on 
common ontological ground and have coalesced around a goal. Rhetoric is therefore the force 
that provides the bonds of community. As Goodnight put it about Weaver’s views on cohesive 
rhetoric, “the community of sentiment provides the basic congruence of imagination which 
allows persons to participate in cultural reality.”39 
 The advantage of rhetoric is that it allows us, in the formation of culture, to access those 
forms of knowledge that lie beyond mere definition, which is the realm of dialectic. Rhetoric, 
Weaver argued in LS, deals with those “ideas, images, feelings, and intuitions which cannot be 
described and classified in the way of scientific phenomena but which have great effect upon our 
decisions.”40 This means that while the forces of dialectic, like definition and logic, can allow us 
to sketch the boundaries and rudimentary aspects of community and culture, it is rhetoric that 
allows us to draw on the past and on non-scientific knowledge to create shared purpose. “As 
humans use rhetoric they create community,” writes Goodnight about Weaver’s views, and as 
“humans are language users they participate in cultural creation.”41  
Weaver’s vision for rhetoric was one of cultural centrality, in which people would avail 
themselves of the forces of history and tradition in order to move beyond what Weaver labels as 
mere dialectic: the how of a culture. Dialectic, according to Weaver, can only really get us to the 
process of defining a community according to its discrete individuals. But cultural solidarity can 
only arise and cohere when a culture defines itself organically as something greater than the sum 
of its parts. Dialectic gets us to think as individuals, but according to Goodnight’s interpretation, 
rhetoric “moves these specific individuals with their own beliefs, desires and prejudices by 
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drawing their feelings together in a vision. The power of rhetoric, thus, is its ability to reach 
higher levels of mutual consent.”42 This is what makes Weaver’s vision of rhetoric a tool for 
solidarity, because we see “rhetorical force,” as he called it in ER, as a “power transmitted 
through the links of a chain that extends upward toward some ultimate source.”43 To accomplish 
this, solidarity needs to be based on something more than an aggregation of individuals—it must 
be rooted in community. 
 Individualism was of great interest to Weaver and his Agrarian teachers, as it represented 
two of their chief philosophical concerns: a force that allows people to become fully realized 
individual humans within a mass-consumer society, and a force that corrodes traditional social 
ties and community foundations if taken to an extreme. For Weaver, these two opposite ends of 
individualism were exhibited by two key American historical figures: the essayist and 
philosopher Henry David Thoreau, and farmer and Virginia congressman John Randolph of 
Roanoke. Weaver’s treatment of these two subjects tells us a great deal about his views on 
cultural solidarity and the rhetoric we find therein.  
 According to Weaver, “A culture is born expressive of a place and a time, and a mood 
which says implicitly ‘We hold these values.’”44 Those who form or are born into that culture 
therefore owe the culture something, since the culture instills in them the values subsequently 
needed to live a meaningful life. To turn our backs on that culture is to ignore those who have 
come before us and those whose absence would deprive us of contextual and historical meaning. 
Small wonder, then, that Weaver embraced as wholly virtuous and exemplary the example of 
John Randolph of Roanoke, who was a hero of sorts to midcentury traditional conservatives. 
Randolph was a staunch defender of states’ rights and a fierce critic of centralized power, and he 
was, Weaver tells us, “an ardent Jeffersonian” who spent his congressional career “in dogged 
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fights against all nationalizing tendencies, especially the tariff and the national bank.”45 What 
was important for Weaver is that “As a defender of the dignity and autonomy of the smaller unit, 
[Randolph] was constantly fighting the battle for local rights. But it was the essence of his 
position that the battle must be fought within the community, not outside the community and not 
through means that would in effect deny all political organization.”46 
 In other words, Randolph loathed the “centripetal” tendencies of the federal 
government—the tendency to always direct power toward the center instead of outward toward 
the yeomen, of whom he was a robust advocate. But he did not let this stop him from working 
within the Congressional community he was given in order to effect change. He recognized that 
his temporary community in the Capitol required work within channels whose very existence he 
loathed, and he did that work in spite of that loathing. According to Weaver, he had secessionist 
tendencies but he “never lost sight of the truth expressed in Aristotle’s dictum that man is a 
political animal. His individualism is, therefore, what I am going to call ‘social bond’ 
individualism. It battles unremittingly for individual rights, while recognizing that these have to 
be secured within the social context… Randolph could not visualize men’s solving political 
questions through simple self-isolation.”47 
 Individualism, in the Randolphian sense praised by Weaver and the Agrarians, is a 
scheme in which a person can realize herself and secure personal rights—but only when she 
recognizes the social context that allows such things and does not simply reject all obligations to 
others. Randolph did not like federal power, but he did not support the nullifiers in South 
Carolina: he thought, as Weaver did, that merely turning one’s back on the situation was a 
simplistic and arrogant solution. This is why he said that “If any of the parties to the 
[Constitution] are dissatisfied with their share of influence, it is an affair of amicable 
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discussion… but no cause for dissolving the confederacy.”48 Weaver praised Randolph because 
his “theory of politics did not favor simple withdrawal as a solution… the fight should be waged 
within the whole and not outside it in some undefinable or ambiguous position.”49 
 The opposite position was taken, according to Weaver, by Henry David Thoreau. That 
famous Transcendentalist, renowned for his chronicled adventures at Walden Pond and for a 
brief stint in jail (and the essay, “Civil Disobedience,” it produced), was to Weaver a helpless 
solipsist who refused to see himself as dependent in any way on his social context or community 
traditions. When Thoreau spent two years at Walden, or when he spent the night in prison for 
refusal to pay a poll tax, he was only seeing his own action devoid of all contextual meaning. He 
refused to consider implications of his actions; in his eyes, all that mattered were the actions he 
determined right based on an ideal of behavior.  
 What Weaver disliked in Thoreau’s behavior is the “premise still more dubious, which is 
that man is a kind of creature who should never be visited with coercion, either by a thing called 
an army or a thing called a government… we are again forced to conclude that Thoreau is not 
talking about real men in the real world.”50 The Weaver biographer Joseph Scotchie says 
“Thoreau can be characterized as representing an extreme vision of libertarianism… To Weaver, 
this was an attitude that was both egotistical and irresponsible.”51 To argue, as Weaver believed 
Thoreau did, that you have no obligations to your community when the latter’s actions violate 
any of your beliefs, is to ignore the many benefits you have received from your community—
indeed, it is to ignore the truth that we do not develop in isolation from our natural and human 
surroundings. 
 What has all this to do with rhetoric? To Weaver, a great deal indeed: the two men whose 
beliefs he sketches in his essay on Randolph and Thoreau represent the twin forces of dialectic 
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and rhetoric, and the solidarity of community they hinder and help, respectively. Thoreau 
represents the cold, calculating tendencies of dialectic, and history’s veneration of him is deeply 
troubling to Weaver the rhetorician. In “Civil Disobedience,” says Weaver, “by the operation of 
a dialectical movement both man and the state are refined out of existence; they are made into 
ideological constructs quite adapted to their author’s play of fancy, but out of all relationship to 
history. It is simple to place man beyond the effect of such things as taxation and slavery if one 
de-incarnates him.”52 
Weaver believed that Thoreau idealized both the things he loved, like unadulterated 
nature, and the things he loathed—namely, obligations to other members of his community. He 
stressed individuality, in other words, to too great a degree, while ignoring what Weaver called 
personality, which one Weaver biographer says stresses “selfhood and relationship with 
others.”53 Because Thoreau was a dialectician, he emphasized “freedom” as an abstract principle 
devoid of any rhetorical context; this made him fail to see, as the rhetorical mode of imagination 
might, that freedom must inevitably be subordinated to some greater good or nobler end. 
Thoreau’s arguments, Weaver alleges, are merely “a dialectical progression toward the author’s 
ideal, which is finally offered very winningly, but in complete isolation from the facts of life.”54 
 Contrast that view with Randolph’s, who was always recognizing the truths that emerge 
from real people living real lives; “what Randolph saw as a last and a problematical choice, 
Thoreau was inclined to see as a first step.”55 Indeed, Randolph was “a classical instance of the 
rhetor, or the master of rhetoric, contending against his enemies,” while Thoreau “becomes the 
mere abstract reasoner.”56 Randolph criticized his fellow states’ rights advocates for committing 
too closely to principle in their pursuit of an idealized notion of self-government—recall his 
admonition that disagreeing with the Constitution need not require the dissolution of the compact 
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itself. This, to Weaver, was the dialectical position. But “rhetoric and history go hand in hand. 
The rhetorician always speaks out of historical consciousness because his problems are 
existential ones… Randolph’s style of thought and utterance was that of the statesman—
rhetorician rather than dialectician… He did not rely upon drawn-out logic for his 
persuasiveness, but rather upon ‘the world’s body’ made real and impressive through concrete 
depiction.”57 Randolph’s arguments were rooted always and forever in the context of history, 
tradition, memory—and, crucially, community.  
 The implication here is that Weaver followed the Agrarians in believing that while 
dialectic can help define the boundaries and exclusivity of a culture, rhetoric was needed to move 
people beyond the merely logical and toward an embrace of higher and more noble ends. If 
people only deal in dialectic when forming and perpetuating a culture, then all they can do is 
consider things in the abstract. In a property dispute, for example, the adjudicators of the 
community would only consider the letter of the law—even if the dispute is between a wealthy 
magnate and a starving widow clinging to her last piece of property. This would be the approach 
of dialectic, according to Weaver, and make no mistake: he believed it is essential. It is through 
dialectic that we determine what our principles are and how we might apply them as fairly as 
possible. 
 But this is not a complete view, he argued: for that, we need the equal counterpart to 
dialectic. If we consider the property dispute within the rhetorical mode of imagination, we allow 
ourselves to take external and contextual factors into account. The adjudicators wouldn’t just 
consider the status of those in dispute; they would consider it within the culture’s history and 
values and what they want themselves to be. Do they want to be a culture that favors magnates or 
widows? Do they prize strict definitions of fairness, or do they want to encourage harmony? To 
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what extent should a culture consider the rights of property, and to what extent will they relax 
their standards when they consider the consequences? 
 Weaver’s point was that cultural solidarity can only be created when the rhetorical 
imagination is given equal billing with dialectic—which, when political and policy debates favor 
variously defined facts over emotion and appeals, we seem to rarely do. The reign of dialectic 
may create a technically fair and just society, but it will not create a good or cohesive one 
because it is unable to consider anything beyond what data and strict definitions tell us. Rhetoric 
moves us upward toward some higher ideal. Without context, how can people possibly know 
what that higher ideal might be? How can they possibly form a culture around it if they resolve 
all debates through application of discrete principles? Randolph would not forsake the higher 
ideal of peace and union for the abstract principle of states’ rights; Thoreau forsook the ideal of 
community and clung to his idealized notion of autonomy regardless of the cost.58 For Weaver, 
questions of individualism ineluctably boil down to questions of the dialectic-rhetoric divide. 
Move too closely toward Thoreauvian individualism, and we abandon rhetoric: we forfeit our 
community solidarity in the name of logical definitions.59 
Solidarity, Rhetoric, and Ethics 
 It’s worth noting that the chapters on argumentation that most rhetorical scholars examine 
as standalone theories arrive in Weaver’s most well-known book in our discipline: The Ethics of 
Rhetoric. Too easily has our discipline focused on the second noun in that title while ignoring the 
first. The deep connections between rhetoric and ethics have perhaps fallen by the wayside in the 
age of the discursive turn and social construction, but the connections remain nonetheless.  
 Weaver was deeply concerned with ethical issues, which were intertwined with his 
understanding of solidarity. Indeed, among his first and most incisive indictments in IHC is that 
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since the rise of nominalism, we have all become our own priests and ethics professors—in other 
words, that we all have taken to forming our own social codes of behavior and no longer give 
thought to how we form them or to what we owe those around us, all because we no longer agree 
on any underlying transcendentals. In many ways Weaver’s portrait of modern ethics resembles 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s famous introduction to After Virtue: the foundation has been destroyed by 
a variety of corrupting -isms, and we are left to assemble the remaining pieces as best we can. 
Our system of ethics is, according to these thinkers, incoherent: it simply does not stick together 
to form anything like a true, governing system of agreed-upon principles.  
 For Weaver, such a system of principles can only emerge from a distinct culture. This 
makes his arguments for particularism and regionalism in culture especially relevant, because he 
rejected the idea of a homogenizing culture. A uniform culture that is imposed from above, he 
believed, could only bring attempts to justify all manner of behaviors and beliefs in the name of 
inclusivity. An organic culture that emerges from below, by contrast, forms an order based on 
agreed-upon principles, and it is from that order we derive our sense of community solidarity. 
Solidarity and ethics, in the Weaverian and Agrarian scheme, go hand in hand; the two are 
counterparts in the same manner as dialectic and rhetoric.  
 Ethical standards come from a culture’s “tyrannizing image,” which, like the 
metaphysical dream and the community of mind, is one of Weaver’s terms for a sort of cultural 
North Star:  
This image is the ideal of [a culture’s] excellence. The forms that it can take and the 
particular manifestations that it can find are various. In some instances it has been a 
religious ritual; in others a sacred scripture; in others a literature which everyone is 
expected to know; codes of conduct (and even of warfare) may be the highest embodied 
form. But examine them as we will, we find this inward facing toward some high 
representation. This is the sacred well of the culture from which inspiring waters like 
magnetic lines of force flow out and hold the various activities in a subservience of 
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acknowledgement. Not to feel this magnetic pull toward identification and assimilation is 
to be outside the culture.60  
 
In this explanation one can find Weaver’s key concepts of culture. A culture rallies around 
something tangible; it aims upward toward something ethereal; it excludes those who do not 
embrace something culturally universal. This tripartite structure is the basis for its subsequent 
ethical codes.  
 Consider the United States as an example. Our “sacred scripture” might be the 
Declaration of Independence: a manifestation to which we routinely offer secular prayer. Our 
“high representation” might be life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: the shared idea of what 
equally created people shall receive. And, most important, our culture rejects people who do not 
share an “identification and assimilation” with our tyrannizing image—this is why recent 
presidents speak of terrorists “hating our freedoms” and worldview. We may take ourselves to be 
a wholly inclusive country that welcomes all viewpoints, but we tend to not tolerate those who 
question the nation’s basic founding precepts. In times of terrorism or other national trauma, for 
example, we retroactively ostracize those who differ with our ideals and give them outsider 
status, ascribing ideas to them “far inferior to the democratic ideal,” as one rhetorical scholar put 
it.61 Taken together, these ideas form a rather bounded definition and picture of American 
culture. More importantly, from this definition emerges a set of nation-defining standards upon 
which most Americans agree, at least nominally: we do not violate others’ rights to pursue 
happiness, we swear fealty to democracy, and so on.  
These definitions help govern public life in the United States. However, they are still 
largely what Weaver would call dialectic-based definitions. All the above paragraph really does 
is sketch an idea of the defining boundaries of American culture. In order to move from the 
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tyrannizing image into actual practice of culture, people need something more than definitions: 
they need the rhetorical mode of imagination. This is where Weaver’s writings on culture 
become very interesting and very relevant for both our contemporary culture and our scholarly 
pursuits. He believed the “collective consciousness of the group creates a mode of looking at the 
world or arrives at some imaginative visual bearing. It ‘sees’ the world metaphorically according 
to some felt need of the group, and this entails an ordering which denotes dissatisfaction with 
‘things as they are.’”62 To continue the example above, once the United States has defined its 
cultural boundaries, it still needs “some felt need” in order to pursue truly noble ends.  
How does the “felt need” of a culture arise, and how does it inform a culture’s rhetoric 
and system of ethical principles? The Agrarians and Weaver believed that part of the reason the 
antebellum South had such a coherent ethical system is because it was fundamentally a local and 
tangible society: it stressed the interactions and experiences of everyday life, and emphasized the 
importance of those you came in contact with on a regular basis. You were not asked to feel a 
vague sense of empathy or solidarity with a person half a world away; you were compelled to 
feel it for your neighbors and your friends and your family. The South “held that society, though 
of intelligible structure, is a product of organic growth, and that a tested modus vivendi is to be 
preferred to the most attractive experiment,” as Weaver argued in STB.63 Hence, the knowledge 
and experience you gained from local exposure and experience is what makes you a part of a 
solid and organic culture. The South’s predominantly local ethical system preserved what 
Weaver called its “ideological unity, or its community of belief about certain ideas, certain 
institutions, and certain figures of history,” because it compelled a certain kind of behavior 
toward those around you.64 This is the basis of all coherent ethical systems, and it worked in the 
South because it was maintained through the customs, manners, and habits of daily life.  
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This matters for rhetoric because a local ethical system is centrally a social ethical 
system, contingent upon daily exposure and reminders about a culture’s way of life rather than 
upon abstract principles. And since “Social man is to a considerable extent rhetorical man,” we 
can only achieve a social ethical system through the rhetorical mode of imagination—which 
requires local exposure to history, tradition, and our social peers. Weaver praised John Stuart 
Mill for writing that “The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals 
composing it,” and Weaver thought that we needed to see the worth of our fellow individuals 
with some frequency in order to form a social ethical system that is more rhetorical than 
dialectical—that is, more rooted in aspiring upward toward a teleological ideal than in following 
clearly defined rules.65  
There is much for rhetorical scholars to explore here, and it is a shame that Weaver’s 
writings on solidarity and ethics go largely overlooked. He was certainly not the first to argue 
that rhetoric is good for community, or that cultural solidarity arises through interaction and 
rhetorical practice. But he was nonetheless an important voice in arguing that we need to 
resurrect the idea of rhetoric as a force for good in the community and the polis and not merely a 
tool for individual self-expression, as the Agrarians and Weaver believed modern life has 
emphasized. Rhetorical scholars have long argued that classical thinkers like Aristotle envisioned 
the good life not just as the end of the individual but also of the state: as one rhetorical scholar 
argued, “the proper end of public deliberation must be to frame laws and social policies that will 
make such a life possible for members of the community. And the instrument of that deliberation 
is rhetoric.”66 But modern life has distanced individuals from the life of the community and the 
life of the polis as it stresses a more rational, self-centered, and technical form of public life. It 
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has elevated dialectic, Weaver believed, and demoted rhetoric: the very force needed to keep a 
community together.  
The practice of rhetoric, however, requires the treatment of humans as absolute ends, 
gives us what James Herrick calls the “concept of choice as the outcome of deliberation guided 
by practical wisdom,” and leads us to exhibit “regard for people as givers and hearers of reasons, 
respect for argumentative context, and attending virtues such as rhetorical persistence.”67 In other 
words, it is a practice that insists upon real people encountering other real people and struggling 
with the messy subjectivities of real human life while developing selves and maintaining 
communities. Because the practice of rhetoric is personal and tangible, it allows little room for 
abstraction; people are forced to encounter other members of the community and to internalize 
the community’s ethical system. Rhetoric is the means by which a community creates an ethical 
system, and the means by which it maintains its sense of solidarity.  
In Weaver’s Agrarian scheme, community is the supreme concern—but the individual is 
still able to form herself within that community. Indeed, a sense of belonging to a community is 
the very thing that allows her to form herself; without it, she is ontologically and morally adrift. 
She must herself be what Weaver calls in IDT “the individual, the irreducible person [which is] 
the primary reality and the sole repository of virtue.”68 Only when she becomes that entity can 
she be a full member of the community, and the community can subsequently draw upon her 
moral strength to sustain itself. This is not today’s solipsistic individualism, driven by narrow 
definitions of what Weaver described as “the establishment of a sophistical utility as the supreme 
sanction, [which] has ended with the setting up of the bitch-goddess Success, so that today it is 
an accepted excuse of any action to say that it ‘will pay.’”69 Rather, it is a community-oriented 
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individualism: it knows that no person stands truly alone and that no person develops within a 
social and historical vacuum.  
Weaver believed this type of individualism creates morality, and this creation of morality 
necessarily incorporates the concerns of the community, because as Christopher Johnstone put it, 
“the intelligent person chooses aims and conduct with a view both toward the satisfaction of 
immediate wants and toward the maintenance of conditions that will make future satisfactions 
the more likely and extensive.”70 Johnstone argued that only concern for the community and 
stewardship of cultural life can make such conditions possible, and only direct encounters with 
“the human being as a living, experiencing creature that functions in and through relations with 
its environment” can make us look to others to help secure “moral selfhood.”71 To move beyond 
local encounters with fellow citizens is to enter the world of abstraction because we cannot 
directly grasp consequences; we fragment ourselves when we struggle with too many external 
realms of authority beyond the local. Weaver and the Agrarians therefore stress engagement and 
social life at as local a level as possible, as it was in the Old South, to help maintain the 
community and develop the self within the framework of “social bond” individualism.72 
Only when we are consistently exposed to the workings of our community, and 
subsequently gain a sense of our tyrannizing image and our community of mind, can we fully 
integrate ourselves into its ethical system. After all, only constant exposure to the concerns of 
others and daily reminders that we are not autonomous sovereigns can show us what it means to 
aim toward a noble communal end. This was the essence of Weaver’s misguided complaint 
about Thoreau: it’s easy to consider yourself a fully self-sufficient and self-formed individual 
when you live by yourself in the woods. But since we innately long for what Weaver called an 
“orientation toward something higher” than ourselves, something we did not create ourselves, we 
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must remain fixed members of a community.73 We must integrate ourselves into the community 
in ways beyond dialectical definition; we must live as if there is something more that we cannot 
always fully understand. The goal, according to Weaver, is not uniform homogeneity such as that 
insisted upon by the North after the war. There is, he wrote in LWP, “a goal higher than unity. 
Unity means oneness. The goal is harmony. Harmony is the fruitful co-existence together of 
things diversified.”74 
This “harmony” has echoes of Danielle Allen’s concept of “wholeness,” which I explored 
briefly in the last chapter. Allen argues that true solidarity and community can only arise when 
we are able to envision something beyond the self: a body in which we fruitfully coexist. She 
writes that “Citizens who hold the conviction that politics is by, for, and of the people can 
assume a place in politics only by imagining ‘the people’ and a place for themselves in, or in 
relationship to, that body… citizens can explain their role in democracy only by expending 
significant conceptual and imaginative labor to make themselves part of an invisible whole.”75 
This “invisible whole” is not unity of belief but rather something closer to Weaver’s idea of 
harmony: people working together with common solidarity and sacrificing for each other and for 
the community of mind.  
Weaver believed this harmony or wholeness is achieved through rhetoric, the ineffable 
but absolutely essential force that can move us beyond the definitions and boundaries proffered 
by dialectic. For Weaver, rhetoric wasn’t just an essential part of community and ethics: it was at 
the heart of formation of those created forces. Rhetoric, according to Johannesen et al., was for 
Weaver “axiological; it kneads values into our lives. Rhetoric is the cohesive force that molds 
persons into a community or culture… Rhetoric involves the making and presenting of choices 
among ‘goods’ and a striving toward some ultimate Good… it reflects choices and urges a 
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particular ‘ought.’”76 Weaver believed that rhetoric forms an ethical system when we imagine a 
common enterprise in our community of mind—it leads us to a noble end because it is based on 
our repeated, local, human interactions. It is, furthermore, agrarian and holistic because it insists 
upon the de-fragmentation and reintegration of social life; it compels us to consider all things 
under the heading of an inscrutable nature and a cyclical pattern of human rises and falls.  
If any thought in Weaver’s entire body of writings summarized his worldview, it is this 
one: “Rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot be justified logically… It is 
impossible to talk about rhetoric as effective expression without having a term giving 
intelligibility to the whole discourse, the Good.”77 We cannot consider rhetoric to be mere 
“effective expression,” which is the analytical approach most critics have taken when 
approaching Weaver’s work. Moreover, we cannot consider rhetoric of any kind without giving 
an intelligible term to rhetoric’s eventual purpose: since language is sermonic, as Weaver 
believed, it must instruct us and move us toward some noble end. That noble end, according to 
the Agrarians, is the cohesive community that shares a sense of solidarity. Rhetoric is what gets 
us to solidarity because it is rhetoric that tells us what is worth aiming for: not just how to get to 
a place or a feeling, but why we ought to get there.  
Sermonic Language and Cultural Solidarity 
The Southern Agrarians believed that at the heart of the derailment of Western 
civilization we would find one recurring theme: the collapse of standards of judgment, whether 
in art or in culture or in daily social life. As the Agrarians’ greatest disciple and expositor—one 
scholar of the South labeled Weaver the “Saint Paul” of Agrarianism—Weaver would take this 
indictment as his guiding assumption in all his cultural writings.78 This is where Weaver derived 
one of his key ideas: “prejudice.” We tend to read this word today in an indisputably negative 
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sense; we equate it with “bias” and “discriminate” (though this latter word has also come 
unmoored from its meaning). When Weaver and the Agrarians used “prejudice,” they meant it in 
the original, Burkean sense: as a set of pre-judgments we bring to a given situation and which is 
formed by our history, our social contexts, and our particular traditions. A “prejudice,” one might 
say, is your set of moral and ethical assumptions that innately guide your behavior.  
“Life without prejudice,” wrote Weaver, “were it ever to be tried, would soon reveal 
itself to be a life without principle. For prejudices, as we have seen earlier, are often built-in 
principles. They are the extract which the mind has made of experience.”79 The problem, 
according to the Agrarians and later repeated by Weaver, is that modern life has increasingly 
compelled us to view all cultural things as wholly discrete and decontextualized: that we are to 
approach each item in culture free of our pre-judgments—that we are faced everywhere with the 
“erasing of those distinctions” that make us individuals and make cultures unique.80 Only when 
we are allowed to retain such prejudices can we achieve cultural freedom, in the sense of 
freedom from homogenizing forces, which is the only way to achieve cultural solidarity.  
Prejudices are expressed in language, and because words stand for ideas it is language 
itself that allows us to express our history and tradition in cultural and social matters. When we 
are asked by a homogenizing culture to erase distinctions between persons, Weaver believed, we 
are asked to reject the idea that words and ideas correspond. This was troubling to Weaver, of 
course, because he saw definition as one of the central tasks of both the teacher and the 
conservative—this is why the argument from definition was so prized by him as an ethical and 
beneficial argument. Weaver’s view is essentially one of Platonic logocentrism: he believed 
words corresponded to fixed realities, and that when we corrupt those words then we corrupt 
those realities. Hence: words, like ideas, have consequences.  
 154 
At first blush this might not seem to have much to do with cultural solidarity and 
agrarianism. But to Weaver these concepts were, for good and ill, linked in the most fundamental 
of ways, and his theorizing here shows the strong influence of Ransom, Davidson, and other 
Agrarians. Recall that one of the tenets of agrarianism is that proximity to sources and 
consequences is ethically and socially beneficial, and that people must take a cosmological or 
ecological view of the world by seeing all things in relation to all other things. Doing so is the 
only path toward a cohesive culture, because if people start to view things as wholly discrete 
then they begin to fracture the oneness of organic culture. But in order to see things 
cosmologically, people need fixed points of reference—in culture no less than in astronomy.  
The view of the Agrarians is that people once had such philosophical cosmology, and 
with it came linguistic cosmology. People could rely on terms meaning the same thing to them as 
to other members of their culture. Then, according to Weaver, came the pernicious doctrine of 
nominalism and its corresponding rupture of that term-concept link. This development 
confounded Weaver, who wrote that “a society cannot remain harmonious and healthy unless its 
use of language remains pure. ‘Pure’ in this sense means stable, because fixed with respect to 
semantic differences. More precisely, the feeling is that people cannot express the same idea or 
take the same attitude toward the same thing or agree on a policy which all will follow alike 
unless there is a certain minimal identity in the signification of the signs they employ, and the 
most common of these sins are linguistic.”81 
This means that if people want a society to maintain any harmony at all, they should 
work to agree on basic definitions. If they lack basic agreement, Weaver wrote in LS, then 
“words have ceased to be a fixed medium of exchange, [and] each party that feels misunderstood 
because its meaning was not received in the form intended may react with passion, and this can 
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be the beginning of internecine strife.”82 Such strife disrupts cultural solidarity, which is the only 
way people can operate with a sense of shared purpose and common endeavor. The solution, 
according to Weaver, is for language to once again become sermonic. We think of “sermon” as 
meaning simply “preaching,” but the word’s etymology is actually a bit more complex. To 
sermonize is to preach or speak of something of moral value—to instruct, in other words, in the 
ways of a particular culture. To sermonize is to provide guidance based on fixed reference 
points. 
Seen in this light, Weaver’s dictum that “language is sermonic” becomes a mantra of 
cultural solidarity. To use language properly is to form, reflect, and preserve a culture; rhetoric is 
therefore not just a corresponding feature but indeed the driving force of cultural solidarity. This 
is because while logic can provide definition and denotation, it is the symbolic and spacious 
meanings of terms that people must agree on if they are to form a cohesive culture, because those 
meanings reveal noble or ignoble ends. “Rhetoric has a relationship to the world which logic 
does not have and which forces the rhetorician to keep an eye upon reality,” Weaver wrote in LS, 
because the concerns of rhetoric are always the concerns of the world-as-it-could-be: the world 
people imagine together and create through language.83 “With its forecast of the actual 
possibility, rhetoric passes from mere scientific demonstration of an idea to its relation to 
prudential conduct”: rhetoric is sermonic because it suggests the right path to choose, he wrote in 
ER.84 Cohesive cultures will have their own way of speaking about things that prevents outsiders 
from final understanding, because the outsiders lack the history and tradition that guide 
prudential conduct. Language, tradition, context, and guidance all go together.  
As Goodnight put it in an excellent interpretation of Weaver, “The goal of the rhetorician 
is to seek a consensus of belief. He recognizes that only when a people agree that a common 
 156 
problem exists can there be an impetus towards its solution; that only when a people agree on the 
causes of a problem and the importance of the effects can there be hope of a reasoned solution; 
and, that only when a people agree upon the definition of a problem can there be a satisfactory 
solution at all.”85 Without agreement on the situation facing a culture, its members cannot 
possibly be expected to form a community of mind and direct their efforts toward a noble end. 
When they use rhetoric and approach the situation symbolically, they inevitably form goals and 
use their historical and traditional contexts. “Men are such because they are born into history, 
with an endowment of passion and sense of the ought,” Weaver wrote in LS, and “life is 
therefore characterized by movement toward goals. It is largely the power of rhetoric which 
influences and governs that movement. For the same set of reasons, rhetoric is cognate with 
language.”86 When people use language they deal in symbols, and when they use symbols they 
come to agreement on terms, and when they agree on terms we find cultural solidarity: rhetoric is 
to Weaver, therefore, the supreme cultural force. It is the unseen glue of a society that binds its 
members to each other and to their shared purpose. 
Final Thoughts 
Speech is a mirror of the soul, the aphorist Publilius Syrus famously observed, and as we 
speak, so are we. Surely this observation is at the heart of Weaver’s understanding of the cultural 
role of rhetoric. His analysis of rhetoric’s decline in culture was inspired by Ransom in GWT and 
other works of the Agrarians: the modern human had become captivated by scientific reasoning 
and the forces of dialectic, shunning myth and history and tradition in the name of unceasing 
progress and materialism. As Goodnight writes of Weaver’s diagnosis, “Twentieth century man 
had paradoxically become a proficient knower—making great advances in the areas of 
theoretical science and technology—but had simultaneously lost the ability of channeling that 
 157 
knowledge toward a productive social order.”87 Creating this “productive social order” is the 
purpose of the Agrarian notion of solidarity.  
Noble ends and a higher purpose were Weaver’s goals for rhetoric. By “higher purpose” I 
do not mean anything in the divine realm, though Ransom’s emphasis on supernatural myth 
pervades Weaver’s writings. A higher purpose is the pursuit of the common good for a culture: 
people asking why they ought to be doing certain things, and not just how they might do them. If 
the culture is not aiming toward something, then what is the purpose of a culture? Finding the 
ought, to Weaver, was the very nucleus of activity for a cohesive culture. People know the ought 
of their culture because they are born and raised in it; they take in its history, its traditions, its 
collective memory and community of mind.  As Weaver wrote in VO, “To know the right thing, 
without mediating thoughts as to what and when, is to be native born to the culture. An 
individual absorbs his native culture as he acquires his native tongue, with the most subtle shades 
of intonation… If a culture appears arbitrary in the preferences it makes and the lines it draws, 
this is because it is a willed creation.”88 
Absorbing a culture by acquiring a tongue: this thought is at the heart of Weaver’s 
conception of cultural solidarity. When people speak the language of a culture, they do not 
simply use words as “effective expression,” nor use terms whose underlying forms they do not 
innately understand. When people are formed in a culture, they are also formed in the fixed 
reference points of a culture’s terms. Without such reference points they cannot have the “willed 
creation” that is a cohesive culture, and it is through the language based on those points that a 
culture continually renews its solidarity and “makes itself felt in the style and conventions of its 
symbolic expressions or language.”89 If man is the symbol-using animal, as Kenneth Burke had 
it, then a culture is the symbol-sharing entity.  
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Agreement on those symbols is essential, and creates a cultural covenant. According to 
Weaver: 
“A covenant—and I like, in this connection, the religious overtones of the word—binds 
us at deeper levels and involves some kind of confrontation with reality. When we 
covenant with one another that a word shall stand for a certain thing, we signify that it is 
the best available word for that thing in the present state of general understanding… the 
convention or covenant of language must be treated as absolutely binding upon us, as far 
as our human condition permits, until a change is authorized by right reason.”90  
 
When people covenant and agree on terms, Weaver is arguing here, they form a culture and 
maintain its solidarity: “Now it must be evident that this conventional function of language is not 
possible unless there lies behind it a oneness of mind.”91 One can take “oneness of mind” here to 
reflect the agrarian concept of cultural solidarity. 
Agrarian society, more so than industrial society, prizes solidarity for its emphasis on 
shared purpose. This arose from necessity: when times turn bad for subsistence farmers, they rely 
upon their neighbors for help. The goal is not just survival but community; when the Smiths help 
the Johnsons, they form something larger than each individual family. In modern society, the 
Agrarians believed, there is a much greater emphasis on separation and the lonely path of the 
individual. This is why Weaver wrote that while Chicago might be a great city, it could never be 
a great community: it is more a cluster of individuals than a group of people sharing values. It is 
hard to generate sympathy for someone eleven apartment buildings away, in other words, but 
much easier for someone who shares your fence. Solidarity in the agrarian scheme depends on 
nearness and tangibility, which compel people to align their cultural terms and definitions more 
often.92 Likewise in rhetorical criticism: when people use rhetoric to build societies and develop 
communities they are doing something greater than simply encouraging agency and opposing 
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discourses of power. They are acknowledging that symbols can and should be put to noble ends. 
They are acknowledging that the whole can be greater than the sum of its parts.  
And yet Weaver’s argument here for solidarity based on catholicity of terms poses an 
obvious problem for rhetorical scholars: how do we accept this and still confront the so-called 
“rhetorical turn” or “discursive turn” in philosophy and public life, and indeed our core belief 
that events are constructed through discourse? There is no doubt this is a lingering question in 
Weaver’s work, and one that will likely not receive a satisfactory answer. It is the tendency of 
the liberal society—and here I mean “liberal” in the philosophical sense, to mean an emphasis on 
personal freedom and individual autonomy—to gradually lose the shared foundations of a 
culture. American liberals and American conservatives alike lament the disintegration of our 
social fabric, though they find different villains on whom to pin the blame. Is Weaver right that 
the root of the problem is our failure to agree upon terms? And if so, how are rhetorical critics—
most of whom are committed to the idea that discourse is epistemic, and that the way we talk 
about things creates the reality of those things—supposed to react to this? 
The best response, I think, lies in Weaver’s roots. Weaver and the Agrarians praised the 
nearness and connectedness of the Old South. They thought the daily exposure to the customs 
and habits that revealed tradition and memory were an essential part of Southern society, which 
they saw as deeply solid and cohesive. The noble ends of Southern culture, the longing for 
something larger that helped distinguish it from the more industrial North, emerged from this 
seemingly quotidian highlighting of history and place. Solidarity, in short, was created through 
direct exposure and frequent accommodation of others. 
This is where I believe rhetorical critics can pick up on Weaver’s thesis even without 
embracing his idea that concrete realities underpin all our words. Given that we study 
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communication, perhaps rhetorical criticism can be a force for solidarity by expressing 
preference for those forms of discourse that reduce the distance between citizens. Surely the 
solidarity of civic life is improved when you know your neighbors as Tom and Susan rather than 
as mere faces in a crowd. Discourse and conversation with them on a regular basis forces you to 
know the instances where your history and tradition overlap with theirs, and thus exposure to 
them—whether in block parties, neighborhood meetings, or something larger—can help us feel a 
greater sense of shared purpose with them. We have a tendency in the United States to think of 
the activities of citizenship only in broad, political terms: national elections, acts of Congress, 
and so on. But perhaps more solidarity is formed in the quick chat with a neighbor than in the 
procedural machinations of the U.S. Senate.  
In other words, reduction of distance in communication is good for solidarity. This is a 
fundamentally agrarian and anti-cosmopolitan argument. Weaver and the Agrarians believed that 
the human is capable of only so much sympathy, and that it is far easier to feel sympathy for a 
neighbor to whom you wave every day than, say, a genocide victim in the Middle East. The 
motto for agrarian solidarity might be: Think Locally, Act Locally. If we focus our cultural and 
civic efforts on those near us, and cultivate our relationships with those with whom we share 
customs and habits, perhaps we can find greater sense of shared purpose.  
Rhetorical scholars are not just critics but also, and perhaps most importantly, teachers. 
We express preferences and values in our classes all the time, and often for the vague concept of 
“civic engagement.” An admirable goal to be sure, but how do we achieve it? Weaver and the 
Agrarians would want us to focus on engagement with those closest to us, radiating outward in 
concentric circles: in our classroom, on our campus, in our town, in our state, and only then in 
our nation. If solidarity is our goal, then we need to remake civic engagement and rhetorical 
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practice along agrarian lines. We need to eliminate the distance between those communicating in 
order to encourage a sense of shared purpose.  
Finding shared purpose often means sacrificing some portion of our individual autonomy, 
as Allen argued, or even becoming complicit in a discourse of power—even a group of activist 
citizens, adjusting to each others’ viewpoints and schedules, would meet this definition. If our 
stance as rhetorical critics—and, even more importantly, as citizens—is that such discourses are 
always and everywhere to be opposed, then what chance do we have of creating solidarity? 
Perpetual opposition to any discourse of power is an ontological cul-de-sac: it promises 
emancipation and freedom but delivers only atomism and isolation. What is the point of 
unrestricted agency and freedom from oppression if nothing is ever created with that ability? 
Why bother with effecting social change if to do so merely makes you complicit in a discourse of 
power? Opposing all discourses of power while offering no alternative save the primacy of the 
individual is not just intellectually unsophisticated but culturally stultifying. 
Weaver always praised the ordered society: one in which people recognized different 
roles, appreciated the distinctions between cultures and persons, and worked to ensure a 
continued stability in social life. This may be too authoritarian a portrait for our libertarian era. 
But even those who most vocally trumpet the rights of the sovereign individual will eventually 
acknowledge the social value of some kind of unity of purpose, whether practical or 
metaphysical. If we are interested in achieving cultural solidarity in our age of fracture, it will 
require at least a small dose of Weaver’s prescription. Rhetorical scholars should stress civic 
engagement and discourse on as local a level as possible—in terms of nearness, in other words. 
When rhetoric is locally focused, we can better form a community of mind and achieve some 
kind of consensus. Weaver’s ideas of cultural solidarity can provide a conceptual starting point.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
If words are all we have as world and god, we must treat them with care and rigor; we must 
worship.  
– David Foster Wallace 
 
When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.  
– John Muir  
 
 
Richard Weaver did not care for much of modern life. He variously inveighed against 
cities, industrialism, the degradation of language, relativism, democracy, liberalism, 
individualism, and many other things we accept as cultural givens. He has been pigeonholed, in 
our field and others, as a curmudgeon: he saw things he did not like and mounted ferocious, if 
usually lonely, crusades against them. He clung to a romanticized idea of what once was, this 
version of the Weaver story goes, and his legacy is one of unrelenting complaints about the loss 
of order, tradition, and social bonds.  
 This depiction, however, is an unfair and incomplete categorization of a wide-ranging, 
highly original, and heavily influential social philosopher. Little attention has been paid, whether 
by rhetoric or by fields like political philosophy, to other dimensions of Weaver’s arguments. 
Yes, Weaver was a critic, but to deploy that old canard of parenting, he criticized because he 
loved. As a biographer notes, Weaver “loved and cherished” his culture and background “but had 
come to see its flaws well enough so as to gain a certain detachment.”1 He saw good elements of 
the American way of life that were being slowly corroded by the forces of materialism, 
sophistry, and nominalism. Weaver was above all a preservationist: he saw good and tried to 
nurture it; saw virtue and tried to maintain it; saw culture and tried to safeguard it.  
 Weaver penned his scathing critiques of modern life and appreciations of bygone days 
mostly in the 1940s and 1950s. That we now look back on many of those years as a golden age 
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of American community and social cohesion suggests that Weaver would be horrified by what he 
would find today: a rights-obsessed culture whose members press for personal autonomy above 
obligation in all spheres; the steady decline of social bond institutions like churches and 
community groups; the displacement of cosmological explanations by an arrogant scientism that 
purports to explain all consciousness and morality through empiricism; and a relentless and 
chattering mass media that elevates spectacle over substance. Perhaps it is a better time than ever 
to reconsider the ideas of a man who waged lonely wars against these forces. Perhaps it is doubly 
appropriate to see that man as more than simply a theorist of how rhetoric ought to be used.  
 To see Weaver as only a scholar of rhetoric, arguing vociferously against corruption of 
language and sophistry in public life, is an unjust reduction of a career—akin to seeing Adam 
Smith as merely a describer of pin factories. And yet this is exactly how our discipline has 
remembered and appraised Weaver: as someone who devised an interesting, if methodologically 
tenuous, theory of argument and terminology. To see Weaver solely in this light is to make the 
very ontological mistake that the man himself saw in modern life. Just as humankind’s place in 
the world must conform to a broader cosmological vision, so too must Weaver’s rhetorical 
theories be seen as just one element of his larger project.  
 For Weaver, rhetoric was a tool for building just and moral societies. It was the means 
through which moral truths were apprehended, and the way in which a person’s underlying 
ideals and principles were revealed. To be a moral rhetor, for Weaver, was to be a moral person. 
Rhetoric must be at the heart of society because corruption of words betrays corruption of 
thoughts. To reduce this vision is to miss the stakes of the problem he was trying to diagnose. 
The battle for moral rhetoric is a battle for the souls of humans themselves, Weaver believed. 
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There was too much at stake in society, he thought, for rhetoric to be reduced to circumstantial 
arguments or supplanted by the cold rationality of dialectic.  
 In this dissertation I have argued that the best way to understand Weaver is as heir to the 
intellectual tradition of the Southern Agrarians, his teachers and friends. This in itself is not a 
novel argument. The neo-Agrarian M.E. Bradford argued that Southern Agrarianism “found its 
final completion in Weaver’s more general and sustained excursions into social theory, rhetoric, 
educational philosophy, intellectual history, and related fields… Always Weaver remained inside 
the tradition he appropriated through the Agrarians, a tradition always ‘at bay’ and always 
defensible.”2 A common conclusion in the fields of history and philosophy is that Weaver was 
the central voice in maintaining the Agrarian critique.  
 Weaver was interested not just in social preservation but in social construction: he meant 
for his criticism to spur a remaking of society along different lines—along older lines. This 
remaking requires, as Weaver quotes Nathaniel Hawthorne arguing, “love for an invisible 
hypothesis.”3 Weaver built upon this idea in ER with his notion of “spaciousness,” or ideas that 
ring true with all people in a given culture even if they lack “definite correspondences.”4 The key 
requirement for building a better society is an increased usage of and reliance upon such 
spaciousness, which people are able to recognize because there is a broadly shared definition—a 
sort of cultural enthymeme. It is a social tool that relies upon ideas of shared authority: it “is 
acceptable only when we accredit someone with the ability to review our conduct, our destiny, 
and the causes of things in general,” as he put in in ER.5 
 But how, in a pluralistic and democratic society, are we to find such sources of authority? 
Weaver’s ideas for building a better society rely, at so deep a level they cannot be sidelined, on a 
Judeo-Christian rendering of the world that allows for ultimate, Godly authority over 
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preternaturally dualistic humans. Even the most ardent Weaver supporter surely recognizes that 
such a conception is a virtual nonstarter in a thoroughly secularized America. But what I have 
argued here is that Weaver’s Agrarian philosophy—moving more closely toward sources and 
consequences; being of a place and finding culture in that place; finding spacious ideas around 
which to form local solidarity—represents a kind of secularlized version of things around which 
we can rally, and, crucially, that these things can go beyond the tired triumvirate of rights, 
security, and prosperity. For if scholars hope to recapture parts of Weaver’s project of a rhetoric 
that advances people toward noble ends, then those ends cannot derive from our current national 
idols: economic growth at all costs, efficiency as an intrinsic end, worship of technology, and 
relentless expansion of individual rights with no heed paid to obligations.  
 In this final chapter, I will take a broader view of Weaver’s ideas. I will first examine 
what rhetoric education has been and what it can again be in terms of moral formation for 
citizens, then explore how Agrarian rhetoric might be a possible model for rhetorical education 
and rhetorical criticism and contrast it with an example from contemporary scholarship. Next, I 
will discuss the main flaws and drawbacks of Weaver’s program and suggest situations in which 
his ideas might help or hinder. I will examine further the idea of solidarity, which should be of 
central concern for rhetorical scholars, and suggest an agrarian-empathic format for our work. 
Finally I will recap the main arguments of this dissertation and offer some concluding thoughts 
on Weaver’s agrarian rhetoric.  
     Rhetoric as Moral Education 
In the first chapter, I mentioned that Pat Gehrke’s study of our field’s history found that 
“growth of the soul” was once a central concern of a comparatively unified field of rhetoric. But 
the fragmenting of our field in the last half-century has mirrored the fragmenting of our society. 
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As Gehrke tells it, we began to distrust grand narratives and shifted our focus from guarding 
civilization to exposing its more unjust elements at every possible opportunity. With this 
development, and the rise of postmodernism, came a reluctance to accept that there even existed 
knowable concepts like “noble” and even “truth.” As Gehrke writes, “In place of knowable, 
objective truth came a view of truth as a product of human interactions and relations. From this 
view, rather than truth governing the operation of rhetoric, rhetoric was instead the force that 
gave the truth-value to truths. Truth, then, was a contingent phenomenon.”6 
 Worse, Gehrke says, the rise of critical rhetoric and ideological criticism turned 
rhetoricians away from seeking or instilling truth and toward what they called permanent critique 
and permanent politicization. Attention was now paid to “which rhetorical theories and methods 
were most appropriate for achieving emancipatory political purposes.”7 Scholars who opposed 
critical rhetoric and permanent critique were called “complicit in continuing the social and 
political ills against which many rhetorical theorists and critics positioned their work.”8 
I raise these issues for several reasons, all of which suggest the need for a correction in 
the path of our discipline. First, the notion of truth being entirely contingent may be appealing 
for a relativistic, socially constructed worldview, but it is also diametrically opposed to the goal 
of a liberal arts education. As rhetoric is a liberal art—chief among them, according to Weaver—
it is spurious to cast our entire field as one without some kind of higher or larger good. If there is 
no truth beyond the socially constructed, contingent version of truth, and thus nothing to which 
the human can aspire, then what is it exactly that we do as rhetorical scholars and teachers?  
 If we assume there is no truth beyond the self—and the self is always and everywhere the 
necessary center of a socially constructed world—then we have reduced rhetoric to instrumental 
reason. We have made it yet another thing that one does because there is some possibility of 
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personal gain or utility, and not because there may be some intrinsic good within it. If we can no 
longer claim an intrinsic good, as so many other areas within the liberal arts seem unable or 
unwilling to do, then we have simply redefined ourselves as the economic creatures Weaver 
bemoaned. Failure to offer a measurable economic benefit to students will result in the slow 
withering of our field.  
 Second, a stance in rhetorical studies of permanent critique is not a workable philosophy. 
We cannot train students to be opposed to every discourse of power, and to always work to 
expose any instance of power. If we do, we are offering them nothing beyond the ability to see 
some narrowly defined unfairness and deem it so. This is problematic for two reasons: first, it 
convinces students that labeling something unfair in a classroom is the same as working to 
change it; second, it weakens the authority we still claim as teachers. If we must be opposed to 
discourses of power, then we have undermined our very position as someone with knowledge to 
pass on to others. Permanent critique inadvertently leads to opposition to the discourse of power 
adumbrated by teachers at the beginning of every class.  
 Teaching someone to question every discourse of power is not education: it is instruction 
in what the novelist David Foster Wallace called “spectation”—the practice of standing on the 
edges of democratic life, rather than participating meaningfully and sincerely in that life. The 
stance of permanent critique is not just intellectually unsophisticated but in fact intellectually 
lazy.9 It is designed for tearing down power structures and only rarely for replacing them with 
something new. Weaver saw rhetoric, as most of our field once did, as a tool for building ethical 
societies. But the critical rhetoric enterprise is not concerned with this potential tool, because it 
opposes the discourse of power underlying the notion that we might build a society with laws, 
customs, and codes of behavior. Such a stance is purely theoretical, and never practical.  
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 Third, the dissolution of standards of truth and noble ends and the expansion of the 
emancipatory project mask a more troubling reality: a field cannot proceed without ethical 
underpinnings any more than a person can. At some point, the individual and the discipline alike 
must finally land somewhere—must finally decide that this is what I do and this is why I do it—
and the assumption of an ethical stance will inevitably be exclusionary in some fashion.10 I 
hasten to add that I do not advocate resurrecting the Old South, nor joining Weaver’s call for 
traditional roles for women. But people cannot proceed without an ethical stance, and it needs to 
be superior to a permanent opposition to anything that smacks of privilege or power. People use 
ethics in their own lives to build things: friendships, childhoods, standards of personal behavior, 
expectations of others. In other words, they believe that one manner of behaving is superior to 
another and they make clear their assumptions in that very behavior—they move themselves 
toward noble ends that they have defined for themselves.  
 What are the noble ends for rhetoric, both in criticism and in instruction? Is our purpose 
merely to criticize and tear down? It is one thing to defend those marginalized unfairly, but 
surely our task must not stop there; surely we must also outline a broader picture of a better 
culture. If we are going to tell students or colleagues to follow some behavior because it is better 
than another—and this occurs in the classroom and the journal article each day—then at some 
point we need to determine the ends of that behavior, and why those ends are worth pursuing. 
Agrarian Rhetoric as a Model for Criticism and Education 
 Weaver’s heretofore overlooked Agrarian education and philosophy offers a potential 
model for rhetoric’s moral center and social goals. Agrarian philosophy prizes practical 
knowledge over scientific technique, rootedness in place over abstract cosmopolitanism, and 
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community cohesion over aggregation of atomized individuals. The discipline of rhetoric, in both 
its critical and pedagogical avenues, can adopt these three concepts as a model for itself.  
 First, practical knowledge: rhetoric is about more than mere persuasive strategies, tones, 
and implied audiences. Use of symbols and language to persuade is a tremendous power, and 
such persuasion never occurs in a social vacuum where all that matters is a congeries of 
accumulated rhetorical techniques. Further, rhetoric is incompatible with mechanism; one could 
never follow a formula that says “If audience response is positive, move to rhetorical strategy 
B—argument from circumstance.” The power of rhetoric simply cannot be isolated into discrete 
strategies that can be deployed scientifically. In our own culture, saturated with the banality of 
infotainment sound bites and the stage-managed oratory of TED talks and Silicon Valley product 
announcements, it can be difficult to think of rhetoric as something more than structured 
presentation or performance. But the best rhetoric, as Burke made so clear, is that which helps us 
identify with one another in order to overcome the perpetual divisions that plague humankind’s 
majestic and mundane pursuits. Rhetoric must be about something more than sales, public 
opinion, or elections: it must move people closer together within a broader picture of 
cosmological wholeness and harmony. It must be built upon a foundation of what has come 
before in order to reach forward to what comes next.  
 This is why the practice aspect of Weaver’s agrarian rhetoric is so important. In 
agrarianism, knowledge comes not from scientific or technical thinking but from an evolving 
body of knowledge that builds upon its practitioners and traditions alike. Each generation adds to 
the whole picture of land-based pursuits; each user of the land draws from a reservoir of 
communal knowledge and experience. Most importantly, each person knows that he or she is 
participating in a broad web of agriculture and community endeavor: what happens in one field 
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affects what happens in another, and the work done in one season directly dictates what produce 
is reaped in the next. Each element of agrarian knowledge is an inseparable part of a whole—
they can never be divided into piecemeal components of the entire process.  
 Likewise with agrarian rhetoric, then: scholars must recognize that each symbol or piece 
of language exists in a whole spectrum of symbols that affect and are affected by each other. 
Weaver’s argument from definition, for example, can never be an isolated persuasive. An 
argument from definition can only truly succeed when an underlying form backs up the concept 
in both the rhetor’s and audience’s mind; when metaphysical bases for terms are agreed upon; 
and when the definition in question spaciously resonates with the broader structure of symbols in 
that particular community of mind. Far from being technical and strictly rational, this version of 
rhetoric is rooted in the shared tradition and knowledge being continuously shaped by the very 
people who act upon it.  
 To use Susanne Langer’s terms, rhetoric is not discursive but rather presentational.11 The 
former term refers to rational, strictly enumerated discourse: that which has denotative elements 
of meaning, can be defined on formulaic terms, and can be understood by the processes of 
rationality. Presentational forms, by contrast, are contextually dependent and can only be 
understood within a web of relations to the whole—they are cosmological, to use Weaver’s term. 
Rhetoric is not a set of denotative terms that can be understood through mechanistic rationality—
it is in fact closer to an art that occurs in situ and in totum, contingent upon an audience to endow 
it with metaphysical meaning and to understand it as a uniting force. A presentational 
understanding of rhetoric elevates the importance of practical knowledge even further, for only 
those schooled in a tradition of connotative knowledge can truly grasp the reach of rhetoric.  
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 Then what might a placed rhetoric look like? In chapter 3 I asserted that a metaphysical 
community of mind can only cohesively exist in a limited, tangible place. This applies to rhetoric 
as well, in Weaver’s agrarian scheme. If people are asked to broaden their community of mind to 
accommodate the maximalist ambitions of cosmopolitanism, then too much is asked of them. 
The narrowest rhetoric is often the most effective rhetoric, as people are naturally tribal beings 
who feel most comfortable inside a familiar web of symbols. When Weaver praised the placed 
rhetoric of the Old South, he was praising a community of mind that equated metaphysical forms 
with the place in which those forms arose and were perpetuated. Just as the land is inseparable 
from the agrarians who work it, so too is placed rhetoric inseparable from the inhabitants who 
invest a place with certain symbols.  
 It is a common belief in agrarianism that the land is more than its elements: a particular 
place is more than the soil, grasses, trees, and even people that compose it. It becomes something 
more when people rely upon and nurture it, and when they invest it with symbolic significance 
that transcends their own limited experience with it. Being of a place means situating oneself 
along a continuum, with the knowledge that the place predated you and will outlast you. Far 
from the dogmas of modern techno-scientific rhetoric, which encourages domination and 
mastery over nature, agrarian rhetoric fosters a sense of human limits and recognition of what is 
larger than the self.  
 Rhetorical scholars and teachers can use this doctrine of placed rhetoric to cultivate a 
greater sense of permanence and stewardship in symbol use. If rhetoric, as Weaver believed, is 
how we apprehend moral truths about self and society, then citizens need a fixed sense of how 
those truths are enacted. People need the daily repetition and daily exposure of moral truths in a 
particular place. It is not enough for them to simply hear “Be kind to your neighbors”—they 
 177 
need to see kindness enacted on the Thompson family next door. The community of mind that 
values kindness will have much more sway and significance when its symbols are seen and lived 
by its members as often as possible. If one goal of rhetoric is to overcome division through 
identification, then surely the closest and most tangible connections between people and symbols 
are the best candidates for identification. In this sense, rhetoric should be as local as possible—
that is, both the physical and metaphysical gap between rhetor and audience should be narrow. 
Successful rhetoric is that which can thrive on, and so help build, neighborly relations.  
Weaver believed a rhetorical community of mind could only coexist within a cohesive, 
intact, regional culture that existed in a certain—and limited—place. This means that citizens 
need to focus more on what they have in common than on what sets them apart. Rhetorical 
scholars have an obvious opportunity here: critical rhetoric and ideological criticism have 
focused on difference in the past three decades, and on what aspects of our identity make us free, 
autonomous, untethered beings free from oppression and domination. Unfortunately, it is the 
very bonds of community—and the normative social codes those bonds produce—that are often 
seen as serving discourses of power. Being told to act a certain way, or to embody a certain script 
in the spirit of communal cohesion, is a nonstarter in the critical rhetoric project. And yet acting 
a certain way and sacrificing some small measure of agency is exactly how community is 
formed.  
Attaching ourselves to a place, and to the rhetoric that forms in that place’s community of 
mind, allows us to look past the twin urges of mobility and progress and instead focus on being 
in that place, which can create harmony among the community of mind’s members. According to 
the scholar Peter King, “Harmony is a concern for permanence, for settlement, for what we 
might call dwelling. To concentrate on dwelling allows us to focus our actions in their fullness… 
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We dwell because we are capable of establishing and operating conventions which moderate and 
regulate our relations with others.”12 Moderating our relations to others, not perpetually striving 
for autonomy unloosed from all social constraints, is what allows us to create the metaphysical 
community of mind based on symbols with underlying forms.  
Without accommodating ourselves in some way to ends larger than ourselves, we never 
participate meaningfully in social life, and symbolic accommodation in a place is one of the 
central paths to community. Only when we accept, however marginally, the communal good of 
the noble ends rhetoric strives for do we finally become more than a collection of discrete selves; 
only then do we begin to exist as a culture in a place. Placed rhetoric is tangible rhetoric: rhetoric 
we see enacted each day by people we know and trust and live with. We are far more likely to 
accommodate ourselves to noble rhetoric when it is in service of a place to which we attach some 
sense of permanence—when the noble end is not some indefinable “progress” but is instead 
social cohesion in a place we nurture and cultivate. Agrarian rhetoric is direct rhetoric, in 
contrast to the nebulous abstractions of cosmopolitanism: it is rhetoric that moves us closer to a 
place and to our fellow citizens within that place. Agrarian rhetoric asks us to settle, to limit, and 
to grow together.  
The third component of Weaver’s agrarian rhetoric, solidarity, is the most obvious 
candidate to be taken up by rhetorical scholars—as solidarity has, named as such or not, been 
one of the central preoccupations of rhetoric for millennia. In the first chapter I defined solidarity 
as the feeling of common pursuit that comes with belonging to a specific and tangible set of 
experiences, and which helps bind one to other members of a group. Spacious symbols are one of 
the central things around which people can and do rally to find common pursuit. Indeed, we 
might go so far as to say that spacious symbols are the only things around which people rally. 
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The key point in Weaver’s idea is that the spacious symbols need to have a transcendent form at 
their base—something that a metaphysical community of mind can agree on as a noble end.  
One need only briefly survey political campaign material to see the centrality of potent 
symbols like “gun rights” and “low taxes.” But Weaver argued that a hollow solidarity is formed 
around symbols like these, which serve more to divide and isolate people into discrete 
ideological groups than to bring them together. The solidarity of Weaver and the Southern 
Agrarians is more tightly centered on the spaciousness of a community of mind. For Weaver, this 
attitude comes from the lifestyles of subsistence farmers in the Old South, whose very survival 
sometimes depended on sacrifices by others. Though privately owned, the land for these farmers 
was never something wholly separate from neighboring land, and this attitude was reinforced in 
the social relations of the farmers themselves. They helped others because they were engaged in 
the same pursuit, and because success of the community depended on the altruism and 
participation of each member.  
The subsistence farmer would not have recognized the “emancipation” at the heart of the 
critical rhetoric project, because he would not have recognized self-cultivation and self-
formation as the highest good of the autonomous citizen. The discourse of power so denounced 
by the critical rhetorician—the community that dictates standards of behavior and norms for 
daily life—was for the subsistence farmer the very thing that made daily living palatable and 
possible. The community was where one turned when she needed help, and in return for that help 
she placed the greater good ahead of her own needs and desires.  
Further, we cannot expect to build—or rebuild, as Weaver would say—a decent and just 
society if we simply assume that “society” is an aggregation of atomistic utility-maximizers, 
each one free to do as she chooses without any social constraint or thought paid to the greater 
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good. Freedom and liberty, for Weaver and the Agrarians, were not the end of the journey but the 
inception: freedom was the beginning of responsibility. Just as becoming a farmer is the 
beginning of stewardship and cultivation, so too is becoming a citizen the beginning of 
responsible and morally beneficial participation in civic life. We cannot very well rally around 
spacious symbols if we refuse to recognize what binds us to each other and what we owe to each 
other.  
 So how might rhetorical scholars encourage solidarity? First, we need to recapture the 
idea of rhetoric as a teleological endeavor. This means combining the idea of persuasion with the 
idea of teleology, giving us a way to pursue rhetorical identification while understanding why 
and for what purpose we seek that identification. If we are to teach students the means of 
persuasion, then surely we must also teach them both the responsibility that accompanies 
persuasion and the ways to understand the noble ends of persuasion—or at least the ability to 
define their and their communities’ noble ends. Merely teaching students the how of persuasion 
without also teaching the why makes our field little more than glorified salesmanship—a course 
in mere compliance-gaining without a broader understanding of the social and ethical context in 
which persuasion occurs. Making democratic solidarity or local solidarity a central goal of 
persuasion is one way to recapture the teleological dimension of rhetoric: we persuade in order to 
identify in order to pursue something together in this place. 
Second, rhetorical criticism—which, as I explain below, should be secondary to 
rhetorical education—should aim upward toward synthesis and holistic understanding, not 
downward toward increasingly specialized interpretations of texts that speak to narrow groups. 
To take an almost random example (such is the extent of critical rhetoric’s grip on contemporary 
criticism), consider an essay from a recent issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. In this essay 
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Charles E. Morris III, a prominent rhetorical critic, offers a “queer interpretation” of Abraham 
Lincoln, whom he describes as a “queer resource of troubling and propulsive indeterminacy and 
inducement regarding sexuality, which is also then intersectionally to say race, gender, class, 
age, ability, and more.”13 His goal is not to examine Lincoln’s rhetoric per se, or to find what 
spacious ideas we might find therein, but rather to contest a non-“queer” reading of Lincoln by 
rhetoricians and historians and instead reclaim him as a “contested” site: this “boundary 
queering, though long a source of heteronormative and homophobic dominance, affords 
opportunities for queer worldmaking through disruptive undoings of historically leveraged 
‘truths’ and normativities, challenges to institutional and individual violences, and enticing 
invitations to rhetorical reconstitutions.”14 
In other words, the goal of the critical rhetorician here is not to find truth but to contest 
the very idea of “truths” and “normativities.” Implicitly rejected here, in fact, is the idea that a 
communally defined noble end for rhetoric could even exist; the noble end, by contrast, seems to 
be the ability of the individual agent to engage in her own “worldmaking” by challenging 
institutional “violences” and engaging in “reconstitutions.” Anything that imposes a constraint 
on individual action—or, here, anything that suggests a truth is contained in a text—is to be 
viewed askance. I see little opportunity here for rhetoric to be a force for social solidarity. In fact, 
rhetoric here seems closer to being a force for division: something in which truth is always 
contingent, interpretations are always personal and subjective, and notions of the good are 
always relative.  
Perhaps none of this is objectionable on its face. But it’s hard to determine exactly what 
this type of rhetorical scholarship is for. Gone in Morris’ telling is Lincoln the orator, Lincoln the 
great leader, and Lincoln the iconic American unifier. Morris wants to redefine Lincoln “as a 
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mnemonic wedge and rhetorical catalyst that potentially troubles and opens reflection, 
engagement, and voice, constituting material and meaningful interventions against multiple 
injustices and violences in schools and beyond them.”15 Lincoln, to put it differently, is now a 
symbol that can be used to oppose discourses of power, to “trouble” the notion that a spacious 
idea can unite us and move us toward noble ends. To Lincoln’s famous assertion that a house 
divided against itself cannot stand, it is easy to imagine the critical rhetorician’s response: Who 
are you to tell me I’m a member of a house?16 
  Problems of the Weaver Rhetorical Program 
To this point, my analysis of Weaver’s work has largely been sympathetic, as I see in 
Weaver some valuable ideas that our field and culture might recover. But there are, of course, 
many flaws in Weaver’s views. They are often ethnocentric. They rely perhaps too heavily on 
old ways of living left behind by urbanization and industrialization. They do not leave much 
room for people who are reluctant to accept their metaphysical premises. They are sometimes 
inhospitable to pluralism, suspicious of democracy, and out of step with much of modern life. 
Here I’d like to explore two hypothetical examples—one that might benefit from Weaver’s ideas, 
and one that might suffer—in order to understand the advantages and disadvantages of his 
theories. 
An area that would do well to adopt Weaver’s Agrarian idea is charity and philanthropy. 
One of the few benefits of the massive centralization of capital in the last half-century is the 
explosion in the growth of foundations and global charities. It is easier than ever to direct dollars 
to the populations and causes most in need of help. Foundations, non-governmental 
organizations, and sprawling advocacy groups have brought new energy and focus to causes 
ranging from fighting malaria to conserving wilderness. 
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But this growth of large, centralized groups has had an unfortunate side effect that would 
be familiar to the Agrarians: abstraction of social ills from the lives of donors and supporters. 
Where people once volunteered at their local soup kitchen in order to combat hunger in their own 
region, they now tend to simply donate a few dollars to the same group at the grocery store 
checkout lane. The latter action is still beneficial, of course, but it comes at the cost of moving 
the giver a few more degrees away from the recipient. Instead of direct assistance, we are left 
with systematized and professionalized charity: one in which our donation frees us from the need 
to actually see the problem in question, and to understand its ill effects on our own lives and 
those of our neighbors. 
The political scholar and sociologist Theda Skocpol has written extensively about this 
move toward “managed” democracy and participation in American civic and charitable life. 
“Professionally run advocacy groups and nonprofit institutions now dominate civil society, as 
people seek influence and community through a very new mix of largely memberless voluntary 
organizations,” she argues.17 Large organizations like the Sierra Club, for all their undeniable 
virtues, now operate on the implied principle that once people give money, the donors have 
fulfilled their obligation to the cause and now do not have to do any of the direct work 
themselves. This is essentially an outsourcing of direct engagement and responsibility: where 
once people volunteered in person, now they give money on the assumption that someone else 
will address the problem.  
Yes, the donation of course surely still helps—but this tactic refashions charity and 
neighborly giving into detached instrumentalism: take action A, assume result B. Weaver’s 
theories on rhetoric and culture, by contrast, would insist that people avoid abstraction whenever 
possible and always attempt to move members of a community closer together. Further, a 
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coherent community of mind that bases life on the same shared symbols will always benefit from 
personal immersion in the reality of a social problem or flaw. In other words, the closer people 
can get to truly understanding what a poverty-stricken neighbor actually experiences, the better 
off the community is—and they do not defeat abstraction or create community of mind by giving 
money to a distant organization and leaving the work to someone else. They do it through direct, 
tangible involvement. 
This is the solidarity component of agrarian rhetoric: forming around a shared symbol a 
community of mind that is truly communal. Even more important, though, is place: people 
should direct our efforts at social improvement, Weaver’s theory holds, at as local a place and 
level as possible. No doubt good work is done by, say, the Gates Foundation’s effort to provide 
mosquito nets to parts of Africa, and donations to that foundation for that effort would be 
commendable. But the concept of place would instead direct a Kansan to provide assistance for 
those closest to her, radiating outward in geographic circles of sympathy. People can feel only a 
vague sense of sympathy for those suffering half a world away; suffering at a neighbor’s house is 
another thing entirely.  
Placed rhetoric is local and direct rhetoric: it is rallying around symbols and taking direct 
action in a place that truly means something to its inhabitants. If spacious symbols in Lawrence, 
Kansas, include opposition to child poverty, then the residents of Lawrence—whose dedication 
to the place presumably means something beyond mere cohabitation—should direct their 
energies to solving that local problem, rather than giving money to an abstract national 
organization and assuming the good will be done. 
There is a danger to this plan, however, and this leads to the main flaw of Weaver’s 
Agrarian rhetoric and its dictates. It is not an insurmountable problem for either citizens or 
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rhetorical scholars, but it is nonetheless a concern: what discursive and practical dangers are 
posed when a community of mind is wholly cohered around a certain symbol? Put differently, 
what happens when we are too unified? 
Take conservation in western Kansas as an example. An ecosystem of traditional 
grassland prairie has been nearly completely converted into a zone of crop monoculture, with 
native grasses uprooted and non-native plants grown widely. This has meant not just harm to the 
soil, but displacement of native animals and deterioration—and, in some cases, near-
extirpation—of entire sub-ecosystems. To make matters worse, much of the land not used by 
corporate farms is being used for oil and gas drilling. It is not just environmental scientists who 
see this as a tragic and irreversible loss for the state and the region. We are running the risk of 
entering another dust bowl phase on the Great Plains. 
And yet the support among rural Kansans in these areas for both corporate monoculture 
farms and energy drilling is quite high. In an area battered by recession and residential flight, 
these two activities represent long-sought economic growth and community development. In 
other words, the community of mind among rural Kansans has rallied around the shared symbol 
of promised economic growth and rejected the symbols of preservation and limits to 
development. They have chosen the symbol that they see as offering greater possibility for their 
place, and who can really blame them?  
The problem is that objections to this rhetorical stance—advocacy of economic growth 
even at the cost of the place itself—would quickly be dismissed by community members. The 
reason some have criticized Weaver’s views on culture and society as bordering on the fascistic 
is that a cohesive community of mind is not exactly hospitable to a diversity of viewpoints. 
When people place the community above the individual, it can be a dangerously short journey 
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from unity to exclusion. When most parties in a place agree that economic growth is a savior, 
then symbols of economic growth will quickly become argumentatively triumphant. Objections 
to such growth, or offers of alternatives, will inevitably be sidelined.  
What seems to be missing from much of Weaver’s theories is the importance of the 
detached outsider, and the necessity of an extra-regional force. This example is one of the times a 
force from outside the community of mind would be valuable. In this case, the federal 
government plays an extraordinarily important role in environmental regulation and 
conservation. National experts, with no sentimental attachments to the place in question, can 
form recommendations based upon empirical data rather than on the rhetorical community of 
mind in that place. The environmental expert here plays the same discursive role as the artist in 
so many other societies: she is outside the dominant cultural mindset, and therefore can offer 
important viewpoints that might otherwise be neglected or shunned.  
Contrary to the insistence of the Agrarians and Weaver, abstraction and distance from a 
situation can sometimes be a tremendous advantage. When we lack the metaphysical ties to a 
place that color the public debates of that particular community of mind, we gain a valuable 
perspective on what is truly important within as neutral an evaluation as possible.18 In this case, 
the forces currently creating economic development in western Kansas will more than likely 
produce a barren wasteland devoid of life, human or otherwise. As flawed, irrational beings, we 
usually elevate current benefits over future costs—but an outsider could possibly offer a more 
fair interpretation and recommendation, even if it goes against the community of mind. One 
could hardly expect people benefitting from oil drilling to take a wholly unbiased view of the 
environmental situation. But the environmental regulator from Washington certainly has a better 
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standpoint for offering an alternative than someone invested, literally and figuratively, in the 
drilling enterprise. It’s a fine line between cohesive community of mind and outright groupthink. 
The only possible rebuttal Weaver offered to this objection is not a completely satisfying 
one, and it is one I discussed at the end of the first chapter. His notion of the “outsider” or 
“exile”—that figure who has willingly left a place and who with the benefit of distance can more 
fairly and accurately judge the place’s people and symbols—probably comes closest to what I’m 
discussing here. People who break with the community of mind, according to Weaver, can 
become “temporal exiles, or anachronisms. They are left little islands of protest, or eccentrics 
whom the regime can tolerate just because it possesses so complete a mastery.”19 This is hardly a 
perfect vision of democratic dissent; surely most of us would hope that differing views would be 
granted greater status than as “little islands of protest” that are merely tolerated by a regime.  
This is the biggest problem with Weaver’s Agrarian vision of solidarity: how might we 
endeavor to see ourselves in common enterprise while still tolerating individual difference and 
objections to that enterprise? Weaver stressed metaphysical unity and resonance of spacious 
ideas that ring true with a people—but is it good if rhetoric rings true with all people in a place 
all the time? That scenario certainly smacks of intellectual tyranny.  
Perhaps the most helpful way to think about this is in terms of thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis. One intellectual community proposes an idea, another proposes a countering or 
competing idea, and over time and through the deliberative process the two are synthesized into a 
workable and mutually satisfying idea—“authorized by right reason,” as Weaver put it.20 An 
Agrarian vision of a community of mind could be structured around such disagreement and 
eventual accommodation and sacrifice.  
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At heart, this problem with Weaver’s theories is the problem at the core of democratic 
societies: how do we maintain community solidarity while still respecting individual difference? 
To err on the side of the community is to risk fascistic ideology, as the scholar and novelist 
Umberto Eco famously diagnosed it: a cult of tradition and a rejection of modernism in pursuit of 
communal cohesion (which certainly sounds uncomfortably close to the Agrarian program).21 
But to err too strongly on the side of individual difference is to enter a Thatcherian dystopia, with 
insistence that a collection of individuals never adds up to anything like a society or culture, and 
that we do not truly owe each other anything. Such a view also reflects the analytical dominance 
of microeconomic neoliberalism, with a relentless focus on individual action and a disregard for 
larger, structural, more frequently unjust forces. Hewing too closely to the primacy of the 
individual, and to the differences between those individuals, is surely no better for a culture than 
total disregard of those differences.  
There is no completely satisfying answer to this quandary to be found in the Weaver 
canon—but neither is a completely satisfying answer to be found anywhere in the history of 
Western societies. I rather like Charles Taylor’s assertion that the best and healthiest debate in 
democracies “does not aim at general truths but rather is the search for enlightening contrasts.”22 
Perhaps that term, “enlightening contrasts,” with its emphasis on dissent and disagreement in the 
service of the quest for greater knowledge and something larger than individual opinion, could 
serve as the basis for an Agrarian solidarity.  
What I mean is that objections to the community of mind should not be met with exilic 
impulses or the ejection of the dissenter, but rather with a general consideration of the objection 
in order to form a greater understanding of our culture and our selves. Perhaps the goal should 
not be unified community of mind but community of open mind: an effort at solidarity and 
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common pursuit with a healthy dose of self-examination and willingness to consider difference. 
Agrarianism, after all, is supposed to be skeptical of the certainty proclaimed by scientific 
knowledge: of all people, Agrarians should be open to the idea of knowledge changing and 
evolving over time. How else is practical knowledge to be formed if not through trial and error—
the search for enlightening contrasts? 
The most important thing to take away from Weaver’s somewhat flawed notion of 
solidarity is the virtue of the attempt at community cohesion. For Weaver, rhetoric was the force 
that broke down boundaries between us and attempted to fashion a more complete social whole 
from the assembled democratic parts. When he lamented the decline of spacious rhetoric, his 
point was not entirely to lobby for the resurrection of a bygone intellectual hegemony. His true 
lamentation was for what was lost: discursive rallying points for members of a community. 
When we have fewer symbols in common, he thought, we are worse off as a society and culture. 
When we forsake attempts at forming greater community, we lose something of ourselves.  
Consider political life in the United States today. With its dreary roster of special interest 
groups, lobbying firms, and thickly cloaked political action committees, political activity often 
seems centered around protecting only the individual interest of this or that elite and moneyed 
group. When the Koch brothers, to take a local example, lavishly fund an effort to weaken 
environmental regulation, their goal is hardly to improve community well-being—it is, 
admittedly and transparently, to improve the profits of their business and so their personal 
fortunes. This is virtually the definition of self-interest at the expense of community, since the 
subsequent gains go directly and completely to the brothers themselves. The rhetoric deployed in 
the anti-regulation effort is not rooted in spaciousness and never aims to aid, or even to address, 
community. It is merely the primacy of individual gain. 
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I have suggested here that the critical rhetoric project unintentionally performs the same 
rhetorical move: it focuses too much on endless categories of individual difference with too little 
attention paid to how those categories might be reassembled into a beneficial whole. Even if it 
does not work perfectly, what is admirable about Weaver’s rhetorical program is that it places 
great emphasis on reassembling that whole: on recognizing, accommodating, and eventually 
transcending individual difference in pursuit of solidarity. This may not strike us today as 
entirely flawless—but what aspect of democratic life is? 
The problem with critical rhetoric is that, in its zeal for finding oppressive discourses of 
power at all times in all places, it becomes “a totalistic formulism that erodes the empathy and 
critical self-reflexiveness that gave leftism its original life,” as Celeste Michelle Condit put it.23 
Rather than searching for enlightening contrasts, the critical rhetorician is forever arguing for a 
general truth that to support forces greater than the individual is to reinforce hegemony by 
default. Small wonder that such theory, according to Condit, “threatens to become a cookie-
cutter template rather than a critically reflective way of thinking that attends to specific 
conditions and realities.”24 It is these “specific conditions and realities” that should be the 
rhetorician’s main focus, since we are concerned with how discourse acts and reacts in the 
material world, and especially with how we might create discursive—and thus material—
solidarity.  
But critical rhetoric moves away from concern for specific conditions in its enthusiasm 
for high theory and in seeing that theory totalized through indictments of discourses of power. 
Condit argues, “When old perspectives become so rigid that they act as blunt weapons rather 
than delicate instruments, or when they shatter on impact with the material world, then it is time 
to move back to experience.”25 Our current fractured moment, with greater social atomization 
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and political gridlock than ever, is the collision with lived experience that shatters the critical 
rhetorician’s vision of society.26 In the same way that Wittgenstein abandoned his philosophical 
atomism once he realized it did not provide a workable framework for living a real human life, 
so too must we move forward to whatever comes after critical rhetoric.  
For Condit, this would mean a rhetorical approach fostering “a complex mix of liberal 
respect for the desires of the embodied human person and social concern that all individuals have 
the necessary communal support to survive and grow.”27 Condit’s preferred rhetorical approach 
is deeply agrarian, focusing first on the “tenet, held by many human groups, that the central 
value is care for all living things,” which “encourages the attempt to achieve an empathic 
orientation to all around us.”28 This is remarkably close to Weaver’s vision of agrarian rhetoric’s 
role in a local culture: rooted in the cyclical nature of life, focused on how we attach to others, 
and respectful of the type of knowledge gained through personal encounters with the community. 
Attaining an empathic orientation to our community members is not easy. Most good changes 
take time. Even the historical objections to the prevailing American community of mind we’d 
most praise today—civil rights, safe working conditions, and so on—did not immediately 
resonate, to say the least, with dominant opinions.  
The Agrarian scheme may not create perfect conditions for social solidarity. But neither 
does critical rhetoric, which insists that no knowledge or opinion can be said to be any better 
than any other knowledge or opinion, thus making solidarity around knowledge or opinion 
impossible. This view, however, fails to recognize that opinion need not be absolutely certain to 
be practical, effective, and beneficial. Stephen Toulmin’s famous example was medical 
knowledge: we may not know with absolute certainty that a treatment will work, but we can still 
make an educated guess based on the circumstances. He wrote, “If absolute agreement is too 
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much to ask in the technical context of clinical medicine, must not the moral realm, too, leave 
room for honest and conscientious differences of opinion?”29 
Toulmin’s point was that we should abandon the dream of finding a universal science of 
human society and instead embrace the messiness of particularism. Agrarian rhetoric, with its 
emphasis on how life is actually lived on the ground by real people rooted in practical 
knowledge, has a better chance of creating conditions for solidarity than any totalizing and 
abstracting theory. This could be aided by Weaver’s old-fashioned rhetoric: forming a well-
reasoned persuasive argument and airing that argument in a public forum, with the goal of 
helping discern moral truths about a particular community of mind. This kind of rhetoric is based 
on what Toulmin called “fields of substantial argument,” or those conditions in which truth is 
based not on scientific logic but on the needs of the situation.30 This kind of rhetoric also 
acknowledges that persuasion and spacious symbols must always include the thoughts, opinions, 
and beliefs of real people who live real lives. Agrarian rhetoric, unlike critical rhetoric, allows 
that people are more than mere subjects to a discourse of power.  
Weaver’s ideas are not perfect. His views on rhetoric and culture are not a cure-all for our 
democratic ills. But they lead to a proposition for contemporary rhetoric: those symbols which 
move us closer together in solidarity are to be admired; those which drive us apart are to be 
viewed with an extra dose of skepticism. Identification with each other, in other words, should be 
our goal. This need not preclude individual difference, but it should place the burden of 
argumentative proof on the objecting party and compel them to justify the difference with the 
community.31 An honest and conscientious difference of opinion, taking into account and 
acknowledging what others hold true, is worth airing even if it breaks with the community of 
mind. 
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Critical rhetoric seems to take the value of individual difference as a general truth, when 
it should actually be used to offer enlightening contrasts. Contrasts can be accommodated and 
assimilated; claims to sole truth through totalizing theory generally cannot. Incorporating 
individual difference into solidarity takes time but is possible, and acknowledges that we aim 
upward toward something greater when we make some sacrifice for each other.  
Rhetoric, Aiming Upward 
“There are no goals of labor like those of the cathedral-builders,” Weaver wrote.32 He 
meant that they treasure their work because they see it as contributing to an overall cosmological 
order that exceeds themselves, in which each member is aware of a certain role in society and of 
a subordination to the greater good. He contrasted this type of work with that of the modern 
citizen, who toils in an anonymous, wealth-driven society with no regard for how individual 
activity defines and shapes the soul. He took a similar view of rhetoric and language: if we do 
not see rhetoric as something that “moves men towards noble goals,” then we debase our 
language; if language is debased, then the transcendent forms behind language are forgotten.33  
 Weaver’s works, I believe, offer us a new—which is to say old—vision of what our 
discipline could be. We need to return to a framework based upon rhetoric as a moral force: a 
tool, yes, but a tool that should lead toward a noble and intrinsically good end. Our goal, as both 
teachers and critics, should be to remember Weaver’s central lesson: that rhetoric is not merely a 
collection of appeals and arguments, but is instead a force for advancing the good life for 
humans and for society. We should not be afraid to instruct such ideas nor to deploy such ideas 
in our criticism, which ought to contribute in some way to Weaver’s project of building a society 
rather than simply criticizing it.   
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I have written this dissertation as both diagnosis and recommended cure—both broad 
examination of a specific thinker and specific critique of a broad field. I have done so because 
Weaver’s ideas have not received the comprehensive scrutiny they deserve from our field; 
because rhetoric once again could use a firm ethical foundation that will form a broadly accepted 
axiological standpoint; because the project of critical rhetoric has weakened our own conception 
of how and why rhetoric should be taught; and because rhetoric is needed to move citizens 
toward noble goals that create solidarity. 
At the heart of all of this is language. Weaver called it “sermonic” for a reason: because 
the terms people use for things matters in a way that few other things matter. When people 
collectively call a thing by a certain name, they agree on its properties and its consequences and 
its metaphysical bases. What people call “patriotism” matters for civic life and for questions of 
tyranny and dissent. What people call “democracy” matters for both electoral processes and basic 
questions of fairness in governance. When people disagree on what a terminology stands for—
see the current debate over what a “marriage” is, or what constitutes “torture”—it leads to social 
division and even conflict. Disagreements over terminologies prevent people from achieving a 
state of identification with each other. They prevent people from moving toward social cohesion 
and a harmonious society. 
I have argued here that the tripartite scheme of agrarianism—practice, place, and 
solidarity—represents a structure for a more noble rhetoric as laid out by Weaver. First, practical 
knowledge and tradition must inform rhetoric as something closer to an art experienced in the 
moment than as a skill deployed formulaically. Second, rhetoric should strive to be as locally 
placed as possible, both to build a culture and to achieve a solid and coherent community of 
mind. Third, the goal of rhetoric should be a focus on what can bring people together in 
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solidarity and move them toward collective noble ends. I said earlier that agrarian rhetoric is 
direct rhetoric, in the sense that it shortens the distance between the self and the community, and 
between the term and its metaphysical basis, and between each of person and their sources and 
consequences.  
People’s terms reflect their thoughts and moral foundations, Weaver believed. If people 
are confused about their terms then they are confused about who they are and what they believe. 
They need agreement on terms to have even a chance for agreement on social structures and 
questions of the good life. At some point, according to Appiah, people must choose a script in 
order to live—and the script they choose reveals that they value some things more than others, 
some ideas more than others, and indeed some people more than others. Our discipline, 
according to Gehrke’s study, once chose a script similar to that advocated by Weaver: one that 
saw rhetoric as a force for growth of the soul and for preserving civilization. Our current script is 
much more muddled.  
Fields like chemistry and classics, for all their undeniable virtues, rarely have a moral 
component as they are deployed in society. It is both the burden and the opportunity of our field 
that rhetoric is charged with such a task. The human is both homo narrans and homo ethicus; we 
tell stories and make ethical judgments because both are required for humans to build a society 
together. Weaver’s views, however imperfect they admittedly are, may offer us a way to 
recapture part of that endeavor. No, Richard Weaver did not care for much of modern life. But 
grant him this: he wanted to preserve and expand something that would enable people to live 
good and noble lives.   
 “There are but three ways for language to affect us,” Weaver wrote. “It can move us 
toward what is good; it can move us toward what is evil; or it can, in the hypothetical third place, 
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fail to move us at all.”34 If we decline to move people toward what is good, or even the attempt 
to define what is good, then we shirk the moral responsibility of rhetoric itself. We have enough 
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